

Comparative Analysis of "the Embedded" Stories between Japanese and US Media during the War in Iraq: A Comparative Study of Political Communication

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Introduction

This paper has two objectives. First, this study briefly reviews the history of political communication research. Political communication is an emerging subfield of political science which encompasses not only traditional communication studies during elections, but also agenda-setting in politics, rhetorical communications of political leaders, and normative theories on the relationship between politics and the media. Recently, advances in the techniques for cross-cultural and comparative studies are shedding important new light on political communication studies. In each area, seminal studies have broadened the horizon of the political communication subfield itself. The widening of the subfield is accounted for by the changing environment of the political process.

Second, as a case study of comparative political communication research, this work focuses on newspaper stories of "embedded" journalists during the War in Iraq. Specifically, stories of Japanese and US newspapers (*the Asahi* and *the New York Times*) are compared and analyzed for their similarities and differences. Although both papers sent their correspondents to Iraq to embed troops of the coalition forces, content analyses of the articles conclude that journalists from the two papers presented quite different views of the war, including evaluations on the everyday developments in battalions, and journalists' sympathy with members of their units with which they were embedded.

I. Political Communication as a Subfield of Political Science

Political communication is an emerging subfield of political science. The

widening of the subfield can be attributed to the gradual change surrounding our political process. Specifically, the media has been more involved in virtually all aspect of the political process; thus, the relationships between the mass media and political actors have been undergoing a transformation over the past few decades. Looking at the transference of political models and theories across political systems, researchers of political communication as well as other subfields of political science have broadened their perspectives.

Political communication is defined as the process by which a government, the media, and citizenry exchange and confer meaning upon messages that relate to a wide scope of politics and society (Perloff 1998, 8). To put it differently, political communication is a transactional process of messages among political actors. The messages are concerned broadly with the governance or the conduct of public policy.

The study of political communication analyzes the construction, sending, receiving, and processing of political messages (Arota and Lasswell 1969). The message senders may be journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, members of interest groups, or private unorganized citizens. The recipients can be citizens as well as political actors, such as politicians. Since the senders can be the message recipients, and vice versa, political messages always create interdependent relationships between the message senders and recipients.

A distinguishing characteristic of a political communication study is that a political message is the center of attention. Political communication scholars investigate political messages which provide political effect on the thinking, beliefs, and behaviors of individuals, groups, institutions, and whole societies in which they exist. The impact may be direct or indirect, immediate or delayed. Direct messages may relate to political activities, such as an appeal for votes, or an appeal for support of a particular policy. In the indirect mode, messages may create images of reality that affect political thinking and action by political elites and the public at large. The impact of messages can be manifested quickly by "instant" public opinion polls conducted after a televised political debate (e.g., Jamieson and Birdsell 1988). The power of messages, however, may be latent and observed later. In a series of famous "cultivation analyses," George Gerbner argues that political messages from the media have gradually shaped our political orientations—whether we pay a particular attention to the messages

or not. According to Gerbner, this is because people consume vast amount of information from the media for a long period of time, and therefore, there is no such thing as a "light viewer" of television in terms of its impact on them (e.g., Gerbner et.al. 1982).

Although political communication is one of the oldest areas of political studies, as a subdisciplinary area of political science it is one of the youngest. Nimmo and Sanders (1981) suggest in their seminal *Handbook of Political Communication* that political communication emerged as distinctly cross-disciplinary in the 1950s. Despite its newness, it has made remarkably fast progress in exploring a variety of topics, such as analyzing the communication by political leaders, examining images created by the mass media and other sources, and probing how people process information. The relevance of political communication in particular has emerged with the rapid growth of the media, especially television. Nowadays, it is perhaps an understatement to declare that mass media play a pervasive role in political life in industrial nations.

It might be a common misunderstanding that political communication is concerned only with elections. This is because political communication research has been developed with the growth of elections studies. Elections provide unique opportunities for political communication scholars to analyze the relationship between the media, politics and society. Specifically, each election produces numbers of significant panel studies and other kinds of surveys, many of which satisfy the demands of scholars who seek an ample amount of data to analyze the impact of political messages.

Indeed, the history of political communication research is akin to the history of election studies. When political communication studies started in the mid-1940s in the United States, they were based largely on the "hypodermic (needle) hypothesis." In contrast to the view that audiences are active, "hypodermic hypothesis," also known as the "bullet hypothesis," was predicated on the notion of audience passivity. Exposure to media messages were equated with its absorption by the receiver in its original form (Greenberg and Salwen 1996, 64-65).

Armed with the hypodermic theory, political scientists began to investigate the impact of mass media stories on voting decisions. They expected media impact to be profound. Unfortunately for the progress of political

communication research, the voting studies, including epoch-making works by Lazarsfeld et al.(1944), Berelson et al. (1954), and Campbell et al. (1960) did not find the expected effects. Consequently, hypodermic theory became discredited and "minimal effects" theory came into fashion. According to these minimal effects theory, applied primarily to mass media messages, election news was insignificant, compared to other choice criteria such as party identification or group allegiance.

Studies of mass media influence on elections have rekindled since the 1970s. This is largely because the notion of media importance in election contests found a contradiction with the "minimal effects" theory (Patterson and McClure 1976; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). These renewed investigations, rather than looking for universal effects, tried to discover under what conditions effects might occur. For instance, interested voters and political experts might be more and differently affected by media than disinterested citizens and political novices. This new approach to research, which confirmed such differential effects, coincided with major social and political changes that affected the interaction between media and politics.

When questions arose about the impact of political advertising during elections, numerous researchers turned their attention to this long neglected array of messages (Diamond and Bates 1988). Advertising content has been examined, with particular emphasis on the balance between issues and images and on the messages conveyed by visual images. Political commercials also appear to be an important source of information for disinterested, poorly informed voters (Owen 1991; Maeshima 2005).

Also, the analyses of the agenda-setting function of the media are derived from election studies. Agenda-setting research posits the notion, based on Cohen's (1963) assertion, that the media do not tell us what to think, but what to think about. Shaw and McCombs (1972) first tested the agenda-setting principle during the 1968 presidential campaign and provided evidence that the agenda of issues communicated by the media became the agenda of issues salient to voters.

The Agenda-setting function of the media has been such an influential approach in political communication research that the notion of agenda setting of the media has been applied to wider occasions in the process of public policy.

Thus, it has been considered separately from the election studies. In the field of US legislative studies John Kingdon synthesizes elements of agenda setting in US public policies in his seminal work, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (2003). Kingdon argues that issues gain agenda status, and alternative solutions are selected, when elements of three "streams" come together. One stream encompasses the state of politics and public opinion (the "politics stream"). A second stream contains the potential solutions to a problem (the "policy stream"). The last stream is the "problem stream" which occupies the attention of government officials who want to generate public policy proposals to ameliorate the problem. These streams usually run somewhat independently until something happens to cause two or more of the streams to meet in a "policy window." This "policy window" provides a possibility of policy change. In Kingdon's agenda-setting model, the media is portrayed as a sometimes powerful outsider, although the media is not a direct participant inside of government. This is because how the media cover and what they cover (and don't cover) may have a direct bearing on the saliency of an issue. Nonetheless, Kingdon finds in his interviews with policy participants that the importance of the media may vary from one type of policy participants to another, and concludes that the media have much less effect on governmental policy agendas than he had anticipated (Kingdon 2003, 57-61).

Although political communication research has been centered on election studies, the subfield has been more and more inclusive in its scope and methods. Political communication has been interdisciplinary because the questions raised by it require political scientists to draw on sister disciplines, such as political psychology and comparative politics, as well as outside the field of politics, such as rhetorical communications and journalism theories. Thus, the conceptual underpinnings of political communication studies are diverse and largely borrowed from these sister disciplines.

Psychological analysis has been adopted by political communication scholars since early 1980s. How human beings process political information is specifically the matter of most concern. The media stimuli are transformed by audiences who bring their own cognition and feelings to bear in the process of extracting meanings from them. Psychological approach has been grounded in a variety of information-processing theories. Among them, schema theories are

currently enjoying the broadest support. According to the theories, people develop mental models about various aspects of their world on the basis of direct experiences and information transmitted by mass media and other sources. Such schemata guide information selection, provide the framework for assimilating new information, and furnish the basis for developing repertoires of inferences (Graber 1988).

A number of scholars have focused on the use of presidential electronic communication as a political tool to overcome congressional opposition (Kernell 1993; Tulis 1987; Lowi 1985). Instead of trying to negotiate with congressional leaders, presidents now appeal to the country by "going public" the electronic media, such as television. If the president is popular, the public is likely to rally around him, making it difficult for the Congress to deny approval. Even before presidents go public, the possibility of such action may persuade members of congress to succumb to presidential wishes. Also, there has been a moderate degree of interest in analyzing the rhetoric of political executives, primarily at the presidential level (Hart 1984, Edelman 1988). The interest in this has been based on the assumption that presidential messages are potent political stimuli because they emanate from the top official of the country. The power or lack of power of the message sender is transferred to the message itself. According to this point of view, one needs to know the senders' political role and orientations to accurately interpret message meanings.

Political scientists and communication scholars disagree about whether media content is shaped primarily by proponents reflecting the right or left side of the ideological spectrum. Scholars like Robert and Linda Lichter and Stanley Rothman (1986) have argued that media elites who work for the leading news media lean to the political left, relying on sources holding biased views. Scholars like Lance Bennet (1988) and Benjamin Ginsberg (1986) consider media to be the minions of big business and right-wing politicians. They suggest news selections by the media have strengthened white middle class values and suppress competing left-wing views. Some critics, most notably Noam Chomsky (1988), contend that these choices are made deliberately to perpetuate a capitalist exploitation of the masses in line with the ideological preferences of media owners.

II. Comparative Political Communication Studies

Among these new approaches, the most remarkable development in recent years is that political communication subfield has become more intercultural and has adopted new theories and methodologies to compare political communication systems across countries. Until 1980s most political communication scholars have conducted their research only within one set of societal boundaries up. However, political communication researchers have laid the groundwork for comparative research, and several studies have attempted to compare the differences of media content and media systems that exist between or among nations.

Comparative political communication studies examine political messages in diverse societies and study its effects and ramifications cross-culturally. It goes without saying that it is important to examine political communication systems from various cultural perspectives. Examining the relationship between politics and the media in other societies permits us to see a wider range of political alternatives and illuminates the virtues and shortcomings in our own political system. By taking us out of the network of assumptions and familiar arrangements within which we operate, comparative analysis helps expand our awareness of the possibilities of studies in political communication (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990).

It is interesting that the comparative analysis of political communication also has started with elections studies. Election messages and depictions of public officials have been compared in various countries (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995; Semetko et al. 1991; Swanson and Mancini 1996). That literature pay particular attention to four key elements that the modern US model of election campaigning have adopted in many countries in recent years. The four key elements in the US model are: 1) the perpetual dependency (interdependency) of mass media, 2) the personalization of campaigns (US-style "candidate-centered" campaign, as opposed to "party-centered" traditional elections), 3) the frequent use of public opinion polls, and 4) a general professionalization of campaigns, such as the advent of election consultant. Looking at the four elements, scholars examine the extent to which electoral politics in a particular country has been affected by the US model.

The comparative analysis of political communication has been focusing on

other areas than elections as well. Generating theories is another centerpiece of comparative research of political communication. Regarding the government-media relationship, Blumler and Gurevitch point out that the media systems in different nations can be classified as more or less subordinate to, or autonomous from, political institutions, depending on the degree of state control over mass media organizations, the degree of media/political elite integration, and the nature of the legitimizing creed of media institutions (Blumler and Gurevitch 1996).

Hallin and Mancini (2004) examined the principal dimensions of variation in media systems and the political variables based on a survey of media institutions in eighteen West European and North American countries. They developed three major models of media system development to explain why the media have played a different role in politics in each of these systems: the Polarized Pluralist, the Democratic Corporatist, and the Liberal models.

According to Hallin and Mancini, the Liberal Model in Britain, Ireland and North America is characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms in media industry. The Democratic Corporatist Model in northern continental Europe have a system that tied the coexistence of commercial media to organized social and political groups with a relatively active but legally limited role of the government. The Polarized Pluralist Model in the Mediterranean countries of southern Europe is in the counties where the development of commercial media is weak and the government is very strong; thus, where the media is integrated into party politics.

Along with these theory-generating studies, many comparative case studies have been conducted recently. Some of them have attempted to empirically test the above-mentioned theories. Most of these studies are comparisons between the content of coverage of a specific event in two countries' representative media. Notably, many of these comparative case studies suggest that the government-media relationship may significantly influence the differences and similarities in media content.

Soesilo and Wesburn compared the accounts of the "Crisis in the Gulf" constructed by a leading American newspaper, *the New York Times*, and a leading Indonesian newspaper, *Kompas*. Their study suggests that the Indonesian newspaper discussed the position of the Iraqi government more frequently than

did the New York Times. Also, it framed the news of the "Gulf Crises" in terms of its implications for the political economies of the Third World nations more than twice as often as it identified its implications for the West. By contrast, the New York Times discussed the position of the American government more frequently than the position of the government of Iraq in relation to Iraq's actions as a threat to the political economy of the West and, more generally, as a threat to world order, thereby legitimizing American policy — at least in some Western eyes. In addition, both countries' leading newspapers exhibited their own patterns of selective omissions: While the Indonesian newspaper failed to cover alleged human rights violations and made no reference to the principle of sovereignty of nations in explaining the "crisis," the New York Times paid little attention to expressions of dissent over U.S. policy in the Gulf region prior to the outbreak of war. Soesilo and Wesburn attribute these differences to the relation between the Indonesian government and the press. Indonesia's ties to both the United States and Iraq led its government to adopt a neutral position in the unfolding conflict. According to the scholars, Kompas, as a developmental press normatively committed to supporting the policies of its government, reported the crisis in ways that helped legitimate this stand (Soesilo and Wesburn 1994).

Another intriguing study is about the comparison between Chinese and U.S. leading network news. Tsan-Kuo Chang and Jian Wang compared the television network news contents between the United States' *ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings* with *CCTV (China Central Television) News*. According to these scholars, the domestic news on CCTV tended to be ritualistic and progressive in that events and issues often revolved around current national efforts and governmental activities or achievements in moving the country forward, including collective concern and action against such natural disasters as flood and drought. By contrast, ABC's domestic news avoided the trappings of dignitaries and civic boosterism, focusing instead on telling stories that drew upon and reproduced institutional and social structures. Its foreign news, on the other hand, exhibited a pattern that persistently built on American ideas and interests, especially in the stories about racial problems and homeless veterans. It was concluded that the selection and presentation of news by the two networks depended not so much on the properties of the event or issue itself, but rather

on the media's positions in the broader social structure relative to their external context (Chang and Wang 1998).

Many scholars have attempted to understand the relationship between the media and politics during the Iraq War. Most of these studies are concerned with situations within a boundary of one particular country, chiefly within the United States. Yet, several scholars have started to analyze the media and politics in the war with a comparative perspective (Maeshima, 2006). In the following section, I will explain my research in comparing stories written by "embedded" journalists during the war in Iraq as a case study of comparative political communication work.

III. A Case Study of Comparative Political Communication Research: Comparing "the Embedded" Stories of the Japanese and US Media during the War in Iraq:

As a case study of comparative political communication research, the second part of this paper focuses on a comparison of newspaper stories written by "embedded" journalists during the war in Iraq. Specifically, the contents of the stories of Japanese and US newspapers, *the Asahi* and *the New York Times*, are compared and analyzed for their similarities and differences. Content analyses of the articles suggest that reports written by embedded journalists from both papers were very personal and realistic, and were focusing on small details in the field. However, the reports of the two papers presented quite different views on the war, both in their evaluations of the everyday developments in the battlefield and in journalists' sympathies with their units to be embedded.

"Embedding"

Arguably, "embedding" was the most controversial aspects in political communication during the Iraq War. "Embedding" is not the first invention of the Iraq War. It is a conventional practice for the media to report a very real image of the battleground for the audience in the US and the world. During the war in Vietnam, however, the images from photographers and television broadcasts of war brought the horror of the situation into the home of Americans. Thus, the US government attempted to control the news media's coverage of the hostilities as the war dragged on, especially since the Tet Offensive in 1968, which is believed to be a turning point of the war. Similarly,

the media complained that they were being denied access to the battlegrounds of Kuwait during the first Gulf War of 1991 (Davis, 2001, Chap. 19). After decades of battling reporters who demanded access to frontline troops during combat operations, the Pentagon finally allowed journalists to join a military unit involved in an armed conflict during the war in Iraq.

What is unique about "embedding" during the Iraq War is the fact that the Pentagon systematically resumed the old convention in order to appease the media. The Pentagon found that embedding was not only a way to ease decades of hostility and mutual suspicion in the media, but also it was another public relation strategy designed in large part as a means of waging information warfare against Saddam Hussein.

The US government allowed about 500 reporters and photographers from around the world, both print and electronic media during the war in Iraq. They were indeed given unprecedented direct access to the battle frontline. These so-called "embedded" reporters were on the ground in Iraq, ate and slept alongside soldiers and reported on firefights and artillery onslaughts at first hand. The world was getting an unprecedented look at war as it happens.

Among 500 embedded reporters, many were American press. Major US media organizations, such as the New York Times or the Washington Post, were allowed to send dozens of journalists. The international press also received certain slots for embedding. The BBC from the UK had 16 embedded reporters in Iraq. In Japanese print media organizations, three from Kyodo, two from the Asahi, and one from the Yomiuri were permitted to stay with US troops in addition to the Asahi journalists. Among electronic media, four from NHK(Nihon Hoso Kyokai) two from Fuji television and NNN (Nippon Television Network) were embedded (Nojima, 2003, 22).

The practice of "embedding" reporters makes compelling journalism; however, some warn of the dangers of losing independence. First, restriction about the content of reports was a matter of concern. Although the Pentagon claimed that there has been no censorship, there were several rules about reporting set by the US forces. For example, journalists could not give specific details about the locations or outline the future plans of their unit. Thus, some critics feel that the level of media censorship by the Pentagon was too strict, and media organizations struck a Faustian bargain by agreeing to become

embeds and consequently losing their objectivity (Brandenburg, 2005). In addition, some suggest that embedded journalists made reports that were so sympathetic to the American side of the war that the objectivity of their story might be endangered. There is a strong possibility that sympathy was likely to develop between embedded journalists and soldiers since journalists were protected by the soldiers in the field (Schechter, 2003).

Several scholars have attempted an empirical examination of the media content of embedded journalists, but the results about how much embedding affected the contents are mixed. Some suggest that coverage of the Iraqi conflict by embedded journalists becomes more problematic when it is subject to closer analysis (Schechter, 2003). Some argue that embedded journalists produced some favorable coverage of the military in the first few days of the war, but the media did not much compromise their objectivity overall by being embedded in Iraq (Pfau. et al., 2004; Aday et al., 2005).

Research design

In order to expand studies on embedding, this paper contain a different attempt to analyze the impact of embedding, namely by comparing articles written by the embedded journalist of both the Asahi and the New York Times.

The Asahi sent two of their staff writers to embed in the coalition forces. One is Tsuyoshi Nojima embedded in the First Marine Division and the other is Ishihara Takefumi embedded on the Aircraft Carrier Kittyhawk. Needless to say, the First Marine Division was a ground troop. The Division was assigned to attack Baghdad, moving up from the Southern tip of Iraq. The Aircraft Carrier Kittyhawk was stationed in the Persian Gulf where it was considered the safe zone with a smallest possibility of counterattacks by the Iraq forces. Since Nojima's assignment was in the actual battleground, his reports are more important for this analysis.

Using the Asahi database *Kikuzo*, there are 24 articles written by Nojima during the period in which major combats occurred (between March 20 and May 1, 2003). Most are written when he was in the field, and some are memoirs after he left the battalion. Nojima was asked by editors of the Asahi to cut his assignment short and leave the field in early April 2003, when his troop was heading for Baghdad. This is because the editors found that it was too

dangerous for him to continue his duties in the field after they read Nojima's experience during the assault by Iraqi forces in Nasiriyah (Nojima 2003, 87). Among his 24 articles, three are reports on preparations for an interim government in the area where Iraq forces were ousted and these were written after he left the field, they are excluded from this analysis.

In the New York Times articles, it is noticeable that almost all the embedded stories contain words in their headline such as "in the field 101st Airborne" or "With the troops—First Marine Division." Also, every headline starts with either such phrases as "A Nation at War" (March 20 to April 20) or "After Effects" (April 21 to May 1)." During the period of analysis, the New York Times sent fifteen reporters in the field. These writers' embedded stories are found in *the NexisLexis* database. In the alphabetical order, they are: C.J. Chivers (twenty-five articles), James Dao (fourteen), Jim Dwyer (eighteen), Dexter Filkins (thirty-three), Remy Gerstein (one), John Kifner (seven-teen), Charlie LeDuff (thirteen), Judith Miller (twenty-one), Steven Lee Myers (twenty-two), David Rohde (thirty-four), Marc Santora (eighteen), Craig S. Smith (twenty-five), Patrick E. Tyler (twenty-three), Bernar Weinraub (twenty-seven), and Michael Wilson (fourteen). Several of them are written by more than one author. Excluding these overlaps, two hundred and sixty eight articles are selected for the analysis.

Findings

There are mainly four findings when comparing articles written by the embedded journalists of both the Asahi and the New York Times. The two leading newspapers articles are similar in their personal and realistic descriptions and their focuses on daily activities in the field. They have, however, huge differences, not only in their formats and structures, but in degrees of sympathy with the coalition forces.

1) Difference in Formats and Structures

Reports from "embedded" journalists in both papers are very different in their formats and structures. First, the lengths of articles are different. In the Asahi, many articles written by embedded journalists are relatively short: 200 to 1500 Japanese letters (not words), which is equivalent to about 75 to 565 words in English. Most articles of the New York Times are between 900 and 2000.

Another difference in formats and structures may be related to the length. In the Asahi, many articles written by embedded journalists are parts of stories about general developments in the Iraq War. Six articles among twenty-one of Nojima's articles include with latest developments of the war and are treated as "related stories" to the main news. The most typical example is Nojima's story at the time when the US forces moved into Iraq to initiate attacks on March 20. His story was a piece of other related stories from Washington, Kuwait, and Jordan after the short description of US decision to start a war with the Hussein regime (March 21). On the other hand, unlike the Asahi, most articles in the New York Times are independent from the main stories about the war.

Perhaps, the most interesting difference in news format is that the Asahi clearly notes that the contents of their embedded stories are controlled by the US forces, and many of Asahi's articles have eye-catching disclaimers. Although there are several versions of the disclaimers, the main point is the same: "This story is reported under the rules set by the US military. Contents of this story may be affected by the rule." According to Nojima, the disclaimers were presented because the editors in the Asahi found that the embedding rules set by the US forces could greatly affect reporting of the truth. Interestingly, Nojima himself believed that the disclaimers were unnecessary partly because allowing journalists to embed their troops in the battleground is considered a great opportunity to be closer to the truth. Nojima also suggests that the disclaimers might suggest to their readers that the stories are not trustworthy (Nojima, 2003, 117-123).

The New York Times does not have similar disclaimers in its embedded stories. Also, among articles written by embedded reporters, there is no reference about the media control of the US government. Instead, articles written by several staff writers who were not embedded questioned the objectivity of their reports. However, these criticisms were mostly on electronic media, such as the cable news network. For example, an article written by David Carr on March 31 ("Reporters' New Battlefield Access Has Its Risks as Well as Its Rewards") claimed that television news reports from the battlefield provided striking images of the war, but raise questions about their objectivity because these reports were based on the information from the coalition forces.

Although the lengths and structures of the articles are different in the two

leading newspapers, there is one clear similarity: every article written by embedded reporters has a byline, which carries the author's name. In general, one of the well-known practices of Japanese print media is that author's name of an article is not explicitly written. There is no clear reason for this convention, but unlike the print media in the US, only some articles, mostly commentaries, are entitled to have bylines. Thus, in this respect, the articles written by the embedded reporters were rather unique within the Japanese media.

2) Similarity in Personal and Realistic Descriptions

Reports from "embedded" journalists in both papers have one very clear similarity: both are very personal and realistic in their descriptions. Since embedded stories are the products by reporters and photographers who risked their lives alongside coalition forces in Iraq, there seems to be no doubt that their stories are very personal and realistic.

Nojima's report in the Asahi became suddenly tense after the troop with which he was embedded was attacked by the Iraqi forces in Nasiria. He reported this incident several times. His first report (March 24) was about the incident in which the members of the troops almost panicked at the news that other forces were ambushed and more than 50 marines were killed. His second and third reports (both articles were on March 26) were more realistic because his own troop was involved in a fierce battle with the Iraqi forces. The battle lasted about 20 minutes and he had to dodge bullets so that he would not be shot. He was amidst the smoke of gun power and a shower of bullets and reported "I prayed not to get shot."

Reporters of the New York Times also experienced serious battles. Many articles of the actual battles chronicled with exact time of the action and recorded further developments in the field. These articles sometimes contain raw comments of the excited or panicked troops when they were facing crucial moments in the battle. For example, a story written by Steven Lee Myers on March 31 featured several changes of strategies and rules of command in the field because of an attack by an Iraqi suicide bomber. In his article, Lieutenant Colonel Scott E. Rutter bluntly mentioned how to handle Iraqi civilians, "Five seconds. . . . They have five seconds to turn around and get out of here. If

they're there in five seconds, they're dead." Also in the article Major General Bufford C. Blount III, commander of the Third Infantry Division recognized "an unfortunate but necessary step" to ensure the safety of his troops and stating that "We went to into this hoping to keep collateral damage and civilian casualties to a minimum. . . .They've not let us do it."

It seems that personal relationships between soldiers and reporters were developed in the course of the action. One of the most personal stories in the Asahi is about the death of Jim Cawley with whom Nojima was embedded in the same Division. Cawley's death was caused by the mistake of a young Marine who ran over Cawley by a humvee, when Cawley was lying on the ground. During the time of his embedding, Nojima became very close to Cawley because he was fluent enough to converse in Japanese with Nojima. Thus, Nojima wrote a very sentimental obituary of him as a close friend (April 9). The article explained that Nojima became a very special person for Cawley because it was Nojima who had to explain about his death in detail to Cawley's Japanese wife, Miyuki.

Because of trust, even during the time of non-combat, soldiers in the field seemed to talk very frankly with New York Times reporters. For example, an article written by Dexter Filkins (April 1) carried a politically incorrect comment of Colonel John Pomfret. He referred to a newly captured piece of Iraqi territory as somewhere close to the south of Baghdad, "We're in bad-guy country. . . I like it."

Also, stories of embedded journalists in both papers are full of the sounds and smells, they sometimes witnessed in memorable scenes. In an article of March 24 written by Patrick Tyler, the New York Times reporter saw American marines ripping down images of Saddam Hussein while jubilant residents greeted them. Nojima of the Asahi reported in detail how the troop searched for Iraqi militia members who hid themselves among the civilians (March 31). The members of the troop took all the residents from their houses in a small village of the Kut Al Hay area and collected weaponry such as machine guns. Among those 50 residents many were women and children, and the crying of children echoed in the area. James Dao in the New York Times (April 14) found that hundreds of children and teenagers were rushed to the forces and tried to cadge food and cigarettes from US troops.

3) Similarity in Focusing on Daily Activities in the Field

As much as their reports are very personal, both papers have similar tendencies in focusing on daily activities in the field. As mentioned above, both papers differ in their length. Since articles of the New York Times have more volume than those of the Asahi, most stories written by embedded journalists of the New York Times contain much more concrete descriptions of the daily activities. Although the details differ in degree, articles of both papers paid great attention to many aspects of the military activities.

In an Asahi article (April 2), Nojima explained daily life in the field in great detail. According to him, each package of field foods ("Meal Ready to Eat") was attached with heating pads. Soldiers love beef ravioli and hamburgers, but pork chops were their least favorite. Also, Nojima reported how all members of the battalion, including himself, had to dig human-size foxholes for their beds.

Since New York Times articles were more voluminous, reporters featured more than daily activities in the field. The psychology of soldiers was especially focused on. A story by Steven Lee Myers (April 13) featured the fear of soldiers who might be facing a gas attack. Although it turned out to be a false alarm later, sensors of their armored vehicle registered traces of a nerve agent. Thus, the brigade's soldiers had to wear their gas masks, hoods, and the rubber gloves. They were very nervous for a while until they found a bird flying over them. Looking at the survival of the creature, they became relieved but also learned that even the most sophisticated sensors could be wrong.

4) Difference in Degrees of Sympathy with the Forces.

There is a sharp contrast between the two newspapers' embedding stories in degrees of sympathy toward the coalition forces. Although it is not clearly stated, it seems that New York Times articles do not indicate their hesitation to report activities in the field through the eyes of the coalition forces. News sources are from members of the troops; thus, a large portion of the reports are occupied with further military strategies, results of the battle, or human interest stories of soldiers, such as their comradeship with other members who lost their lives. In this way, arguably, it seems that their articles imply a sympathetic view toward the forces.

By contrast, Nojima's articles in the Asahi are ambivalent toward the US forces. Although he was sometimes sympathetic with the troop in which he was embedded, he showed a strong sense of "otherness" to the forces at other times. In the article on April 1, Nojima himself admitted that his articles were ambivalent toward the forces. Nojima recalled the time when his troop was fighting with Iraqi forces and a 60-millimeter mortar of his troop destroyed the enemy. He yelled with joy for the successful attack, but soon realized that he was supposed to be an objective observer. He also presented his feeling that he had been constantly evaluating whether or not his articles were too sympathetic toward the coalition forces. Thus, although a close friendship between Nojima and the members of the troop was developed, he had to be very aware to screen out information provided by the forces because the troop may manipulate him.

In another article (April 2), Nojima found another occasion for feeling a sense of "otherness" from the members of the troop because his perspective about what was important or valuable was different from theirs. He explained to members of the forces that the Tigris-Euphrates River area was one of the origins of the world's earliest civilizations, only to find that the soldiers wanted to chat about women and food most of the time and many of them looked at porn magazines or took pictures of the land where they were located. Also, their eyes suddenly turned very "beastly," according to Nojima's description, before the battle, and Nojima concluded that they were "totally different from a Japanese civilian like him." In another article (April 16), Nojima suggested that the soldiers seemed to hold a firm belief that the Iraq War was justifiable and that the US government had made a correct decision to initiate the war. He continued that the soldiers seemed to believe in a simplified idea of the war as one between "the good guys" and "the bad guys"

It is interesting that Nojima's stories are different from other articles in Asahi on the Iraq War. Many of the other Asahi articles imply more anti-US sentiments. Considering this, his articles are more sympathetic with the US forces than other Asahi articles. One example of this is the story on March 24. His articles several times feature some sort of interactions between Iraqi civilians and the troop with which he was embedded. In an article (March 24), the members' faces turned very relieved when many civilians waved their

hands and smiled at them in Basra, the Southern part of Iraq. According to the story, the members of the troop seemed to believe that building up good relationship with civilians, especially with those who had anti-Hussein sentiments, might hold the key to their future mission in Iraq; thus, they had been very anxious about Iraqi civilians' reactions.

Although Nojima witnessed that many civilians were cordial to the troops with which he was embedded in Basra (March 24), another story on the same day written by another staff writer denied this, citing telephone interview with a civilian from Baghdad. She mentioned, "although the US forces announced that Iraqi civilians welcomed them in Basra, I believe many Iraqi never welcomed them because we have been protecting our country. . ."

Conclusion

This paper first reviewed studies of political communication as a subfield of political science. The subfield has matured as the media's role in politics has become indispensable. Recently, a cross-cultural comparative method is a thriving approach in political communication, which has generated internationally important studies.

The second part of this paper is a case study of comparative political communication, which compares articles between Japanese (Asahi) and US (New York Times) embedded reporters during the Iraq War. According to the content analyses of the articles, the two leading newspapers articles are similar in their personal and realistic descriptions and in their focus on daily activities in the field. Nonetheless, there are significant disparities in their formats and degree of sympathy they have with the coalition forces. ⁽¹⁾

Notes

(1) In another of authors' study, stories of Asahi leading up to the Iraq War period implied more anti-war and anti-military stance than the article of the New York Times (Maeshima 2006).

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イラク従軍記事の内容分析の日米比較 ——比較政治コミュニケーションのケーススタディとして

前 嶋 和 弘

本論文は2部構成になっている。まず、最初の部分では、最初に政治学のサブフィールドとしての政治コミュニケーションの発展をまとめている。主に政治とメディアの関係を分析する政治コミュニケーション研究は、選挙研究とともに発展してきた経緯があるものの、特に近年では政治学などのサブフィールドのアプローチを取り入れ、メディアの議題設定機能の研究や、政治家の政治戦略としての国民へのPR手法の研究や、各種理論の研究など、対象となる領域は広がっている。特に、国際的な比較の観点から政治コミュニケーションを分析する比較政治コミュニケーションは注目されている分野であり、比較政治学的に研究する研究が相次いで発表されている。後半部分は、この比較政治コミュニケーションのケーススタディである。具体的には、イラク戦争（2003年3月20日から同年5月1日）に従軍した記者の記事の内容分析の日米比較を行っている。日本（『朝日新聞』）とアメリカ（『ニューヨークタイムズ』）の両紙の従軍記者の記事はいずれも、実際に非常にリアルで切迫感があるという点で共通しているほか、従軍の際の様々な出来事を詳細に伝えている点でも似通っている。しかし、そもそもの記事の量が大きく異なっており、それが、従軍記事のフォーマットにも影響しているほか、米軍を中心とする連合軍への感情移入の度合いや、軍に対する「他者性」の認識など、日米の従軍記者の間には大きな差があることが明らかになった。