

Reason and Intuition in Christian and Buddhist Philosophy:

Anselm's *Proslogion* II and IV Reinterpreted in Light of D. T. Suzuki's Zen Thought*

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Introduction

In my recent essay "A 'Buddhistic' Reinterpretation of Karl Barth's Argument for the Existence of God in *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*"¹ I have demonstrated that Anselm's Name of God, *aliquid quo "nihil" maius cogitari possit*, can be reinterpreted Buddhistically in terms of Nagarjuna's notion of "Emptiness" in reference to the *Proslogion* II and III. The former, which Barth, Hartshorne, and Malcolm call Anselm I, can be critiqued, as by Kant. The latter or Anselm II is nevertheless tenable. For Anselm's Deity is "loyal" to Emptiness emptying itself, thereby paradoxically coming out to "be" the only one in the universe who can call forth loyalty in us.²

That essay was preceded by a more general, philosophical reflection on "How Can Principles Be More Than Just Epistemological Or Conceptual?: Anselm, Nagarjuna, and Whitehead"³ dealing with the issue of convertibility of principles into realities. In this first attempt at considering Anselm in comparison with other thinkers, such as Nagarjuna and Whitehead, I was motivated to learn the philosophical grounds for the scientific use of principles in reference to their convertibility into realities.

In still another of my recent essays (actually, the third one) on Anselm and Buddhist wisdom, "Ignorance—Christian and Buddhist: Reinterpreting Anselm's *Proslogion* IV in Light of D. T. Suzuki's Zen Thought,"⁴ I have dealt with the problem of *insipiens* (the Fool) in the *Proslogion* IV (which Barth designates "The Possibility of Denying the Existence of God") in light of Suzuki's Zen thought which culminates in the following dicum: "Ignorance is the negation of Enlightenment and not the reverse."

Now, in this fourth essay on Anselm and Buddhism I will first discuss, with Karl Barth and Gregory Schufreider, how Anselm's argument aiming at

fulfilling the request upon God in the *Proslogion* I to "show Yourself" is shot through with the procedure of reasoning evolving in itself the sort of understanding which admits reason to a vision of the matter itself (i.e., God) or what Barth designates "divine *illuminare*," based upon "divine *donare*," resulting in the "*Gratias tibi, bone domine*."

Second, I, again, will scrutinize and reinterpret Anselm's procedure at its very outset (namely, the Name of God as *aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*), however, by reference to Suzuki's clarification of the Zen *mondo* (question and answer) as involving in itself what he calls *soku-hi* logic, "A is not-A and therefore A is A," in which *vijnana* (knowledge) is never *vijnana* without *prajna* (wisdom); *prajna* is the necessary postulate of *vijnana*. Thus, Anselm's final gratitude to God, "*Gratias tibi, bone domine*," will be verified as being deepened by its inclusion of Zen logic of *prajna* (or *soku-hi* logic) while proceeding because of reason's vision or revelation.

Third, concomitant with this double nature of Anselm's gratitude to God is the emergence of my Buddhist-Christian theology of loyalty as a viable way of doing theology in a neo-Anselmian way.

I. Reason's Vision of the Thing Itself (*id ipsum quod res [sc. deus] est*): Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God and Its Native Soil

1. *On the Surpassability of the Deity—pro et con: Barth, Hartshorne, and My Own View*

As is well known, Anselm's argument for the Existence of God culminates in the following passage in *Proslogion* IV:

Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse Deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare. (I 104, 2ff)

For God is 'that beyond which nothing greater can be conceived'. Whoever truly knows that knows that it exists in such a way that even in thought it cannot but exist. And so whoever knows that this is the manner of God's existence cannot conceive him as not existing.

Barth interprets this passage in the spirit of *confessio laudis* or adoration, I

might say. "What does it mean to know—to know and recognize—God himself," asks Barth only to come to this position: "Anselm goes back to his *argumentum*. God is he who revealing himself as Creator, is called *quo maius cogitari nequit* and therefore who immediately confronts us with his Name as the one who forbids us to conceive a greater than him" (AFQI, 169). In a word, Barth' vision of the Deity which he obtains from Anselm's Name of God as *aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit* (or what is here designated as *id quo maius cogitari non possit*) is a negativistically sovereign one; that is, it preserves itself as a supremely lofty vision of being insofar as it negates all other things (i.e., creatures) while forbidding us to conceive a "greater [*maius*] than him."

In so saying, Barth definitely denies the surpassability of the Deity in *any* sense. However, as I demonstrated elsewhere,⁶ God is surpassable—at least by Godself in two senses: by the innermost beyond-essence of the Deity (as the intra-Trinitarian relationality, *perichoresis* which Meister Eckhart designates *Nichits* as compared with divine personae, and which I identify with Buddhist Emptiness emptying itself) and by the quality of the Deity; for God, according to Charles Hartshorne, is to be conceived as capable of including "quantity in His quality, without the quantity being that presumably impossible thing, an unsurpassable quantity."⁷

In Hartshorne's case, what he envisions is the fact that "[t]he divine quantity will be surpassable, but only by God Himself" (AD, 29). The all-inclusive concrete God-*now*, is surpassable insofar as the nature of God grows in relationship to the quality of God who calls us forward into the future ever anew—and this while absorbing into his bosom all new experiences in the world occurring in dual response to the divine quality and the past. Yet, this vision of the Deity is not there in Anselm's original argument in which "[t]he exclusion of quantity and becoming from God is decisive" (AD, 31). Anselm and Barth share in the view of God which Hartshorne critically evaluate in these terms: "A God unsurpassable, even by Himself, is a pure 'absolute', wholly unreceptive or insensitive toward the world" (AD, 30). While appreciating Anselm's discovery, Hartshorne nevertheless declares: "Anselm discovered, and really discovered, the modal uniqueness of the idea of God. What he overlooked, and nearly all his critics equally fail to see, is that, since actuality cannot be necessary, there

must be a real duality in God, as in no other being, between necessary existence and contingent actuality" (AD, 134).

In my own case, the quality of God (which is identifiable with Whitehead's notion of the primordial nature of God and which is perceived by Hartshorne as surpassing the quantity of God) is further surpassable by what Anselm calls "*nihil maius*"—the metaphysical ultimate, Nothingness or Buddhist Emptiness which is "greater," metaphysically, than the Personal Deity.⁸ Hence, I propose to say, first, that God is loyal to the "*nihil maius*" or Nothingness Greater.

Yet, I propose to put forward, in the second place, that Nothingness Greater is not Something insofar as it negates itself; and this is the wisdom I learn from Buddhists that can be traced back to Nagarjuna's doctrine of "Emptiness emptying itself" ("How Can Principles," 93-97).

Significantly enough, Anselm himself seems to be susceptible of sharing this wisdom with Buddhists. According to Desmond Paul Henry, the only way in which "*nihil*" has a meaning for Anselm is to "deny that it is a name, insofar as its significative functions are concerned."⁹ If so, "*nihil*" (nothing) has, as Henry explicates, a two-fold significative function, remotive and constitutive, neither of which is naming. Thus Henry concludes: "Remotively (*removendo*) '*nihil*' = 'nothing' effects the complete removal from its import of every object which is something; constitutively (*constituendo*), therefore, the meaning which it establishes is 'no thing at all' or 'no thing that is something' " (CDC, 337). In other words, to refer to my own interpretation, remotively, "*nihil*" = "nothing" signifies something (which is therefore to be negated); and, constitutively, it signifies nothing (which is rather to be recognized as the relatedness as such of ultimate reality, *nihil*).

Furthermore, in the third place, let me call your attention to the fact, which is thorough-and-through Christian in its essence, that God is the only one in the universe who can call forth loyalty, faith, or obedience in us creatures. I think this triadic idea of a theology of loyalty has been demonstrated in a convincing manner in my 2004 essay on "A 'Buddhistic' Reinterpretation of Karl Barth's Argument for the Existence of God in *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*" mentioned earlier.

The net result of my argument thus far is this: that since God in the third

step in my triadic picture of a theology of loyalty appears as the one who evokes loyalty in us, God forbids us with justice to conceive a "greater than him" in the form of any member of the community of worldly actualities, but not in the senses of God Himself and Buddhist Emptiness. Here, I might say, lies the rationale of perceiving that the divine prohibition Anselm espouses is not really incompatible with an interreligious dialogue with Buddhism.

Be that as it may, I would prefer to say, on the one hand, positively that God urges us to conceive Nothing Greater than him. Hence, we can say, on the other, in a negative manner that God forbids us to conceive a greater than him. In between these two statements, one positive and the other negative, there lies a mystery: why an urging God has turned into a forbidding God. One thing is now clear: while urging us to conceive Nothing Greater, God is the one who has shown his loyalty by conceiving Nothing Greater than him. And this is the pre-condition of his sovereignty of forbidding us any sort of idolatry.

In this whole state of affairs, however, it is of course pivotal that Nothing Greater is not Something but Emptiness emptying itself—the insight which lies at the core of Buddhist wisdom which Anselm seems to share, as I mentioned above. Let us recall at this juncture D. T. Suzuki's succinct summary of Buddhist wisdom: "Indeed, Ignorance is the negation of Enlightenment and not the reverse."¹⁰ Emptiness empties itself—thus awakening us, God and creatures alike, to Enlightenment which lies at the bottom of any and every person's existence as reality in itself, even reality as relatedness as such.

The foregoing is a description of Anselm's intuition as it is combined with what I interpret as Buddhist wisdom in terms of my thesis of a Buddhist-Christian theology of loyalty. If this intuition is prepared, then Anselm's argument for the Existence of God, as it is elaborated upon by Barth, appears convincingly clear as in the following:

To know that [i.e., the fact that God forbids us to conceive a greater than him] properly is to know *id quod Deus est*, God himself. In this his Name as Lord he himself is and is known, known in such a way that the denial of his Existence becomes impossible and thereby the proof of his Existence is

made valid. Therefore, *bene intelligere* is not to be immediately equated *a priori* with *intelligere id ipsum quod res est*. But in the sense of our passage *bene intelligere* is the fulfillment, the development, the manner of this real knowledge, which by its relation to the object establishes itself as true. It consists concretely in the fact that the embargo contained in the Name of God is heard, recognized and obeyed and that therefore in his thinking man allows God to be God. (AFQI, 169)

What is conspicuous in the above passage is that Barth opts for a developmental view of *bene intelligere*. His is a view of negating the immediate equation *a priori* of *bene intelligere* with *intelligere id ipsum quod res est*. But how is this so? Answering this question is not an easy task, it seems to me. For in order to answer this question adequately we need to distinguish in proper terms between contemplation (or insight) and development (or proof) as they are inherent in the problem of *bene intelligere* or a rightful understanding. Let us see in the following passage how Barth refers to what he regards as the pre-condition of the development or proof of the Existence of God:

In his very thoughts, precisely in the limitation of his freedom of thought. All piety and morality are nothing worth, have nothing to do with God and can even be atheistic or may become atheistic again unless they are directed towards establishing an absolute limitation on this, the most inward and most intimate area of freedom. *Bene intelligere* means: to know once and for all, as a real ox knows its master or a true ass its master's stall. *Bene intelligere* means: finally to realize that it is not possible to think beyond God, not possible to think as a spectator of oneself or of God, that all thinking about God has to begin with thinking to God. (AFQI, 169)

Here it is revealed that what is central to Barth's theological concern, based upon his research into Anselm's proof of the Existence of God, is a new orientation in God-talk whereby thinking to God is clearly differentiated from thinking about God. Accordingly, it is important for him to add to the above passage a few words clarifying his intention: "That is what the fool and also his advocate Gaunilo have not yet realized. Those

who have realized it, by so doing, stand under the compulsion of knowledge of God's Existence" (AFQI, 169). The motif of the unsurpassability or sovereignty of the Deity vis-à-vis creatures¹¹ is resonant here again in Barth's theology, re-confirming within the context of Anselm studies what he began putting forward in his maiden work, *Der Römerbrief* (1919), with these words:

The justification of our prayer is not what we have attained some higher eminence on the ladder of prayer; for all ladders of prayer are erected within the sphere of 'No-God' of this world. The justification of our prayer and the reality of our communion with God are grounded upon the truth that Another, the Eternal, the Second Man from Heaven (I Cor. xv, 47), stands before God pre-eminent in power and—in our place.¹²

Barth's clarification of the unsurpassability of the Deity notwithstanding, I opt for its critical revisions in terms of the surpassability of the Deity by Himself (first, by the quality of God, as elucidated by Hartshorne; and second, by Buddhist Emptiness or the intra-Trinitarian Godhead as *Nichts*, as proposed by me), as has been discussed earlier. I presuppose these two cases of God's being surpassable in order for God to be re-affirmed as unsurpassable by creatures. The net result is the same reverence for God's being unsurpassable whether in the cases of Hartshorne and me, on the one hand, or in Barth's case, on the other, yet it is important to acknowledge the depths of insight into the Divine loyalty to Nothingness Greater [*nihil maius*] lying at the back of the Divine unsurpassability or sovereignty or irreversibility.

This whole state of affairs, let me propose, covers the problem of "thinking to God" or prayer which is the native soil of Anselm's argument for the Existence of God. Accordingly, thinking to God or prayer or intuition gives rise to its development or thought or argument for the Existence of God. Hence, Barth writes:

And immediately and primarily of that existence of God which belongs only to him amongst all that exists, his *sic esse*, the existence which cannot be annulled even in mere thought. Once more and with no ambiguity Anselm

makes clear that the narrowed-down Proof of *Prosl. 3*, the proof of this *sic esse*, the proof that it is impossible for God to be conceived as not existing, is what he understands by knowledge and proof of God's Existence. With the *bene intelligere* of the divine Name a 'God' who as God can be conceived as not existing is cast out and room made for the God of faith, of revelation and of the Church who so exists that he makes even the thought of his non-existence impossible. (AFQI, 169- 170)

Thus, inherent in the proof of the Existence of God is the process of casting out of a "God who as God can be conceived as not existing" or of our ignorance which, according to D. T. Suzuki, "is the negation of Enlightenment and not the reverse."¹³ And this process of casting out of the idea of a non-existent Deity, an idea concomitant with our ignorance, can only take place by virtue of a real Deity who is loyal to the Nothingness Greater, *thereby paradoxically tending to be* the one who evokes our loyalty, that is, our willingness to stand under the compulsion of the Existence of God, resulting in the execution of the Proof.¹⁴

2. The Native Soil of Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God, Contemplation: Schufreider's Anselm vs. Luther

As we have ascertained thus far, the problem of *bene intelligere* (a rightful understanding) is solved by Barth in a developmental manner in connection with *intelligere id (ipsum) quod res (i.e., deus) est* (understanding that which the thing itself [God] is). Barth's developmental view of the *bene intelligere* reminds me of Martin Luther's understanding of the "*deum iustificare*" or acknowledgment of God's righteousness which lies at the heart of his doctrine of justification.

In *Lectures on Romans*, Luther speaks of the motif of the justification of God (*deum iustificare*) with a specific focus on the righteousness "by virtue of which God, being righteous, makes us righteous, and he alone is righteousness with respect to us." According to Luther, God as he is in himself can be justified by none because he is justice itself—that is, the "righteousness by virtue of which he is righteous in himself."¹⁵

As is most expressly articulated by Rudolf Hermann in the article "Das Verhältnis von Rechtfertigung und Gebet nach Luthers Auslegung von Röm.

3 in der Römerbriefvorlesung,"¹⁶ this motif of the justification of God cuts across Luther's whole discussion of justification as it operates on its subjective axis, prayer. Referring to Romans 3:4, Luther states, "The Greek text reads: 'God shall be truthful' or 'Let God be truthful.' These words give expression not so much to the truthfulness of God as to a confession of the truthfulness of God. What they mean is this: It is right that all should confess and admit that God is truthful" (LR, 63-64).

The basis for this act of justification of God by the believer, in my view, is God's manifestation of his own justice, righteousness, or truthfulness in his words that took shape in the Incarnation, that is, the Christ event.¹⁷ This state of affairs is precisely in parallel with Anselm's idea of *bene intelligere* mentioned above, as far as I can see. Thus, Anselm's argument for the Existence of God can be grasped as confessional in nature in the Lutheran sense of "*confessio peccati*" because it involves the process of casting out a false Deity who is non-existent and who resides, I might say, in the midst of our ignorance—and this while thinking to God. However, the basis for this confessional procedure of the argument for the Existence of God, in Anselm's case, is a real insight ("*bene intelligere*" at its core) into the innermost nature of the Deity or of what Luther calls God as he is in himself or *deus nudus* [the naked God]. Here Luther's theology is to be broken through *ad intra*.

Now, it may be in order for me to pay due attention to Gregory Schufreider's explication of the passage in question in IV. First, let me quote again Anselm's text—this time together with its translation by Schufreider:

Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utque intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare.

For God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. Whoever really understands this understands clearly that this same being so exists that not even in thought can it not exist. Thus whoever understands that God exists in such a way cannot think of Him as not existing.¹⁸

Schufreider brilliantly summarizes schematically some of the major contents of Anselm's *Proslogion* II, III, and IV when he says:

This critical passage encompasses the entirety of Anselm's argument. It begins recalling the first step in the reasoning of *Proslogion* II: God is *id quo maius cogitari non potest*. Now, whoever *really* understands this, that is, that God is something than which nothing greater can be thought, well understands that *id ipsum sic esse ut nec cogitatione queat non esse*; that it itself so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist. This latter claim is the conclusion which we have determined is supposed to follow from the single argument of II and III. This clearly indicates that the answer Anselm is offering (to the Fool's "*non est deus*" of II) does not appeal to the conclusion of II, but to a conclusion which is only stated in III and can be shown to follow not from the reasoning of III alone, but from the single argument which spans II and III. But something else is noteworthy here. (IAA, 80)

By "here" Schufreider emphatically points to the importance peculiar to the above passage in IV. It consists of three elements: (1) the Name of God as it is intuitively envisioned; (2) the *bene intelligere* (rightful understanding); and (3) the Proof of the Existence of God. Schufreider speaks of each of these after he has articulated that in that the repeated use of "*intelligit*" refers us to the strict manner of thinking in which the very thing itself is grasped, our reading of the "*id ipsum*" should be enlightened: namely, we should see that that which the thing itself is (in this case, *id quod deus est*) involves within itself what I might call a distinctively singular intentionality of being (as characterized by the "*sic esse*").

This is what I have obtained by reading between the lines of Schufreider's text here. Actually, he writes: "...we should be treating the '*id ipsum sic esse*' to be claiming that: it (the thing) itself so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist" (IAA, 80). And this last dictum of Schufreider's is profoundly reminiscent of Hartshorne's reference to hayathology which he depicts in these terms¹⁹:

For instance, the text translated "I am that I am" is made to support the primacy of being and thus classical metaphysics, although, as scholars tell

us, the verb in the Hebrew original may be translated in quite other ways, as meaning "I live (or breathe) as I live, I act as I act, I become what I become, etc." My good friend Professor Tetsutaro Ariga of Kyoto University has wittily suggested that instead of ontology, what theologians need to cultivate is *hayathology* or *hayathontology*, utilizing the Hebrew verb in question.²⁰

At any rate, Schufreider thinks the aforementioned consideration would clarify our reading of the entire passage in question. The passage is of a triadic character, as I mentioned above. First, it begins, according to Schufreider, by claiming that God is something than which nothing greater can be thought, and immediately turns to the issue of what it is really to understand this *id quo maius cogitari non potest*; that is, in that to understand signifies: to grasp the thing itself (by means of reason's intuitive vision). Second, Schufreider perceives in the second line that when this something than which a greater cannot be thought is so understood, it is clearly seen that it (the thing) itself so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist. Third and finally, it is important to note, with Schufreider, that whoever has such sure insight into the matter itself cannot think that it does not exist (see IAA, 80).

If we can say that the first stage of Anselm's argument for the Existence of God, the Name of God as intuitively envisioned as *id quo maius cogitari non potest*, is Reality in itself, then we might be able to say after the manner of Ernst Fuchs's hermeneutics that the second stage, the *bene intelligere* or a rightful understanding of or an insight into the *sic esse* (namely, the self-interpretative principle of Reality to the effect that the thing itself "so exists" that it cannot be thought not to exist), helps Reality to its Truth, the third stage which is the actual fulfillment of the Proof of the Existence of God.²¹ I have just now noticed that the *bene intelligere* as an insight into the *sic esse* is the self-interpretative principle of Reality helping it to its Truth, the Proof.

This is important in that I see the principle of interpretation as inherent in and as accordingly derivative from the vision of Reality in the case of Anselm's argument for the Existence of God. For if the principle of interpretation was different from the vision of Reality in one's scheme of thought, one would have to find its rationale apart from the vision of Reality; then one's full integrity of thought would be somewhat truncated, at least

metaphysically, like Luther's doctrine of justification, mentioned earlier. That is not the case with Anselm. Thus, I concur with Schufreider when he states:

But reason's insight into the matter is unique in this case, for the essential intuition of God as that which so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist does not disclose a "universal essence" but rather distinguishes God from all else, and in so doing *directs reason's vision to the matter in its distinct singularity*. (IAA, 81; emphasis Schufreider's)

In other words, here we obtain reason's vision (namely, what we referred to as the principle of interpretation) and the matter in its distinct singularity (namely, Reality in itself or, if you like, Luther's *deus nudus*) together in unity. What then is the inner reason for this unity of reason's vision and God as such? I can find a proper answer to this question in the following passage of Schufreider's:

Such "vision", of course, does not refer to the corporeal intuition of images by the imagination; that is, it does not refer to "imaginative vision," but to the radically purified vision of the *oculus mentis* which gained insight into its matter, in this case, by means of the thoughtful distinction between what so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist and what so exists that it can be thought not to exist; *the difference between God and everything else*. (IAA, 81; emphasis Schufreider's)

In accordance with this difference in the matter of envisioning between the radically purified vision of God and the imaginative vision of everything else we have to account for the difference in the matter of ontology, which manifests itself in the actual procedure of the argument for the Existence of God by Anselm, between the claim that God so exists that He cannot be thought not to exist and the claim that something exists both in the understanding and in reality. For these two types of difference between God and creatures, one with respect to "vision" and the other with respect to "existence," are one in terms of what Schufreider calls "both reason's revelation of God and a contemplative's prescription for thinking God (and

these belong together)" with the "so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist" effectively operative as the distinctive mark (*proprium*) of God (IAA, 82). It is precisely in view of this state of affairs that Schufreider tried to re-implant the argument "in its native soil"; that is, to recommend that "Anselm's argument has its roots, and therefore its life, in the practice of contemplation" (IAA, 82).

Now, it seems to me that the contemplative dimension in Anselm's argument was rather minimized in Barth's explication of it, concomitant with his Protestant confessionism that can be traced back to Luther's doctrine of justification, as we have demonstrated earlier; whereas the developmental dimension in Anselm's argument was articulately presented to the fore by Barth. By contrast, Schufreider appropriately takes into account both dimensions on an equal basis. However, when it comes to discussing the problem of contemplation, his concern with Anselm's famous wording, to the effect: "*sub persona conantis erigere mentem suam ad contemplandum deum*,"²² in the person of one striving to elevate his (own) mind to contemplate God," is tending to be negativistic, in the sense of the "withdrawal from the world" characteristic of monasticism. Is he doing full justice to the rich potential dynamics of Anselm's argument in its depths? I doubt it. This is the reason why I now opt for D. T. Suzuki's argument for reason and intuition in Buddhist philosophy in order to fill a gap here.

II. D. T. Suzuki's Argument for Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy and Its Relevance to Anselm's *Proslogion* II and IV

1. *Vijnana and Prajna vs. Understanding in Its Weak and Strong Senses: Reflections on an Existential Leap or an Elevation of the Mind toward God*

D. T. Suzuki begins his famous essay on "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy" with these words: "For 'intuition' Buddhists generally use '*prajna*' and for reason or discursive understanding, *vijnana*. *Vijnana* and *prajna* are always contrasted."²³ According to Suzuki, *prajna* is the fundamental noetic principle whereby a synthetic apprehension of the whole becomes possible, while *vijnana* being the principle of differentiation (SZ, 124). Central to these two notions is the understanding Suzuki discloses: "*Vijnana* cannot work without having *prajna* behind it; parts are parts of the whole; parts never exist by themselves, for if they did they would not be

parts—they would even cease to exist" (SZ, 85).

What I think is conspicuous in the above consideration by Suzuki is that there are some interesting equivalents here in relation to Anselm's ways of thinking, one in the weak sense and the other in the full sense, appearing throughout his argument for the Existence of God in *Proslogion*. One of the most important equivalents between them, let me emphasize, is that they are both concerned with "an existential leap" (SZ, 121) or "an elevation of the mind toward God" which constitutes the development of understanding (IAA, 84-85). For instance, Suzuki writes:

From *vijnana* to *prajna* is not a continuous process or progress. If it were, *prajna* would cease to be *prajna*; it would become another form of *vijnana*. There is a gap between the two; no transition is possible; hence there is a leap, "an existential leap". From *vijnana*-thinking to *prajna*-seeing there is no mediating concept, no room for intellection, no time for deliberation. So, the Buddhist master urges us to "speak quick, quick!" Immediacy, no interpretation, no explanatory apology—this is what constitutes *prajna*-intuition. (SZ, 121)

It seems to me that it is because of this need for "an existential leap" that Suzuki is motivated to speak of the *mondo* (question and answer). In this sense, the *mondo* is that which adds something crucial to the Buddhist meditation or contemplation—something which might also be crucial to Anselm's contemplation. In the previous section I have mentioned that Anselm's contemplation, as interpreted by Schufreider, is negativistically characterized in terms of the "withdrawal from the world." This character might be challenged by the Buddhist *mondo* toward an absolutely affirmative orientation toward the world. Let me quote below in this regard some representative cases of the *mondo* from Suzuki's volume:

[1] A monk asked Zemi of Shurei monastery: "I understand that all the rivers, however different their sources, pour into the great ocean. How many drops of water could there be in the ocean?"

The master asked: "Have you ever been to the ocean?"

Monk: What then, after we have been to the ocean?"

The master replied: "You come tomorrow and I will tell you." (SZ, 115)

In this *mondo* one is encouraged to see after having been to the ocean of *sunyata* or emptiness, in which, as Suzuki explicates, "all the phenomenal world is absorbed, and the counting of drops of water in it is to understand what becomes of the multiplicity absorbed therein" (SZ, 115). Although the monk wants to find out what the master will say concerning the relationship between the one and the many, between *prajna* and *vijnana*, the master retorts: "Come tomorrow." By so saying he shows that what is really crucial here is arriving at tomorrow's world without indulging in epistemological methodology; therefore, Suzuki says that "I do not know" sums up the essence of *prajna-intuition*" (SZ, 115).

[2] Seishu of Rinningji monastery:

He once asked a monk: "Do you understand the Buddha-dharma (the truth or ultimate reality)?"

The monk said: "No, I do not, master."

"You honestly do not?"

"That is right, master."

"You leave me now and come tomorrow."

The monk bowed saying: "Fare thee well."

The master then said: "No, that is not the point." (SZ, 116-117)

Here again the master's dictum "You leave me now and come tomorrow" appears; but it was taken by the monk in its literal or intellectual sense. To remind him of his misunderstanding the master soft-heartedly states: "That is not the point." "The point," according to Suzuki, "is to understand what is not understandable, to know what is unknowable, wherein *prajna-intuition* really consists" (SZ, 116). First, you have to leave the world of conceptuality; and then, tomorrow, you encounter the real world in which the unknowable is immediately at hand—although appearing in manifold forms. Herein is involved what I might call a twofold significative function, remote and constitutive, of the *mondo*.

[3] A monk asked Yomyo: "I have been with you for a long time, and yet I

am unable to understand your way. How is this?"

The master said: "Where you do not understand, there is the point for your understanding."

"How is any understanding possible where it is impossible?"

The master said: "The cow give birth to a baby elephant; clouds of dust rise over the Ocean." (SZ, 116)

[4] When Seishu was still in his novitiate stage under Joye, the latter, pointing at the rain, remarked: "Every drop of it fills your eyes."

Seishu at the time failed to understand this, but afterwards, while studying the *Avatamsaka Sutra*, the meaning dawned on him. Later, in one of his discourses, he said: "All the Buddhas in the ten quarters of the world are ever facing you. Do you see them? If you say you see, do you see them with the mind or with the eyes?"

"Just because you fail to grasp this point and go on cherishing your confused views in manifold ways, you erroneously see differences and unities where there are really no differences and no unities.

"Just at this very moment your immediate apprehension of the mind [i.e., the unknowable] is imperative, and then you will realize that it is vast emptiness and there is nothing to see, nothing to hear...." (SZ, 116-117)

We know from reading another of D. T. Suzuki's volumes, *Zen and Japanese Culture*, that the mind and the eyes can go hand in hand, with Basho's famous "old pond" haiku showing this magnificent truth as its example:

Furu ike ya!
Kawazu tobikomū,
Mizu no oto

The old pond, ah!
A frog jumps in:
The water's sound!

Suzuki grasps Basho's old pond as lying on the other side of eternity,

where timeless time is. And he goes on to write:

It is so "old," indeed, that there is nothing more ancient. No scale of consciousness can measure it. It is whence all things come, it is the source of this world of particulars, yet in itself it shows no particularization. We come to it when we go beyond the "rainfall" and "the moss growing greener." But when this is intellectually conceived, it becomes an idea and begins to have an object of intellection.²⁴

How can we get rid of the danger of intellection in accounting for the "old pond"? Suzuki replies:

It is by intuition alone that this timelessness of the Unconscious is truly taken hold of. And this intuitive grasp of Reality never takes place when a world of Emptiness is assumed outside our everyday world of the senses; for these two worlds, sensual and supersensual, are not separate but one. Therefore, the poet sees into the Unconscious not through the stillness of the old pond but through the sound stirred up by the jumping frog. Without the sound there is no seeing on the part of Basho into the Unconscious, in which lies the source of creativities and upon which all true artists draw for their inspiration. (ZJC, 241-242)

With respect to the third line, "**Mizu no oto**"; "The water's sound!," it might fairly be said that without the frog the old pond cannot make a sound, and vice versa. In other words, what lies at the core of Basho's intuition is an insight into the unity of the pond or the Trans-Individual or the Mind and the frog or the individual or the eye—the unity which constitutes the entirety of our daily experiences. This understanding of the unity in question is in line with Suzuki's view of emptiness which he expresses in these terms: "Buddhist philosophy has *sat* for 'being', *asat* for "non-being", and *sunyata* for 'emptiness', showing that 'emptiness' has a positive connotation and is not a mere negation. *Sunyata* transcends being and non-being; that is, both presuppose the idea of *sunyata*. Therefore, when a Buddhist philosopher declares that there is nothing to see, nothing to hear, etc., we must understand it as not denying the experiences of our daily life but as indeed

confirming them in every way" (SZ, 117).

[5] Keijyu of Hannya monastery came to the "Dharma-Hall" and the monks congregated, hearing the board struck three times, which was the signal for them to come together. The master then recited an impromptu verse:

"Strange indeed—the board thrice struck,
And you monks are all gathered here.
As you already know well how to tell the time,
I need not repeat it over again."

He left the hall without saying anything further. (SZ, 117)

It is important to make a distinction between all kinds of acts of religious piety, including the one mentioned above, the master's sermon, and the actual gathering of the monks in response to the sound of the board struck three times. I would like therefore to concur with Suzuki when he states: "We may not all claim to be Buddhists; we may even protest against being called religious; but the deeds here mentioned are what we are performing every day. It does not make any difference whether we are Buddhists or Christians or communists" (SZ, 117).

Now, referring back to Anselm's argument from the perspective of Buddhist *mondo* Suzuki espouses, it turns out that "an immediate existential leap" essential to the *mondo* is very much in parallel with "an elevation of the mind toward God" from understanding (in the weak sense) the sign signifying the thing without in any way understanding (in the strong sense) the thing itself. As we already know, there was at the very starting point of Anselm's argument the way in which II characterizes what the Fool "understands": namely, he "understands what he hears" (*intelligit quod audit*). That is to say, he "understands the words that he hears in so far as he speaks the language" (IAA, 84). In a word, the Fool's understanding is merely a rhetorical one. By contrast, this weaker sense of "thinking or understanding" a thing is rejected in IV as inadequate for a proper understanding of the matter at hand.

Thus, Anselm's argument is shot through with a leap from II toward IV in

the matter of understanding the thing itself (i.e., God); and I think the twofold significative function, remotive and constitutive, of the Buddhist *mondo* has something new to contribute to Anselm's leap. True, we can notice, with Schufreider, the following crucial point: "if Anselm's argument begins in II by simply thinking in the weak sense the sign signifying the thing, and ends in IV demanding that one think, in the strong sense, that which the thing itself is (*id ipsum quod res est intelligitur*), then this must mean that the aim and strategy of the argument involves the *development of understanding*" (SZ, 84; emphasis Schufreider's.). Yet, Anselm's developmental argument, as is so viewed by Schufreider, is of a negativistic character, as we mentioned earlier.

What in Anselm's argument plays a role similar to the *mondo* with its two elements of intuition (*prajna*) and reason (*vijnana*) at work within it, I assume, is the "so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist" as the distinctive mark (*proprium*) of God (cf. SZ, 82). From my comparative perspective Schufreider's following passage is of the utmost importance in clarifying (even unknowingly, I would say) what is needed for the completion of Anselm's argument at which is operative both reason's revelation of God and a contemplative's prescription for thinking God (and these belong together):

Against the strict measure of what so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist all other beings pale, as if to nothing. And the contemplative's task is to *perform* this annulment of existing creatures so that they may fade from reason's sight. For it is through this withdrawal of all creatures that the way is cleared for a *radically purified* (rational) *vision of the matter itself*, that is, of something than which nothing greater can be thought. (SZ, 82; emphasis his)

Although Schufreider is convinced of the way in which the withdrawal of all creatures gives rise to a radically purified vision of "something than which nothing greater can be thought," it seems to me that he has not mentioned what might be inversely correlative to the annulment of existing creatures by the contemplatives. If so, he has not elucidated the power of contemplation by virtue of which we contemplatives can truly perform the

annulment of existing creatures in question. It is precisely in view of this need for elucidating the power of contemplation that I look upon Suzuki's discussion of the *mondo* as highly edifying because of its reference to the dynamic nature of *sunyata* or emptiness. Suzuki writes:

When we speak of the *prajna*-continuum as undifferentiated or differentiated, we must not think that this process of differentiation is a function given to the continuum from an outside source. The differentiation is evolved from within the continuum, for it is not the nature of the *prajna*-continuum to remain in a state of *sunyata*, absolutely motionless. It demands of itself that it differentiate itself unlimitedly, and at the same time it desires to remain itself. *Prajna* is always trying to preserve its self-identity and yet subjects itself to infinite diversification. That is why *sunyata* is said to be a reservoir of infinite possibilities and not just a state of mere emptiness. Differentiating itself and yet remaining in itself undifferentiated, and thus to go on eternally engaged in the work of creation—this is *sunyata*, the *prajna*-continuum. (SZ, 123)

This elucidation of the dynamic, contemplative-cum-creational, nature of *sunyata* is highly edifying for the sake of the further development of Anselm's argument because it legitimately accounts for the meaning of "*nihil maius*" (Nothing Greater) in the Name of God as "something than which Nothing Greater can be conceived" (*aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*).

Now, it has been clarified again that God is loyal to Nothingness Greater, which is the first thesis of my theology of loyalty mentioned at the outset of this essay. If that is truly the case with the Deity, he is entitled to forbid us to conceive a greater, thus leading us into performing the annulment of existing creatures in question, which corresponds to the third thesis of my theology of loyalty, the evocative principle in the universe as God. Inasmuch as God humbles himself to be loyal to Nothingness Greater, we are truly encouraged to perform the annulment of creatures, including ourselves. Herein lies, I might say, the principle of "inverse correlation"²⁵ between God and creatures. In Lutheran conceptuality I can express it as the correspondence of the Divine "*sese profundum humiliare*"²⁶ and our

creaturely humilitas in the spirit of "*Libenter peccator ut tu iustificeris in me.*"²⁷

Incidentally, the self-emptying Emptiness is the third thesis of my theology of loyalty, which has been brilliantly elucidated and articulated by Suzuki, as we saw. Emptiness negates itself as a concept remotively (*renovendo*) in order to establish itself anew in actuality constitutively (*constituendo*). Hence, Suzuki puts forward his logic of *prajna*-intuition in this manner: "A is not-A and therefore A is A" (SZ, 120).

This same state of affairs Suzuki expresses in reference to the contemplation/creation dynamics peculiar to emptiness: "Creation is contemplation and contemplation is creation. When *sunyata* remains in itself and with itself, it is contemplation; when it subjects itself to differentiation it creates. As this act of differentiation is not something imposed upon it but an act of self-generation, it is creation; we can say it is a creation out of nothing" (SZ, 123).

What matters in theology, on the one hand, serves this dynamics of Emptiness emptying itself in the spirit of loyalty, thereby, however, on the other, paradoxically giving rise to its own creativity. Hence, the dynamics of contemplation/creation peculiar to emptiness necessarily accompanies theology, even Anselm's argument for the Existence of God. Accordingly, it is through the withdrawal of all creatures turning into their utter re-affirmation which is tomorrow's business,²⁸ I might say, that the way is cleared for a *radically re-purified Buddhist-Christian (rational) vision of the matter itself*, that is, of something than which Nothing Greater can be conceived.

"This vision over-passes," claims Schufreider, "all those things which can be thought not to exist [let me add, though: if left alone] until it comes to rest upon that which alone truly exists [with us], in its singularity and precisely as that which *sic esse ut nec cogitatione queat non esse [cum nobis]*" (SZ, 82). The net result of the proof of the Existence of God is the proof of God's being "with" us. This is because the inverse correspondence between God and creatures, mentioned above, turns out to be enabled only by virtue of Nothingness Greater [*nihil maius*]: namely, this is the state of affairs that we can express, with St. Paul, in these terms: "Nothing shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom. 8:39).

Within this context, it appears that the intentionality of being inherent in the *sic esse* ("so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist") is inclusive not only of the Deity but also, in one and the same breath inseparably, of us creatures "with" Him—and this in a wondrous gracious manner.

2. *Gratias tibi, bone Domine: Toward a Buddhist-Christian Gratitude with Barth's Exposition as Guide*

The Proof as Anselm wanted to conduct it and had to conduct it finishes in this manner:

Gratias tibi, bone Domine, gratias tibi, quia quod prius credidi te donante, iam sic intelligo te illuminante, ut si te esse nolim credere, non passim non intelligere. (I 104, 5ff)

I thank thee, good Lord, I thank thee, that what I at first believed because of thy gift, I now know because of thine illumining in such a way that even if I did not want to believe thine Existence, yet I could not but know it. (AFQI, 170)

Now, herein is manifest what Anselm understands by proof. I think Karl Barth's explication of the inner relationship between the accomplished Proof of the Existence of God by Anselm and his gratitude is excellent in that it clarifies what theology is all about at its core. Barth begins his reflection on this issue with these words:

Not a science that can be unraveled by the Church's faith and that establishes the Church's faith in a source outside of itself. It is a question of theology. It is a question of the proof of faith by faith which was already established in itself without proof. And both—faith that is proved and faith that proves—Anselm expressly understands not as presuppositions that can be achieved by man but as presuppositions that have been achieved by God, the former as divine *donare* and the latter as divine *illuminare*. (AFQI, 170)

As mentioned earlier, there are two types of metaphysics: one is concerned with the integral relationship of the vision of Reality with its self-

interpretative principle; and the other consists in making a distinction between the vision of Reality and its interpretative principle. Obviously, as is clearly shown by Barth, Anselm's case represents the former type of metaphysics, whereas the latter type of metaphysics is vigorously pursued by Luther in his doctrine of justification whereby the justice by which God makes us righteous (*iustitia qua nos iustus faciens*) is differentiated from the justice of God as such by which God as he is in himself is righteous.

In this latter case, one cannot find the basis for the principle of interpretation in the vision of Reality in itself; and this is the reason why the Protestant revealed theology of the Lutheran type is amiss with metaphysics, thereby presenting itself as a truncated metaphysics. By contrast, in the former case, one can interpret the vision of Reality by virtue of the same vision of Reality. For instance, what Barth finds in Anselm's proof of faith is a self-interpretative case (or what Barth calls "faith that proves") of the metaphysics of faith, or of the vision of Reality as *aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*. (which constitutes what Barth refers to as "faith that is proved").

Accordingly, as presuppositions that have been achieved by God Anselm accounts for the vision of Reality in itself and its self-interpretative principle in terms of divine *donare* and divine *illuminare*. What has already been given as the Name of God is now illumined by means of the Proof of the Existence of God. But there necessarily occurs in between these two occasions—*divine donare* and *divine illuminare*—a tertiary occasion in Anselm's mind, the *bene intelligere* (rightful understanding) which is shot through with what Barth designates as "thinking to God" or prayer inasmuch as Anselm speaks about God while speaking to him, saying, *Da mihi, ut...intelligam quia es, sicut credimus* (*Prosl. 2: I 101, 3f*): "Grant me...that I may know that thou dost exist as we believe" (cf. AFQI, 101). Thus, Barth writes:

He 'assumed' neither the Church's *Credo* nor his own *credere*, but he prayed and the Church's *Credo* and his own *credere* were assumed. God gave himself to him to know and he was able to know God. On this foundation, comparable to no philosophical presupposition and inconceivable for all systematic theology, he has come to know and has proved the Existence of

God. For that reason his last word must be gratitude. Not satisfaction over a work that he has completed and that resounds to his own praise as its master, but gratitude for a work that has been done and of which he is in no sense the master. (AFQI, 170-171)

God, in Barth's view, gave himself to Anselm to know and he was able to know God. But, let me ask, in what mode of Existence? My answer: in the Divine mode of Existence "with" us. Inasmuch as God revealed himself in IV, in response to Anselm's prayer in reasoning put down in II, as that which so exists that it cannot be thought not to exist, God exists "with" Anselm as he is prayerfully reasoning.

Of course, Anselm strives to elevate his mind to pray in reasoning (namely, to contemplate) while performing the annulment of existing creatures because he is standing under the compulsion of the Existence of God. However, in accordance with the Name of God as Something than which Nothing Greater [*nihil maius*] can be conceived, I think Anselm is at one and the same time urged to conceive Emptiness emptying itself as surpassing the Deity in such a way as it paradoxically embodies itself in lying between the Deity and him.²⁹ If so, we need to conceive God as being loyal to Emptiness lying between the Deity and us creatures—hence, as graciously being "with" us at the bottomless bottom of our existence. We also need to conceive this same God as calling forth our faith or loyalty or obedience in us precisely by giving himself to us. Then, our gratitude tends to be twofold: first, for God's fundamental togetherness with us by virtue of Nothingness Greater or Emptiness emptying itself; and second, for God's evocative nearness to us.

My idea of a Buddhist-Christian gratitude stands for these considerations. In this new understanding of gratitude as distinct from Barth's, I, nevertheless, concur with Barth when he states brilliantly:

God gave himself as the object of his knowledge and God illumined him that he might know him as object. Apart from this event there is no proof of the existence, that is of the reality of God. But in the power of this event there is a proof which is worthy of gratitude. It is truth that has spoken and not man in search of faith. Man might not want faith. Man might remain always a

fool. As we heard, it is of grace if he does not. But even if he did, *si te esse nolim credere*, truth has spoken—in a way that cannot be ignored, refuted or forgotten and in such a way that man is forbidden and to that extent is unable not to recognize it. Just because it is the science of faith about faith, theology possesses light but it is not the light of the theologian's faith. (AFQI, 171)

To me one thing is clearly implied in this passage: although the Divine mode of Existence is necessary existence, in the sense that God so exists that God cannot be thought not to exist, if it is the case that God, as Barth argues, gave himself as the object of Anselm's knowledge, thus illuminating him that he might know him as object, God as he is known by Anselm who certainly is a contingent being, is definitely inclusive of contingent actuality. Herein is involved what I might call the Divine self-reversion of being from necessary existence (*esse*) into contingent actuality (*existens*), from which is derivative the development of the proof of the Existence of God as this occurs in the mind of Anselm who reasons while praying to Him. If so, what Hartshorne refers critically to as a "real duality in God" in partial opposition to what would seem to be Anselm's negligence at this point despite his discovery of "the modal uniqueness of the idea of God" is, in actuality, clearly visible in Anselm, too—contrary to Hartshorne's assumption (cf. AD, 134). Gladly to say, this is our re-discovery of Anselm's discovery: Anselm's Deity is inclusive not only of necessary existence but also of contingent existence. In this respect, God for him is the One who *truly* exists—"truly" signifying the all-inclusive mode, contingent as well as necessary, of the Divine existence, in which God is "with" us.³⁰

Now, it is in this particular sense that I can understand what Barth means when he says that "*si te esse nolim credere*, truth has spoken—in a way that cannot be ignored." Yet, I don't think that Barth has elucidated the very power by virtue of which the Divine self-reversion in question can and does actually take place. To me it appears that the Divine power of self-reversion originates in God's loyalty to Emptiness emptying itself in such a way that solely the One who has experienced loyalty can and therefore does actually evoke loyalty in us creatures. Then, I can say after the manner of a Karl Barth while at the same time putting forward what is genuinely my own

idea: just because it is the science of loyalty about loyalty, a Buddhist-Christian theology of loyalty possesses light but it is not the light of the theologian's loyalty.

Conclusions:

Now, let me make some concluding remarks below:

1. *The Paradoxical Reversal of the Need of Faith for Understanding to Understanding without Faith and Its Buddhist-Christian Explication: The Argument Fulfilled*

Finally, we have been led to envision that the light of the Divine loyalty overflows human barriers! Schufreider knows very well about this miracle for which Anselm gives thanks to God, saying, *Gratias tibi, bone Domine*. Thus, he states:

Contained in this passage is a paradoxical reversal of the often quoted line which immediately precedes *Proslogion* II: "*nisi credidero, non intelligam*"; "unless I believe, I shall not understand." Here in IV Anselm proclaims that even if he did not believe, he should nevertheless be unable not to understand. Presumably, this marks the binding character of such "illumination," an illumination for which one is prepared by the reasoning of II and III and which has shed so much light on the matter that Anselm is willing to claim that even without faith the existence of God would be evident. (IAA, 85)

Is such illumination, then, standing by itself or reflecting in itself its inner source when it has shed so much light on the matter, that which the thing itself is (*id ipsum quod res est*), that Anselm is willing to claim that even without faith the existence of God would be evident? Schufreider doesn't raise this question, and therefore seems to be presupposing the binding character of such illumination without any further reason.

By contrast, we contend that the biding character of such illumination, as it gives rise to the paradoxical reversal of the *nisi credidero, non intelligam*" ("unless I believe, I shall not understand") to the *ut si te esse nolim credere, non possim non intelligere*" ("if I did not want to believe that You existed, I should nevertheless be unable not to understand it"), is reflecting in itself its

inner source, the self-reversion of the Deity as he is loyal to Nothingness Greater [*nihil maius*] to the Deity as he evokes loyalty in us creatures. And further, this Divine self-reversion presupposes Emptiness emptying itself, the ultimate metaphysical principle of self-reversion.

The Divine loyalty has these two dimensions of self-reversion at its core. As such, it sheds so much light overflowing human barriers that at the close of III we are told that "it is evident to a rational mind" (*in promptu sit rationali menti*) that God truly exists—"truly" signifying, as our final re-examination of Hartshorne's theory shows, the all-inclusive mode of the Divine existence, contingent as well as necessary, in which God is "with" us.³¹ And now at the close of IV Anselm claims that one who does not believe should nevertheless understand. In the words of Schufreider: "The illumination of which Anselm speaks is reason's revelation of God as He is brought before the mind by the purified vision of thinking" (IAA, 85). And I propose to add: the purified vision of thinking contains within itself what I call the Divine loyalty with two dimensions of self-reversion at its core: namely, the Divine self-reversion and Emptiness emptying itself.

2. *Prajna-Intuition and This "That": Reason and Intuition in a Buddhist-Christian Perspective Recognized with Suzuki's Zen Insight as Guide*

Emptiness emptying itself is grasped by D. T. Suzuki as *prajna* intuiting itself. If Suzuki's purified vision, *prajna*, intuits itself, it in one case, claims Suzuki, makes the "rock nod even before the master uttered a word," and in another case keeps "the master very much alive even after his is cremated and his bones sound like copper." Then, Suzuki goes on to state:

"How?" one may ask, in this second case. The master would say: "Does not the boy-attendant respond to my call, saying: 'Yes, master?'" One might still insist that the boy is not the master. If I were the master I might strike you down, saying: "No such nonsense, O you stupid fellow!" But as I am not, I will say instead: "Your vision is still beclouded by *vijnana*. You see the master on one side and the boy on the other, keeping them separate according to our so-called objective method of interpreting an experience. You do not see them living in each other, and you fail to perceive that death 'objectively' comes to the master but has no power over 'that' which makes

the boy respond to the master's call. To see this 'that' is *prajna-intuition*." (SZ, 119)

This "that"³² permeates all that exists as the power of Emptiness emptying itself, thus alive among us as well as between God and us, which *prajna-intuition* attends to even beyond the problem of death. And it is operative, as far as I can see, throughout "reason's revelation of God" in Anselm's argument for the Existence of God. Our intuition in this matter started with acknowledging the Name of God as involving in itself the Nothingness Greater [*nihil maius*] and now ends up with a Buddhist-Christian interpretation of the paradoxical reversal of faith preceding understanding to understanding even without faith, thus manifesting the truth, which Schufreider espouses, that "reason is the way to the vision of God" (IAA, 95).

In the matter of reasoning we are urged to conform to what we intuitively know as presented in our minds as the Really Real. Thus, the intuitive knowledge (the *bene intelligere*, in Anselm's case) as it is properly conformed to by reason helps the Really Real (the Name of God as *aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*) to its Truth (the all-inclusive Existence of God "with us").³³ In my case, reason is a Buddhist-Christian reason which has been at work throughout this essay with D. T. Suzuki's Buddhist insight into the matter of "reason and intuition" as guide.

3. Reason As the Way to the Vision of God and Its Relevance to a Buddhist-Christian Perspective: Schufreider's Contribution Acknowledged

Specifically speaking, I believe, in order for reason to function appropriately we need some authentic urge or urges to face us. In this respect, the role of Zen *mondo* is in parallel with the role of what Barth calls "the compulsion of knowledge of God's Existence," as has been demonstrated thus far in connection with the function of the Nothingness Greater [*nihil maius*] in our examination of Anselm's argument. This grasp of the matter, admittedly, is a new one, as compared with the famous discussion of the relation between II and III; and it forces, as Schufreider acknowledges concerning his own case of interpretation, the "emergence of issues we are not usually asked to consider in connection with Anselm's

reasoning" (IAA, 95). However, he thinks it is clear by now that "...the strangeness presently confronting us does not lie simply in my account, but at the heart of the reasoning itself" (IAA, 95).

Further, Schufreider writes:

It [the strangeness] stems from the fact that Anselm's argument attempts to unite logical rigor with mystical insight; and we are not accustomed to the strenuous demand upon thinking such a seeming unlikely union entails. Those who treat the argument as an expression of mysticism (independent of logical standards) miss this as surely as those who deal with it as an exercise in logic. In Anselm these two dimensions are blended; for, on his account, *reason is the way to the vision of God*. (IAA, 95; emphasis Schufreider's)³⁴

What he says concerning Anselm's argument is doubly true in my own Buddhist-Christian neo-Anselmian re-interpretation of the argument which I think is inter-religiously amplified by Suzuki's Zen insight into the matter of "reason and intuition."

Notes

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- 1 *Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No. 13, February 28, 2004, 1-14; hereafter cited as "A Buddhistic." The essay is also available online at: http://www.keiwa-c.ac.jp/ipo/4_on_line_doc/eng/a_buddhistic_reinterpretation.htm
- 2 This proposal for a theology of loyalty consists of three principles: (1) God is loyal to Emptiness or Nothingness; (2) Emptiness empties itself; and (3) God is the only one in the universe who can and does actually evoke loyalty or faith or allegiance in us creatures. Throughout this essay I will develop this threefold proposal for a theology of loyalty in connection with Anselm studies.
- 3 *Process Thought*, No. , September 1993, 97-101; hereafter cited as "How Can Principles."
- 4 A paper delivered at the 19th World Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions at Tokyo, Takanawa Prince Hotel, March 24-30, 2005; see *Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No. 15, February 28, 2006, 1-16.

- 5 Karl Barth, *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of his Theological Scheme* (London: SCM Press, 1960), p. 168; hereafter cited as AFQL.
- 6 See Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "How Can Principles," 97-101.
- 7 Charles Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery: A Re-examination of the Ontological Argument for God's Existence* (Lasalle, ILL: Open Court, 1965), p. 29; hereafter cited as AD.
- 8 Whether or not the Personal Deity is surpassable by Buddhist Emptiness emptying itself, which is the Trans-Personal Ultimate, is in itself (I mean, even apart from Anselm studies) an important philosophical question emergent in Buddhist-Christian dialogue. I took up this question and explored a solution to it in the essay "Hartshorne and Nishida: Re-Envisioning the Absolute. Two Types of Panentheism vs. Spinoza's Pantheism" <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cont/ContNobu.htm>
This essay was originally presented as a paper at the 20th World Congress of Philosophy Paideia: Philosophy Educating Humanity, Boston Massachusetts U.S.A., August 10-16, 1998.
- 9 Desmond Paul Henry, *Commentary on De Gramatico: The Historical-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselm's* (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1974), p. 337; hereafter cited as CDR.
- 10 D. T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 139.
- 11 This motif of the unsurpassability or sovereignty of the Deity vis-à-vis creatures inherent in Barth's theology gave rise to Japanese philosopher Katsumi Takizawa's proposal of the idea of "irreversibility"—together with the notions of "inseparableness" and "non-identifiability"—in critically re-examining his mentor Kitaro Nishida's understanding of "God and the world." Takizawa writes: "If Dr. Nishida had really brought into its proper consequence his original intention inherent in his notions of "continuity in discontinuity" and "inverse limitation," he might have found anew that what lies beyond this world (or what Kenji Miyazawa refers to as "the fourth dimension") and what lies on this side, Jenseits and Diesseits, are distinguished *in terms of the absolute irreversible order*—and this without doing damage to what is positively expressed by Nishida's philosophical ideas of "soku" (*sive*-relationship) and "contradictory self-identity" of God and the world as opposed to traditional Christianity's behavior with a "sad countenance" (Matt. 6: 16) (*Takizawa Katsumi Chosakushu* [Works], Vol. 1, Kyoto: Hozokan, 1972), p. 432. Takizawa critically assumes that Nishida's philosophical insights, including those disclosed at the final steps of his career in the last essay written just before his death on July 7, 1945: "The Logic of Place and a Religious Worldview" (now contained in *Nishida Kitaro Zenshu* [Complete Works], Vol. 11, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1965), lacked the element of "irreversibility" although sufficiently clearly dealing with the elements of "inseparableness" and "non-identifiability." On the other hand, however, his Western mentor Karl Barth, according to Takizawa, was not really clear enough in his grasp of the inseparableness of the relationship between God and the world since he looked upon the fundamental Divine-human unity as "initiated" by the Incarnation of the Eternal Word of God in the history and person of Jesus as the Christ (see, e.g.,

- Chosakushu* [Works], Vol. 2: Studies in Karl Barth, Kyoto: Hozokan, 1975, ch. IX: "Was hindert mich noch, mich taufen zu lassen?", pp.435-464, esp. pp. 448-449, 456-457). As to my studies of Takizawa's thought, see the following essays: "Principles for Interpreting Christ/Buddha: Katsumi Takizawa and John B. Cobb, Jr.," *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, Vol. 3, 1983, 63-97; "Analogia Actionis: A New Proposal for Christology 'From Below,'" *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, 39/4, 1984, 268-85; "Katsumi Takizawa: Approach Toward A World Theology: A Critical Exposition From A Process Perspective," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, 41/3 & 4, 1987, 39-54.
- 12 Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 317.
 - 13 See D. T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, p. 139.
 - 14 In this sentence—especially by the expression "thereby paradoxically tending to be" in it—I am clarifying my position regarding the famous Kantian question about whether existence could be derivable from the mere concept of a Being. My position here is in line with Charles Hartshorne's critique of Kant's position (presented in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Max Mueller [New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1920], pp. 483-86) in the following dictum: "In these famous passages Kant seems scarcely aware that from the standpoint of the second Anselmian or Cartesian Proof the question is not whether ordinary or contingent existence could ever be derivable from the mere concept of a kind of thing, but only whether a uniquely excellent kind of existence, necessary existence, can be derived from a unique concept, that of divine perfection or Goodness" (AD, 225). That is to say, it should be stated from my position that the true question is whether the loyal God, implied in the Name of God, can paradoxically appear as the evocative God, not the Kantian question as to the derivability of contingent existence from the mere concept of a Being.
 - 15 Martin Luther, *Lectures on Romans*, ed. W. Pauck (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1961), p. 67; hereafter cited as LR.
 - 16 Rudolf Hermann, *Gesammelte Studien zur Theologie Luthers u. Reformation* (Göttingen: Vendenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960), pp. 11-43.
 - 17 See Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "Toward a Global Hermeneutic of Justification in Process Perspective: Luther and Shinran Comparatively Considered," *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 12 (1992), 103-20, esp., 106.
 - 18 Gregory Schufreider, *An Introduction to Anselm's Argument* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 79; hereafter cited as IAA.
 - 19 See Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection* (Lasalle, ILL: Open Court Publ. Co., 1962), p. 8.
 - 20 See *Proceedings of the IX Intern. Cong. For the Hist. of Religions* (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1960), pp. 223-228. Also "An Inquiry Into the Basic Structure of Christian Thought," *Religious Studies in Japan* (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1959), pp. 418-419.
 - 21 Cf.: "Language helps reality to its truth. In faith's view it is the possible that helps the real [come] linguistically to its truth and thus expresses itself as itself, i.e., as what is becoming" (Ernst Fuchs, *Hermeneutik*, Bad Cannstadt: Muellerschon, 1954, p. 211; cited in James M. Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus and Other Essays*,

- Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983, p. 207).
- 22 *Anselmi Opera Omnia*, vol. I, pp. 93-94; cited in IAA, 108. Cf.: "... [these pages] it seems to me indicated that the sole purpose of writing these works and circulating them among the brethren was to assist the monks with their meditation. In this connection, I might mention that the account I am offering here should serve to fill out the significance of the 'withdrawal from the world' characteristic of manasticism" (IAA, 108).
- 23 D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in Zen*, ed., with a foreword by Christmas Humphreys, New York: Dell Publ. Co., 1978, ch. IV. "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy," p. 85; hereafter cited as SZ. This essay is taken from *Essays in East-West Philosophy*, edited by Charles A. Moore, and published by the University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, in 1951. Humphreys notes that "[i]t is regarded by many as one of the greatest works ever produced by the author" (SZ, 10).
- 24 Daisetz T. Suzuki, *Zen and Japanese Culture* (New York: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 241; hereafter cited as ZJC. The background of Basho's writing the haiku poem in question was an exchange of questions and answers, namely, *mondo*. When Basho was studying Zen under his master Buccho, Buccho one day paid him a visit and asked, "How are you getting on these days?" Basho said, "After the recent rain the moss has grown greener than ever." Buccho shot a second arrow to see the depths of Basho's understanding of Zen, "What Buddhism is there even before the moss has grown greener?" Basho's answer was, "A frog jumps into the water, and hear the sound!" Basho's answer at the time it was uttered did not have the first line, "the old pond," which, it is reported, he added later on to make a complete haiku of seventeen syllables. See ZJC, 239.
- 25 Cf.: "Therefore we always encounter the absolute in our own self-negation, reflecting the paradox [or, more correctly, inverse correspondence] of God"; "The self always encounters the absolute as the paradox [or, more precisely, inverse correspondence] of God himself—that is, as the self-negation of the absolute One" (Kitaro Nishida, *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview*, trans. with an introd. David A. Dilworth, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987, pp. 94-95). Dilworth takes the Japanese adverb "*gyakutaioo teki ni*" (literally meaning "inversely correspondingly") to mean, and therefore translates it as, "paradox." My own use of the expression "inverse correlation or correspondence" is a result of my own theology of loyalty, as is clearly observable in the text. In Nishida's case, the idea of "inverse correspondence" presupposes what I might call the metaphysics of ultimate reversion, which is exemplified in Nishida's following passage: "A true absolute must possess itself through self-negation. The true absolute exists in that it returns to itself in the form of the relative" (*ibid.*, p. 67).
- 26 Luther writes of Psalm 70 as follows: "The justice of God is all this: to abase oneself to the uttermost [*sese in profundum humiliare*] and this properly Christ expresses here. For he is the power and justice of God through his uttermost and deepest humility" (Martin Luther, *Luthers Werke*, Weimarer Ausgabe, Weimar: Boehlau, 1938, 3: 458. 407, 465. 1. 33; quoted in G. Rupp, *The Righteousness of God: Luther Studies*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1953, p. 135).

- 27 "Gladly a sinner that thou mayest be justified in me [*Libenter peccator ut tu iustificeris in me*]" (Martin Luther, *Lectures on Romans*, ed. W. Pauck, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1961, pp. 7--71).
- 28 Remember in this regard Jesus' admonition: "Therefore do not worry about tomorrow, for tomorrow will worry about its own things" (Matt. 6:34). Of course, the real implication of "tomorrow" is not just literal; it rather signifies the nearness of the Unknowable in our life. Cf. the *mondo* 1 and 2 above.
- 29 This means that Emptiness emptying itself lying between the Deity and us is the innermost ontological core of the fundamental togetherness of the Deity with us, or of what Katsumi Takizawa calls the *Proto-factum* Immanuel. One cannot simply think of Emptiness as a Buddhist way of being awakened to the *Proto-factum* Immanuel. For in this case, no proper philosophical understanding of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel in itself is provided in a convincing manner. The truth of the matter is the other way round. Without thinking ontologically in the manner I mentioned above, we would not be able to epistemologically arrive at the power of awakening, which I find in God as he is evocatively near to us. According to my theology of loyalty, it is essential that (1) since God is loyal to (2) Emptiness emptying itself, (3) God can and does actually evoke loyalty in us creatures in the capacity of the voice of voiceless Emptiness. When Whitehead designates God as the "outcome of creativity," I notice a parallel hermeneutical concern at work. See Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, Corrected Edition, eds. David R. Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 88: "This is the conception of God according to which he is considered as the outcome of creativity, as the foundation of order, and as the goad towards novelty."
- 30 At this stage it can fairly be said that we are now going beyond Hartshorne's position of the derivability of necessary existence from a unique concept, that of divine perfection or Greatness—namely, the position from which he repudiates Kant's position of denying the derivability of contingent existence from the mere concept of a Being. Ours is the position of putting forward the Divine inclusion of contingent as well as necessary existence in the development of the Proof of God's Existence as it goes from *essentia* to *esse* to *existens*—and all this due to the Divine loyalty to the Nothingness Greater [*nihil maius*] as contained in the Name of God as *aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit* (Something beyond which Nothing Greater can be conceived). Cf. n. 14.
- 31 Personally, it is important to me that I came to prove the truthfulness of my teacher Katsumi Takizawa's theory of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel through this study of Anselm's argument with D. T. Suzuki's Zen insight as guide. What is pivotal in my own work of the proof is that I took the Nothing Greater [*nihil maius*] in Anselm's Name of God to mean Buddhist Emptiness as it empties itself as a concept, thus turning itself into that which lies between God and creatures, which points to the authenticity of what Takizawa designates as the "*Proto-factum* Immanuel." Yet, it seems to me that Takizawa usually doesn't refer to Buddhist Emptiness as the inner core of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel. Rather, he identifies what his mentor Kitaro Nishida calls the self-identity of absolute contradictories (Jpn., *zettai mujun teki jiko dooitsu*), which in Nishida

stands for Buddhist Emptiness, with the *Proto-factum* Immanuel which he has learned from Karl Barth. His attainment of a fundamental philosophical conviction occurred, he thought, in envisaging these two expressions of Reality by his two mentors as signifying one and the same Reality. However, what I have attempted to show in this essay is a different approach toward Takizawa's philosophical achievement. I do not identify Buddhist Emptiness with the *Proto-factum* Immanuel; rather, I regard the former as the inner core of the latter. Only through this approach I came along with Anselm to arrive at the proof of the Existence of God "with us." Yet, in this approach I was intending to vivify Takizawa's another expression appearing as early as 1936 in *Fundamental Problems in Nishida's Philosophy* (Tokyo: Toe Shobo, 1936; new edition, Tokyo: Kobushi Shobo, 2004): "All that actually exists is immediately faced with absolute Being (i.e., God) through the medium of absolute Nihil (i.e., Emptiness)" (p. 38-39). Takizawa explains this state of affairs in terms of Nishida's idea of "continuity in discontinuity" (Jpn., *hirenzoku no renzoku*). For my discussion of the distinction between Nishida's standpoint of unity of opposites and Takizawa's notion of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel, see my article "Suynata, Kenosis, and Jihi or Friendly Compassionate Love: Toward a Buddhist-Christian Theology of Loyalty" (*Japanese Religions*, 15/4, July 1989), 50-66.

- 32 Cf.: "This 'that' is what is primarily and immediately given to our consciousness. It may be called 'undifferentiated continuum', to use Mr. Northrop's term. To the Western mind, 'continuum' may be better than *sunayata*, though it is likely to be misinterpreted as something 'objectively' existing and apprehensible by *vijnana*. In the 'continuum' immediately given, however, there is no differentiation of subject and object, of the seer and the seen. It is the 'old mirror' that has not yet been polished, and therefore no world of multiplicities is reflected in the 'mirror'. It is the Primary Man, in whom neither flesh nor bones are left and yet who can reveal himself not only to his parents but to all his brothers, non-sentient as well as sentient. It is 'the father' whose age is not calculable by means of numbers and therefore to whom everything is a 'grandchild' of conceptualization. It lives with *prajna* in the absolute state of quiescence, in which no polarization has taken place. It therefore eludes our efforts to bring it out to the discriminable surface of consciousness. We cannot speak of it as 'being' or as 'non-being'. The categories created by ratiocination are not at all applicable here. If we attempt to wake it from the eternal silence of '*neti, neti*' (not this, not this) we 'murder' it, and what *vijnana* perceives is a most mercilessly mutilated corpse" (SZ, 119-120).
- 33 Let me show this state of affairs by reference to Anselm's crucial, second to the last text in IV: "For God is 'that beyond which nothing greater can be conceived'. Whoever [1] truly knows that [2] knows that it exists in such a way that even in thought it cannot but exist. And so whoever knows that this is the manner of God's existence cannot [3] conceive him as not existing" (AFQI, 168). Here we have three stages of knowing or conceiving at work in Anselm's argument: the first stage of truly knowing [1] stands for the intuitive knowledge of the Name of God; the second stage of knowing [2] points to the function of reason in conformation to what appears in the first stage; and the third stage ("cannot conceive him as not existing") [3] refers to the mode of God's Existence as it inseparably appears to the knower, thus showing that God is "with" him, which is

nothing but the execution of the proof. As is clear here, the Proof of the Existence of God is neither a merely intramental nor a merely extramental event, but is an inter-subjective, relational event. As such, it would be commensurate with the quantum-mechanical truth to the effect that "an experimenter is part of the experimental apparatus." You cannot think of the apparatus *per se* apart from the experimenter within it. By the same token, you cannot think of the Existence of God *per se* apart from one who is involved in the argument, Anselm, either. At any rate, at this final stage it can fairly be said that reason as the way to the vision of God is accomplished. Anselm's contemplation is fulfilled.

34 Cf. n. 31 above.