

PORTRAYING “AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE” BY
 THE METHOD OF
 ANALOGY: TOWARD CREATIVE USES OF
 THE ANALOGY OF
 ATTRIBUTION *DUORUM AD TERTIUM* FOR
 COMPARA—
 TIVE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Part II

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**Section III: A Metaphysical Re-interpretation of the
 Analogy of Attribution *duorum ad tertium*:
 Whiteheadian Process Thought and The
 Nishida School of Buddhist Philosophy**

*A. Alfred North Whitehead and Kitarō Nishida: Their Visions of
 “God and the World”*

Whitehead’s metaphysics culminates in the final chapter, entitled “God and the World,” of his magnum opus, *Process and Reality* (1929). There might be at least two ways of understanding this chapter: one is to understand it in the light of the whole development of his cosmology in the preceding chapters of the book and in other important works written by him prior to it; and the other is to elucidate the significant structure of the chapter in the light of the whole history of Western philosophical theology as regards the problem of analogy. This is because the chapter, in my view, has two characters: the theological consequence of Whitehead’s “philosophy of organism” and a new interpretation of the theological analogy. In this sub-section, I shall first consider the latter character, together with a similar development in Kitarō Nishida’s philosophy of the *topos* of absolute Nothingness in its final stage, in the light of what I

have thus far achieved in Sections I and II; and then reflect upon the first character in comparison with Charles Hartshorne's, Susanne Langer's, and Dorothy Emmet's respective considerations of analogy on the ground of Whitehead's philosophy.

For our task in this section it is important to confirm two major results of the preceding section. First, we ascertained there that Barth's *Analogia Relationis* is, unfortunately, a metaphorical analogy, symptomatic of his lack of the knowledge of the ontological relationship between Godhead and humanity, hence, inadequate to the solution to the Thomistic question as to how Being, God, and beings are related to each other. Second, we also acknowledged there that in Panneberg's doxological analogy Jesus' history (including his claim to authority) is to be conceived as the *modus significandi*, although in and through his resurrection by God it points analogically to the *perfectio significata* as the Eschaton. It follows that we now can perceive a new formation of the *duorum ad tertium*: Godhead, God (as the Eschaton), and humanity (including Jesus of Nazareth) form a triangle. *The only problem is: How can we conceive of this triangle in analogical terms more proper than Barth's metaphorical ones?*

It is in answer to this question that I prize the following two passages from Whitehead's *Process and Reality*:

[A] Neither God, nor the World, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God and the World, is instrument of novelty for the other.⁴¹

[B] The *particularities* of the actual world presuppose it [the primordial nature of God], while *it* merely presupposes the *general* metaphysical character of creative advance, of which it is the primordial exemplification. The primordial nature of God is the acquirement of creativity of a primordial character. (PR, 344)

From my perspective of analogy, the former passage, A, superbly accounts for the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*, in the sense that there is the reality of Creativity (or

the creative advance into novelty) which is antecedent to God and the World. Creativity is not a genus but the metaphysical ultimate; therefore, what we find in the above passage is not a generic predication but an analogical transference of creativity—language to the ultimate metaphysical reality. Hence, we can vindicate the metaphysical validity of this analogy against the Thomists' overall negation of it.

Now it is important to recognize that by the expression "in the grip of" Whitehead asserts an ontological relationship (which involves the element of univocity) to exist between the metaphysical ultimate (in his case, Creativity, which I can identify as the intra-trinitarian Godhead within the scheme of Barth's dogmatics, and which is a radically desubstantialized case of the Thomist Being, *esse*) and the World (as this includes in itself humanity and Jesus of Nazareth). However, he asserts it to exist between Creativity and God as well. In this respect, his reality-picture very much resembles the founder of the Kyoto school of Buddhist philosophy Kitarō Nishida's notion of the *topos* (Jpn., *basho*) of absolute Nothingness where God and the World are both ultimately located.⁴² Nishida also calls the *topos* the "(mutual) self-identity of absolute contradictories" in the sense of the "unity of opposites" because it is the ultimate unitary place which, being neither God nor the World, subsumes both God and the World under itself. As an interpretation of the Mahayana Buddhist logic of *prajñā*-intuition as "is-ness/is-not-ness" or "sive/non" (Jpn., *soku-hi*), Nishida's notion of *topos* is comparable to D. T. Suzuki's rendering of the same logic: A is not-A; and therefore A is A.⁴³

It is important to note that Nishida delivers a unique analogical interpretation of the *topos* of absolute Nothingness in his celebrated last essay "The Logic of Place and a Religious World-view" (which was written just before his death in 1945 and was published in 1946). What is central in the essay is the concept of "*gyaku-taiō*" in Japanese, which I once rendered into English as "a mutual priority"⁴⁴ and David A. Dilworth designated

as “a relationship of inverse polarity.”⁴⁵ What Nishida means by this concept is a unique, paradoxical relationship of God (or Buddha) and creatures in and through the *topos* of absolute Nothingness. I might rather translate it now as “inverse proportionality or correspondence” in view of the context from which he derives the concept, namely, “...because there is Buddha, there are sentient beings, and because there are sentient beings, there is Buddha” (LPRW, 110, 121). For Nishida, God is to creatures just as creatures are to God simply because the entirety of this inverse proportionality/correspondence or, I might say, a proportionality/correspondence “back to back” is *reality in itself*. Hence, we should say that for Nishida analogy goes beyond the matter of predication of God by us. Indeed, it *is*. And it is *itself* the *topos* of all actualities as the creative world or the mediator as this limits itself *as* its opposite poles, God and creatures (LPRW, 88, 94, 115).

In the afore-mentioned essay Nishida tries to interpret Pure Land Buddhism and Christian faith in terms of this inverse analogy as well. But I do not think he makes a good score in this respect because he is not mindful enough of the element of irreversibility essential to these religions, as Katsumi Takizawa critically assumes.⁴⁶ By contrast, Whitehead’s reality-picture in the latter passage quoted earlier, B, provides a philosophical rationale for interpreting them. For this picture consists in the fact that there is an irreversible order of ontological-*cum*-axiological presupposition as regards the relationship between Creativity, God, and particularities when it comes to dealing with the initiation of aims in the World. Significantly enough, in Whitehead’s metaphysics this picture is combined with the former picture which I identified as the metaphysical vindication of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*.

This correspondingly reminds me of the fact that there are, within the framework of Mahayana Buddhism, two basically different reality-pictures, Zen to which I already referred above and Pure Land Buddhism in which we can find an irreversible

order as regards the relationship between *Dharmakāya* (i.e., Buddha-body or Emptiness), *Sambhogakāya* (i.e., Body of Bliss or Recompense, that is, Amida Buddha), and *Nirmānakāya* (i.e., Manifest Body or the Dharmakara Bodhisattva).⁴⁷ In the case of Pure Land Buddhism, the irreversible order is related to the cosmic operation of Amida Buddha's Vow to save all sentient beings; it is the order of volitional sustenance of creatures by a theistic Buddha.

However, it should be remembered that Pure Land Buddhism is truly Buddhistic in asserting that as the *Upāya* (expedient) *Dharmakāya*, Amida Buddha is supremely loyal to the *Dharmakāya* as such, thus making trust in Him/Her⁴⁸ translatable into Enlightenment to Emptiness.⁴⁹ This might be equivalent to Whitehead's dictum: "The primordial nature of God is the acquirement of creativity of a primordial character" (PR, 344).⁵⁰

This being so, we now might be able to draw the following diagram (Fig. II). It may be noted that in this diagram the metaphysical ultimate (i.e., Whitehead's Creativity, as comparable to the *topos* of absolute Nothingness in Nishida's philosophy—comparable not in its exact conceptual sameness but because it shares the metaphysical import of ultimacy with Nishida's idea of *topos*) is situated *down here*,⁵¹ thus giving rise to the turning upsidedown of the properly triangular picture of reality (as found in Fig. I) into this reverse one consisting of three apices: namely, Creativity, God, and the World.




Fig. II

There are involved in this diagram the two reality-pictures, A and B, that are finally compatible for the reason I have thus far explained. Ontologically, that is, in terms of the *ordo essendi* as the reality-picture A, \overrightarrow{WC} (The World's Loyalty) = \overrightarrow{WG} (Service as Understood by God) + \overrightarrow{GC} (God's Loyalty). Here I am using the term "loyalty"⁵² in its ultimate *ontological* sense, that is, in the sense of "metaphysical dependence" commensurate with what Nishida designates as "the logic of place" whereby one can refer to the ultimate metaphysical place "within" which actualities "are (located)." *This loyalty, in my view, always ontologically precedes our conscious acknowledgment of it.*⁵³ Although our conscious acknowledgment of this ontological loyalty takes one and the same form as the said formula, yet it needs the power or agency of enabling us to awaken to the "metaphysical dependence" in which we all actually exist, willy-nilly. This power is coterminous, at the *axiological*-ontological level of the universe, with our vision of reality B. This vision of reality is to be called, in a sense, the epistemological order (*ordo cognoscendi*) at whose core is the evocation by God of our conscious, creaturely loyalty to Creativity (and, simultaneously, to God), which is the same thing as God's awakening us to the "metaphysical dependence" or God's *active* creation, in the sense of realization, of our value in the universe.⁵⁴

In this sense, axiologically, that is, in terms of the *ordo cognoscendi* as the reality-picture B, \overrightarrow{CW} (Concrescence or the Buddhist Self-Realization) = \overrightarrow{CG} (Primordial Exemplification) + \overrightarrow{GW} (Incarnation). Here we are concerned with "concrescence," in the sense of the actual exemplification of the ultimate metaphysical principle of Creativity, of which God is the lead. As is well known, the Whiteheadian notion of "concrescence" signifies the "many becoming one and being increased by one"; but this horizontal process of creative synthesis must presuppose the vertical dynamism of concretizing and embodying Creativity *qua* the ultimate metaphysical principle that is "without a character of its own" (PR, 31).⁵⁵ Accordingly, what is implied in the

"conrescence," in my view, is a voiceless encouragement for us to become *loyal* to Creativity (and, simultaneously, to God), in the sense of our conscious acknowledgement of the "metaphysical dependence" inherent in our vision of reality A. In other words, our vision of reality B has its own proper place between the ultimate ontological significance of our vision of reality A (let us call it A [1]) and its creaturely attitudinal significance (let us call it A [2]).

Given this threefold clarification of our Whiteheadian vision of reality (as A [1], B, and A [2]),⁵⁶ it turns out comparatively philosophically that there can be found parallel modes of thought in at least two representative thinkers on the side of the Nishida school of philosophy: Katsumi Takizawa and Shizuteru Ueda.

First, Takizawa in his final years came to conclude that what he calls the *Proto-factum* Immanuel (God with us) or the contact of God and humanity divides into two dimensions, the primary (i.e., ontic) and secondary (i.e., noetic) contacts, the latter, secondary contact further subdividing into the primary aspect (i.e., God's *self*-expression in and as humans) and the secondary aspect (i.e., humans' expression in themselves *of* God).⁵⁷ The primary contact inheres within the bottom of each and every person's existence; and the secondary contact is the way in which we humans respond consciously and conscientiously to it, Jesus being its perfect embodiment (see II, b, 2). In this threefold vision of reality by Takizawa we can notice a very interesting fact: namely, his idea of the primary contact between God and humanity (or the *Proto-factum* Immanuel) would be correlative to our Whiteheadian vision of reality A only if he allowed the notion of the "contact between" to mean in itself the metaphysical ultimate such as Nishida's concept of the *topos* of absolute Nothingness subsuming God and beings under itself. Takizawa himself is reticent on this point, though. His major concern, rather, is with clarifying that the primary contact (*qua* "unio substantialis") is "irreversibly antecedent" to the secondary

contact (*qua* “*unio functionalis*”).⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Takizawa seems to have confidently assumed that his notion of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel (which he identifies as the Logos in John 1:1) is identical with Nishida’s standpoint of the *topos* of absolute Nothingness. I think he needs a metaphysical clarification, such as mine, of his philosophical theology here.

If he acknowledged our supplementary clarification mentioned above, he would be able to conceive that \overrightarrow{WC} (i.e., the World’s immediate loyalty to the “Contact between” or, more precisely, the realm of the “Between”) is analogically correlative to \overrightarrow{WG} (i.e., the World’s irreversible dependence upon God) + \overrightarrow{GC} (i.e., God’s supreme loyalty to the metaphysical “Between”), namely, the World’s loyalty to the “Between” as mediated by God. This is important in that it allows us to think cogently about the secondary contact between God and humanity in terms of the basic (albeit paradoxical) compatibility of the Zen-like immediate satori (in the sense of \overrightarrow{CW}) and the Pure Land-type faith in the mediation of the ultimate Dharmakaya as such by Amida’s Vow (in the sense of $\overrightarrow{CG} + \overrightarrow{GW}$).

This same supplementary knowledge is important in reflecting upon the secondary (humanly–subjectively self–expressive) aspect of the secondary contact between God and humanity as this corresponds to the primary (divinely–subjectively Self–expressive) aspect, as well. Namely, it provides us an insight into the fact that the secondary aspect is the way in which we humans *retrieve and re-enact in our existential attitude* the original ontological loyalty in which we actually are, willy–nilly.⁵⁹ Of course, our attitudinal loyalty is evoked by God; but it is ultimately oriented toward the Between, the *topos* of absolute Nothingness, or Creativity—although in and through God who encounters us within the context of the primary aspect of the secondary contact between God and humanity.

In a word, what I am concerned here with is a threefold truth: to use D. T. Suzuki’s phraseology, (1) although we “live Zen” ontologically, willy–nilly, (2) we “live by Zen” at

the attitudinal level, (3) because we are encouraged to this end by God while at the same time enabled to *grasp intellectually* reality as such in terms of our Whiteheadian vision A [1] which I identify as the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*, as has thus far been discussed in this study.⁶⁰

Second, it is Shizuteru Ueda who has brilliantly re-articulated Kitarō Nishida's philosophical enterprise as comprising three dimensions. In the Preface to his maiden work *An Inquiry into the Good* (1911) Nishida's famous dictum appears: "For many years I wanted to explain all things on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality."⁶¹ And Ueda proposes to say that the first dimension, pure experience, is an ineffable occurrence, *qua* the proto-word, which unfolds of itself into the second dimension, the *Grundsatz* (fundamental sentence or symbol quintessential to philosophy as the "science of principles") to the effect that "pure experience is the sole reality," which further gives rise to the third dimension, discursive philosophical thinking *per se* aiming at explaining all things from the standpoint of the "science of totality."⁶²

From our present perspective in this essay, it is important to notice that in the actual development of his philosophy Nishida has radically reconsidered this three-stage unfolding of the standpoint of pure experience (into the "science of principles" and the "science of totality"), first in *Intuition and Reflection* (1917) by introducing the standpoint of "absolute will" and then in the second half of *From the Actor to the Seer* (1927) through the mediation of the Greek philosophical concept of "place."⁶³ In view of this fact Ueda proposes to grasp the entirety of Nishida's philosophical development as comprising three stages: pure experience to self-awareness to place.⁶⁴

Crucial in what is contained in Ueda's observation, in my own view, is this issue: the unfolding of pure experience into the subsequent two stages of the *Grundsatz* and discursive philosophical thinking cannot happen in a merely linear fashion in terms of a monistic emanation of all things from pure experience. Then,

what would be the basic moments that brought about radical changes in Nishida's philosophical development?

It is precisely in response to this question that we hold that the problems of the "volitional evocation of our creaturely loyalty by God" and of the "retrieval of the topological structure of pure experience in and through our actual, attitudinal loyalty" are to be elucidated by means of our Whiteheadian reality-pictures, B and A [2], based upon our fundamental vision of reality A [1] identifiable as the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*.

There seems to exist in the universe not only pure experience but also the "evocative power" that encourages "us creatures or sentient beings" to correspond and be loyal to pure experience. If so, the fundamental structure of reality turns out to be inclusive of and subsuming under itself the evocative power and creatures together. Hence, ultimate reality is of the topological nature that fits in with our re-interpretation of the Thomist analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*.⁶⁵

The topological nature of ultimate reality (our reality-picture A [1]), however, comes to the fore *in our cognizance* only through the two processes of the Divine evocation (our reality-picture B) and of our attitudinal loyalty (our reality-picture A [2]). Yet, it is essentially inherent in the ultimate reality of Creativity from the outset to which God and creatures are both loyal *on the equal ontological basis*—in the case of God *willingly* and in the case of creatures *willy-nilly*. Inasmuch as God is willingly loyal to Creativity (which is "without a character of its own" [PR, 31], hence, equivalent to Buddhist Nothingness or Emptiness in this regard), God is the only one in the universe who can evoke conscious loyalty in our creaturely hearts and minds. In this sense, I might call God the principle of loyalty in the universe. When I say that God is loyal to Creativity, I do not mean that God is loyal to Something—in contradiction to the First Commandment (Ex. 20:3). For Creativity is Emptiness, as mentioned above. As such, Creativity is creative insofar as it empties and negates itself to become pragmatically effective in

the world as the creative advance; however, it lacks an empirical basis for being the principle of loyalty as the evocative power in the universe like God.⁶⁶

Referring back to our Whiteheadian discussion mentioned earlier, there are two specifically important issues to be considered here after our scrutiny of the Nishida school of philosophy. One is the issue of how in our reality-picture B Creativity is directly related to the World, an issue which is analogically correlated with the irreversible ontological-*cum*-axiological order as regards the relationship between Creativity, God (as primordial), and the World. (See \overrightarrow{CW} [Concrescence or the Buddhist Self-realization] in Fig. II.) The other issue concerns the fact that what is contained in our reality-picture A is a reference to the relationship of the World to God, which completes the picture of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* as thus explained. (See \overrightarrow{WG} [Service as Understood by God] in Fig. II.)

From my perspective of analogy, these two points have to be specifically emphasized in relation to the respective reality-pictures. First, because of the need for the \overrightarrow{CW} we are led to consider what Whitehead calls the ontological principle, which can be summarized as: "no actuality, then no reason" (PR, 19). For Whitehead, "'Actual entities'—also termed 'actual occasions'—are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real" (PR, 18). Now actual entities are actual entities only by virtue of the ultimate metaphysical principle of Creativity characterizing ultimate matter of fact. Hence, as already mentioned, "The many become one, and are increased by one" (PR, 21). That is to say, actual entities *concrese* in the double sense of "becoming actual" (vertically) and "growing together" (horizontally).⁶⁷

It is crucial for a right understanding of Whitehead's metaphysics that one thinks of nothing intermediary between the ontological principle and the ultimate principle of Creativity

by which “the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively” (PR, 21). For, as Whitehead stresses, “The definiteness of fact is due to its forms; but the individual fact is a creature, and creativity is the ultimate behind all forms, *inexplicable by forms*, and conditioned by its creatures” (PR, 20; italics mine). This is significantly reminiscent of Nishida’s idea of the *topos* of absolute Nothingness as this subsumes and undergirds actualities without the operation of any sort of medium between itself and them.⁶⁸

Second, let me refer back to the reality-picture A. Because of the need for \overrightarrow{WG} we are obliged to account for what Whitehead terms the consequent nature of God, which is the “fluent world become ‘everlasting’ by its objective immortality in God” (PR, 347). *It is noteworthy that this nature of God is in itself \overrightarrow{WG}* . In Whitehead’s words, “The consequent nature of God is the fulfilment of his experience by his reception of the multiple freedom of actuality into the harmony of his own actualization. It is God as really actual, completing the deficiency of his mere conceptual actuality” (PR, 349).

It follows that our actual (even unknowing) service to God, as a physical, ontological contribution to Her, is at the same time God’s acceptance or understanding of us. We cannot separate one from the other. Hence, as Whitehead superbly explicates,

What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands. (PR, 351)

This may sound appropriate as an interpretation of the analogy of attribution *unius ad alterum*, as Analogia Fidei as it functions on the ontological level before our conscious faith

emerges, combined with the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* in the form of our Whiteheadian reality–picture A [1]. Yet, it differs from the Thomist *unius ad alterum* in that it recognizes a causal contribution of creatures to God, as well as God’s causal influence over creatures. When we come to appreciate this whole process *consciously*, we are *in faith*. And this is what I intend to mean by the Whiteheadian reality–picture A [2].

In the diagram mentioned earlier I applied loyalty–language to description of \overrightarrow{WC} and \overrightarrow{GC} (see Fig. II); they mean the World’s loyalty and God’s loyalty respectively directed toward Creativity. By “loyalty” I mean the fact that either of them, God and the World, is the “*instrument* of novelty [i.e., Creativity] for the other” (PR, 349; italics mine).

In conclusion, based upon the three reality–pictures, A [1], B, and A [2], thus far depicted, we could creatively re–interpret the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* in terms of creativity–language in this manner: the World actually induces and accepts, God both primordially and consequently manifests, and Godhead (as God beyond God) enjoys, creativity. As is clear in this formula, we affirm with Whitehead two working principles in the matter of analogy, namely, bipolar theism and the distinction of Creativity as the metaphysical ultimate from God as the religious ultimate. Because of these two principles our stance toward analogy is radically different from the one assumed in the Thomist doctrine of analogy (see Section I). We neither accept the Thomists’ identification of existence and essence in God nor affirm their identification of Being (*esse*) and God, the notion of *Ipsium Esse Subsistens*. However, we approve with Thomists of the principle of relation of creation, but on condition that it refers to the initiation of aims in the World by the Primordial Nature of God, to whom we humans respond in faith while at the same time understood by the Consequent Nature of God.

(To be continued)

NOTES:

41. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, Corrected Edition, eds. D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), p. 349. (Hereinafter cited as PR.)

Wolfhart Pannenberg takes up this same paragraph to show critically that Whitehead's vision of reality (here in the present study depicted as A) is a renewed development in a different fashion of the Platonic dualistic conception of the world as it is formed out of a formless matter through the work of a Demiurge. What is problematic in this vision of reality for Pannenberg is that it presents the idea of the world as "outcome of certain kind of co-working of God with another principle" (*Ergebnis irgendeines Zusammenwirkens Gottes mit einem anderen Prinzip*)—and this against the classical Christian doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* (see *Systematische Theologie*, Band II, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991, pp. 29–30). He also repudiates Whitehead's view of the divine essence as being "just a correlate of the concept of the world" (*schliesslich ein Korrelat des Weltbegriffs*) (see *Systematische Theologie*, Band I [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988], p. 397; E.T.: *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1991], p. 367).

At any rate, it seems to me that Pannenberg feels it very difficult to grasp Whitehead's reality-picture A properly philosophically-theologically because it is formed analogically after the manner of the Thomistic analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*. The fact that he refers to it as a Platonic dualism or synergism simply manifests that he is not accustomed to the "triadic" way of metaphysical thinking in which the first item (i.e., God) and the second item (i.e., the World) are correlated to each other only by virtue of their analogical attribution/relation to the third item (i.e., the metaphysical principle of Creativity). Pannenberg lacks a thirdness in his philosophical-theological thinking. To think of a thirdness (which, to my mind, needs not to be "Something" but which can and must be "Not-Something") would mean to theologians like him to be always antagonistic to the authentic Christian doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*.

42. Kitarō Nishida, "Bashoteki ronri-to shūkyōteki sekaikan" (The Logic of Place and a Religious World-view), in his *Tetsugaku*

ronbunshū (Philosophical Essays), vol. VII (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1946), pp. 111, 115, 135. (Hereinafter cited as LPRW). See also Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "Whitehead and Nishida on Time: Part I," *Japanese Religions*, 12/2, July 1982, 51-52. The same idea I have expressed elsewhere within the context of Buddhist-Christian dialogue in contemporary Japan in terms of the *duorum ad tertium* (see my article "Principles for Interpreting Christ/Buddha: Katsumi Takizawa and John B. Cobb, Jr.," *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, vol. 3, 1983, 64-97, esp. 78; see also Niels C. Nielsen, Jr., "Analogia Entis as the Basis of Buddhist-Christian Dialogue," *Modern Theology*, 3/4, July 1987, 345-57, esp. 354).

43. D. T. Suzuki, "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed., *The Japanese Mind: Essentials of Japanese Culture* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), pp. 66-95. Suzuki's formula points to the way in which we can break through the law of excluded middle: in Mahayana Buddhism Nirvana is neither A (world) nor not-A (supra-mundane reality of Being); as such, Nirvana is both A and not-A; under the aspect of this Nirvana A is really A again.

The logic of *prajñā-sive/non* (Jpn., *hannya soku-hi*) may be considered a peculiarly Eastern way of thinking based upon the Mahayana Buddhist vision of reality. But there is a very illuminating, corresponding case in the West: St. Anselm develops a unique reflection upon "nihil" as having a dual significative function. In *De Casu Diaboli* 11, he states: "On account of all the foregoing points, the utterance 'not-something' in a certain fashion signifies *thing* and *something*, and at the same time it in no fashion signifies *thing* or *something*. For it signifies them remotively, while not signifying them constitutively. This is why the name 'nothing,' which eliminates all that is something, has a twofold significative function: remotively, it does not signify nothing, but something, and constitutively it does not signify something, but nothing. Hence there is no necessity that nothing should be something on account of its name's in some way or another signifying something; rather it is necessary that nothing should be nothing, since the name only signifies something in the sense described just now" (S I, 249.6-250.1; cited in Desmond Paul Henry, *The Logic of Saint Anselm* [London: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1967], p. 210).

Basically, Anselm is prepared to hold that *voces non significant nisi res* (utterances only signify things). However, he is mindful of the difficulty accompanying this doctrine. Namely, if combined with it is the equation of "nihil" (nothing) and "*non-aliquid*"

(not-something), then the result will be the idea that “*nihil*” (nothing) is simply a non-significant utterance. This is because, as D. P. Henry explicates, “on one interpretation of ‘res’ = ‘thing,’ if ‘*nihil*’ = ‘nothing’ is the same as ‘*non-aliquid*’ = ‘not-something,’ then ‘*nihil*’ = ‘nothing’ cannot be said to signify any *res* = things; how then can ‘*nihil*’ = ‘nothing’ be said to signify anything at all?” (Desmond Paul Henry, *Commentary on De Grammatico: The Historical-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselm’s* [Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1974], p. 335).

Thus, the only way in which “*nihil*” (nothing) has a meaning is to deny that it “is a *name*, insofar as its significative functions are concerned” (ibid., p. 337; italics mine). If so, “*nihil*” (nothing) has, as Henry explicates, a two-fold significative function, remotive and constitutive, neither of which is naming (or predication, in my own language here in the present essay). Henry concludes: “Remotively (*removendo*) ‘*nihil*’ = ‘nothing’ effects the complete removal from its import of every object which is something: constitutively (*constituendo*), therefore, the meaning which it establishes is ‘no thing at all’ or ‘no thing that is something’ (S I 249.6.17; compare “‘*non-aliquid*’ *vox nullam rem aut quod sit aliquid significat*’ = ‘The utterance “non-something” signifies no thing nor anything that is something’ (S I 249.17, cf. S I 249.9,250.3) with Peter of Spain’s “‘*Nihil enim significat idem quod “nulla res”*’ = “No thing” signifies the same as does “no thing” (HSL 12.28)). In the first (remotive) case, ‘*nihil*’ = ‘nothing’ signifies something; in the second it signifies nothing” (ibid., p. 337).

In my own judgment, the only way “*nihil*” (*qua* “not-something”) is meaningful in the two-fold significative function (as remotive and constitutive) is to conceive of it as *reality in itself* like Buddhist Emptiness. Emptiness is Emptiness insofar as it empties (or removes) itself as a mere notion or name or predication in order to manifest (or constitute) itself as ultimate reality. (In writing this note, I am indebted to Dr. Jon Whitman of Hebrew University for calling my attention to the above-cited two writings of D. P. Henry’s.)

44. Nobuhara, “Whitehead and Nishida on Time,” 51.
45. David A. Dilworth, “Religious Consciousness and the Logic of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra: From *The Logic of Place and a Religious World-view*,” *Monumenta Nipponica*, XXV, 1–2, 1970, 206.
46. Katsumi Takizawa, *Hikkyō: symposium “sei-no konkyō-o tou”* (In Short: A Symposium Questioning the Ground of Life), eds.

- Takizawa et al. (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1974), p. 121,
47. See Katsumi Takizawa, *Zoku Bukkyō-to Kirisutokuyō* (A Sequel to "Buddhism and Christianity") (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1979), pp. 74-76; see also John B. Cobb, Jr., "Can a Buddhist Be a Christian, Too?," *Japanese Religions*, 11/2-3, September 1980, 43.
 48. Some Japanese scholars, including Nishida, sometimes call Amida "Buddha the Mother," although Amida is a male figure in the original Indian literature.
 49. Cf. Shin'ichi Hisamatsu, "Zen: Its Meaning for Modern Civilization," *The Eastern Buddhist*, New Series, 1/1, September 1965, 31. Takizawa and Cobb, however, reject with justice the subordination of Amida to Dharmakaya. For them the *upāya* figure has its own proper status in the universe (as the *Proto-factum* Immanuel for Takizawa, and as the principle of rightness for Cobb) (see Takizawa, *Zoku Bukkyō-to Kirisutokuyō*, p. 137, n. 7 and Cobb, "Can a Buddhist...", 43, 46). In elaborating the standpoint of Pure Land Buddhism philosophically, the following two works are illuminating: Yoshinori Takeuchi, *Kyōgyōshinshō-no tetsugaku* (The Philosophy of the *Kyōgyōshinshō*) (Tokyo: Ryūbunkan, 1987) and Hajime Tanabe, *Philosophy As Metanoetics*, trans. by Yoshinori Takeuchi, foreword by James W. Heisig (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1986).
 50. Cf. John B. Cobb, Jr., *Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), pp. 126-28, 131.
 51. For Whitehead, "Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the Aristotelian 'matter' is without a character of its own. It is that ultimate notion of the highest generality *at the base of actuality*" (PR, 31; italics mine). Likewise Nishida holds that "Our own self has the [True] Self in that which transcends its existence through and through *precisely at the bottom of its existence*" (LPRW, 157-58; translation and italics mine).
 52. Philosophically, the concept of loyalty was first representatively articulated by Josiah Royce in his celebrated volume *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908): "Loyalty is the will to manifest, so far as is possible, the Eternal, that is, the conscious and superhuman unity of life, in the form of the acts of an individual Self" (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914, p. 357). Here Royce's major concern is with relating the "acts of an individual Self" to the "Eternal" in the sense of the religious ultimate, God.

However, in my case, this concept is, primarily, provided a metaphysical turn, in the sense of making it relevant to the mode of relationships of the individual actualities (including both creatures and God) to the metaphysical ultimate (such as Whitehead's Creativity and Nishida's *topos* of absolute Nothingness). This I can call the *apotheosis* of the philosophical concept of "loyalty" because, for me, the individual Self who is supremely loyal to the "transindividual unity of life" *per se* is God. For further clarification of my thesis of "God as the principle of loyalty in the universe," see my article "Principles for Interpreting Christ/Buddha," 87-89. As to the philosophical use of the concept of "apotheosis," see Whitehead, PR, 348: "Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached its final term which is everlastingness—the Apotheosis of the World."

As a result, in this particular sense, my use of the term "loyalty" is significantly different from the ways in which H. Richard Niebuhr and Theodore W. Jennings, Jr. use it religiously in their important recent works: *Faith on Earth: An Inquiry into the Structure of Human Faith*, ed., Richard R. Niebuhr (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1989) and *Loyalty to God: The Apostles' Creed in Life and Liturgy* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1992).

53. This issue may correspond to Hans Küng's distinction between what he calls "fundamental trust" and religious faith (*Does God Exist? An Answer for Today*, trans. Edward Quinn, New York: Vintage Books, 1981, pp. 473-74). However, it seems to me that insofar as his notion of fundamental trust is conceived as a person's saying "Yes to the uncertain reality of himself and the world, making himself open to reality and able to maintain this attitude consistently in practice" and thus is put forward in opposition to nihilism (*ibid.*, pp. 442-77, esp. 445), it rather belongs within what I call "attitudinal loyalty" as basic affirmative decision. By contrast, my notion of "ontological loyalty" signifies the way in which all actualities come to be in reality, willy-nilly—something like the Buddhist notion of *pratitya-samutpada* (dependent co-origination) or Whitehead's idea of "conrescence," of which each of the actual beings is an "instance" (see Cobb, *Beyond Dialogue*, pp. 107, 146).
54. In other words, God is the one who provides each actuality a feature of its *für sich* essence or "whatness" while *at the same time* presupposing that it is endowed with its *an sich* facticity or "thatness"—which I call the "metaphysical dependence" in the

text—by the purely formless act of creating, Creativity. Here my language is almost Thomistic in explicating what the Whiteheadian Creativity is all about, but not really so. For I distinguish it from God, whereas Thomists identify the act of existing (*esse*) with God as "He Who is." As to a parallelism between creativity and *esse*, see Lewis S. Ford, "Creativity in a Future Key," in Robert C. Neville, ed., *New Essays in Metaphysics* (Albany: State University of New York, 1987), p. 186.

55. In this respect, I concur with Lewis S. Ford in attributing to creativity its vertical dynamism (as well as its individualized valuational activity). Yet, my view differs from his in that I do not hold that the vertical dynamism of creativity is to be conceived of as "God conceived as a simple everlasting concrescence or unifactory activity, forever future, forever unifying, never terminating in any past determinate actuality, yet forever generating novel possibilities" (Ford, "Creativity in a Future Key," p. 186). Ford goes on to say: "This future creativity values each occasion's particular past conditions in terms of all the ways that can possibly be unified, and then passes on this individualized valuational activity to the occasion for its determination. (In this way, God functions both as the source of creativity and the source of that which functions as subjective aim.')" (ibid.) However, for me, God is *not* the source of creativity. In my own view, its source rather lies in the fact that it is devoid of a character or actuality of its own. Inasmuch as it is *utterly* characterless, creativity then *wants* its characterization only through its own *negation* of this characterlessness. This is because the "characterlessness" cannot be clung to as if it were another character.
56. This is my own proposal, not Whitehead's.
57. Katsumi Takizawa, *Anata-wa doko-ni iru-no-ka* (Where Are You?) (Tokyo: San'itsu Shobō, 1983), pp. 46–58. See my article "Principles for Interpreting Christ/Buddha," 63–79.
58. Significantly enough, however, this concern results from his more decisive concern with asserting that the "absolutely irreversible order" prevails between God and humanity in the midst of their primary contact (see Takizawa, op. cit., pp. 49–51). That is to say, Takizawa is thinking predominantly in terms of what we call the reality-picture B, instead of clarifying the reality-picture A [1] in his own way.
59. This "willy-nilly" is my own rendering of what my teacher Takizawa wanted to say by his notion of "the utterly determined nature [Jpn., *zettai hikettei*]" as this inheres in the bottom of our

existence" (see *ibid.*, p. 48). Yet, my notion has no connotation of *divine* determination like his.

60. See D. T. Suzuki, *Living by Zen* (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1971), pp. 1-8.
61. Kitarō Nishida, *An Inquiry into the Good*, trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. xxx.
62. Shizuteru Ueda, "'Experience and Language' in the Thinking of Kitarō Nishida," trans. Tokiyuki Nobuhara, *Annual Report from the Institute for Zen Studies*, no. XVII, May 1991, 101-18.
63. See the "Upon Resting the Type" in October, 1936 of *An Inquiry into the Good*, pp. xxx-xxxiii.
64. Shizuteru Ueda, "Pure Experience to Self-awareness to Place" (written in Japanese), *Annual Report from the Institute for Zen Studies*, no. XVII, May 1991, 251-66.

Noticeably enough, what in Christianity is basically in congruence with this line of thought has articulately been brought to expression by Wolfhart Pannenberg in his *Systematic Theology* in reference to the distinction between what he calls (1) "non-thematic, primordial awareness of the infinite," (2) "the natural knowledge of God," and (3) "discursive, philosophical natural theology" (see *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, pp. 73-118).

First, it is important that what Pannenberg calls a nonthematic awareness is one in which "God, world, and self are still not differentiated" (p. 114). This is strongly reminiscent of Nishida's notion of "pure experience," which Ueda explicates as follows: "In the moment of seeing or hearing, where reflection ('I see flowers') and judgment ('The flowers are red') are not yet present, in that moment of actual seeing or hearing, there is neither subject nor object. This directly experiencing experience, this 'pure experience' not yet elaborated by reflecting and judging thought, is the ground of being of the most real of all realities and the ground of being of the true self, since prior to the dichotomy of subject and object a non-differentiation, which is the original fullness of totality, is present" (Ueda, "'Experience and Language' in the Thinking of Kitarō Nishida," 118).

At this level the awareness does not involve "an explicit concept of the infinite as distinct from the finite," namely, the second level. "Hence," as Pannenberg stresses. "direct awareness cannot be defined thematically as awareness of God" (Pannenberg, *op. cit.*). In this connection, he refers to Karl Rahner's notion of "transcendental experience" whereby "from the very first we are set before a transcendent mystery in the sense that the

silent infinity of reality that is beyond our control constantly presents itself to us as a mystery" (ibid.). And he notices that what is at issue here is "a general condition of the possibility of experience, not a principle that structures its content like Kant's categories and rational ideas" (ibid., n.166).

Second, Pannenberg understands the natural knowledge of God to arise "only when we see later on the basis of [direct] experience and reflection that the infinite in the true sense is one, and is identical with the one God" (p. 144). In this connection, he refers to what Paul calls the knowledge of God from creation through his works (Rom. 1:20) as being only a vague sense of infinitude. Yet, he thinks that the knowledge of God of Rom. 1:20 is not innate, like that of Rom. 2:15, but acquired, in the sense that it is linked to experience of the world and gained by it (p. 117). What we have here is, thus, "the religious experience of God by means of a sense of the working and being of God in creation" (ibid.). At this level we are not allowed to speak of a philosophical natural theology yet. For Pannenberg, this knowledge of God is the basis for arriving at a "more nuanced judgment on the world of the religions" than the traditional view of them as no more than "idolatry" (see pp. 177-78).

Third, what is crucial in the *logical form* of the natural theological argument for the existence of God, for Pannenberg, is, accordingly, this paradoxical fact: in contrast to *it*, "the elevation above the finite that takes place in the proofs of God implies that the finite ultimately has no independent being" (p. 91). In this connection, he thinks of the function of anthropological proofs by such thinkers as Augustine (in *De lib. art.*), Descartes (in the Third Meditation), Kant (in *Critique of Practical Reason*), Fichte (in *Die Wissenschaftslehre*), Schleiermacher (in *Christian Faith*), and Kierkegaard (in *Sickness unto Death*) (see p. 93). In my own opinion, it is in this same context that Nishida's philosophy of the *topos* of absolute Nothingness is to be considered a significant natural theological attempt at the proof—namely, the proof of God as located, through and through "together with us creatures," within the *topos* of absolute Nothingness, in his case, though.

65. From this specific perspective, I prize Charles Peirce's semiotic category of "thirdness" that mediates between two subjects—or, categorically speaking, between the universal which forms the category of "firstness" and the individual which constitutes the category of "secondness" (see *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders*

Peirce, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932], I, 328, 356; see also James Harry Cotton, *Royce on the Human Self* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954], pp. 228–30, 235, 291). Royce uses Peirce's doctrine of signs for his metaphysical theory about the "world of interpretation" (see *The Philosophy of Josiah Royce*, ed. and with an introd. by John K. Roth [New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1971], pp. 388–402, esp. 390). For me, the category of "thirdness" applies, here at the present stage of this study, to the metaphysical need for a creative use of the Thomist analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* for envisaging the God-world relationship in terms of the metaphysical ultimate, as it is presented in the form of Whitehead's concept of "creativity" and Nishida's standpoint of the "*topos* of absolute Nothingness."

66. For further articulation of my thesis of "God as the principle of loyalty in the universe," see the following two articles by me: "Principles for Interpreting Christ/Buddha," 87–89; and "Sunyata, Kenosis, and Jihi or Friendly Compassionate Love: Toward a Buddhist-Christian Theology of Loyalty," *Japanese Religions*, 15/4, July 1989, 50–66.
67. Cf. Ivor Leclerc, *Whitehead's Metaphysics: An Introductory Exposition* (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 89.
68. Essential to Nishida's idea of the *topos* or place (Jpn., *basho*), as found in the essay entitled "Place" (1926), are the views as follows:
 - (1) The standpoint of knowledge must be one of the modes in which one's personal experience reflects itself in itself. It is within the place of experience that the opposition of form and matter comes to be. That which infinitely reflects itself in itself, that which, although being Nothingness in itself, includes the infinite Being in itself is the true I in whose domain there arises the subject-object opposition.
 - (2) This I, as the place of experience, cannot be limited by so-called logical forms. On the contrary, it rather gives rise to them. This is because forms cannot be surpassed by themselves; the true form of forms is the place of forms. Thus, what might be called the self-reflecting [metaphysical] mirror is not only the place where knowledge comes into existence but is also the place where feelings and the will emerge.
 - (3) Whereas epistemology, usually, has started from out of the subject-object dichotomy, with the consequence that knowing is understood as the act of constituting matter by forms, Nishida

thinks of knowing in terms of the idea of self-awareness as this arises when [experience] reflects itself in itself.

(4) In order to acknowledge that which is, we need, as its background, that which is not. Yet, that not-something which is recognized against the background of something which is, is still a relative, conflicting Being. The true Nothingness must be that which is inclusive of such Being and such non-Being; namely, it must be the place where such Being and such non-Being come to be. The Nothingness which negates and is opposed to Being is not the true Nothingness; the true Nothingness must be that which constitutes the background of Being.

(5) Within the true place it should be the case that something not only does actually but also can cross over to its opposite—and this even beyond the boundary of genera. The true place is not the place of a mere change but is the place of life-and-death where we cease to see that which works and begin to see that which includes working in itself. The truly genuine activity is not that which works but that which is inclusive of working.

(6) The place within which there are objects must be the place within which so-called consciousness is also located.

(7) Reflecting does not arise from working. On the contrary, we can derive that which works from the act of infinitely reflecting itself in itself. The very idea of working arises from the move to reflect, within the confines of finite universals, that is, within the colored [or characterized] place, the infinite content. Within the place of Nothingness where all Being is negated, there working becomes simply knowing and knowing is reflecting. Further, within the place of true Nothingness that goes beyond this standpoint, we see the will as such. The will is not a mere activity; there rather has to be the seer behind it. Otherwise it is nothing else than a mechanical and instinctive function. The darkness that lies behind the will is not a mere darkness but must be what Dionysius Areopagita called "dazzling obscurity."

(8) The world of Being, which lies within the place of true Nothingness, can be thought as the objective world, not of pure thinking but of pure willing.

(9) What lies behind the will is the creative Nothingness. The Nothingness that begets is much deeper than the reflecting Nothingness.

(10) The place within which that which is self-identical, nay, even that which infinitely includes in itself a contradictory development is located, is what Nishida calls the place of true

Nothingness. The self-identity of the infinite contradictories is obtained at the end of the direction of pursuing the logical subject of judgment, and the place of true Nothingness can be conceived at the end of the predicative direction of judgment. To be immanent is what it means to be predicative. Thus, if the substratum, which becomes the logical subject but not the predicate, can be known as long as it is immanent, we must start from the latter end of judgment. The latter can be said the deepest and the most fundamental. In traditional philosophy there has not been a sufficient consideration of the standpoint of consciousness. If we think of consciousness from the standpoint of judgment, we can find no other way than the predicative direction. Namely, we should pursue in the direction of the presumptive universal. Although people say that we constitute matter by forms and that the logos develops, they cannot drive consciousness from this approach. We must seek that which reflects all objects in the ultimate direction of the predicate. If we thought of some one who is conscious at all, he would already be him who is conceived, not the conceiving one.

(11) There is the place of Nothingness which is to be called the simply reflecting mirror. The will can be seen in the relation of such place to the place of Being.

(12) Going beyond the realm of consciousness, we can think of the place of true Nothingness within which are located Being and Nothingness. True intuition is located directly within such place, breaking through the place of consciousness. (See *Basho, Watashi-to Nanji, hoka roku-hen: Nishida Kitarō tetsugaku ronbunshū* I [Place, I and Thou, and Six Other Essays: Selected Philosophical Essays of Kitarō Nishida, Vol. I], ed. Shizuteru Ueda [Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko Edition, 1987], pp. 67-151; trans. mine.)

For further clarification of the problem of *topos*--esp. points (8) and (10) respectively--, see Shizuteru Ueda, *Basho: Nijū sekainai-sonzai* (Place: The Double Being-in-the-World) (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1992) and Yūjirō Nakamura, *Basho: Toposu* (Place or Topos) (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1991). My own perspective in the text takes into account points (5) and (12) in particular.