

**A New Possibility for Logos Christology
Through Encounter with Buddhism:
Tillich and Takizawa Critically
Considered and Compared**

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II. Takizawa's Logos Christology and Buddhism

My own answer to the foregoing "whence" question is, as I have been trying to show recently on other occasions,¹⁸ by way of the idea of God as the principle of loyalty in the universe: the evocative power that the Logos is, comes from the fact that "God, *qua* the Logos, is supremely loyal to Emptiness emptying itself." Essential to this idea is the contention as follows: only the one who has been experiencing loyalty to a supreme degree, while being with us creatures in silence, can paradoxically evoke loyalty in us with authority. By this I am saying three things: namely, (A) the principle of God as being "with us" (which is what Takizawa wants to consider in terms of his notion of the Logos as the *Proto-factum Immanuel*) is paradoxically undergirding (B) the principle of God as "evocative" (which is

what lies, if I am correct, in Tillich's reference to agape as the spiritual foundation of democracy) simply because (C) this God with us is at the same time loyal to the frame of reference of God's being, Emptiness emptying itself as this expresses itself as the intra-Trinitarian "interrelatedness" (*perichoresis*) within the purview of Christian doctrine—an insight which is at the core of my own thesis.

Let me, then, scrutinize and elucidate from this perspective the Logos Christological meanings of Takizawa's critique of Shin'ichi Hisamatsu's Zen studies and of his critique of Karl Barth's understanding of Pure Land Buddhism. Both critiques I have studied carefully in my 1983 article "Principles for Interpreting Christ/Buddha: Katsumi Takizawa and John B. Cobb, Jr." for *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 3(1983). (Hereafter cited as PIC/B.) Thus, what I want to do now is to re-view and re-examine my major points in the article from the said perspective of my own.

A. Takizawa's Critique of Shin'ichi Hisamatsu: the Primary and Secondary Points of Contact between God and Humanity and the Problem of Zen Buddhism

Let me first show some excerpts from the original article of mine as follows. My critical re-examination of the text will come later.

[Excerpt 1] (PIC/B, 69-71)

In his 1964 book, *Buddhism and Christianity* (TKC,¹⁹ VII, 249-361), Takizawa critically deals with Zen Buddhism, especially Shin'ichi Hisamatsu's Zen atheism²⁰ from the perspective of his Logos Christology. The reason why he has chosen Buddhism as a "true counterpart of Christianity" (TKC, VII, 350-51) is that he finds a genuine polarity between the Buddhist and the Christian understanding of the relationship between the enlightened or faithful and the unenlightened or unfaithful—and this within the

context of their common knowledge of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel. The Buddhist realizes his or her own nature or self as “empty,” whereas the Christian believes in Jesus as the “Christ.”

In this encounter with Hisamatsu’s Zen Buddhism, Takizawa has given an explicit expression to the Jesus-as-Jesus-dimension of the person of Jesus Christ. Takizawa is not merely applying the already found categories of Christology to his consideration of Buddhism. He also tries to deepen his theology of “small signs” [as this refers to whatever appear in the world, including Jesus of Nazareth and other religious figures] through encounter with Buddhism. This is particularly true of his *Zoku: Bukkyō to Kirisutokyo* (A Sequel to “Buddhism and Christianity,” 1979). In this work, Takizawa is mainly concerned with a comparative study of Jōdo Shin Buddhism and Christianity. By means of this comparative study, Takizawa has articulated more fully the Christ-dimension in its depths.²¹

The Jesus-as-Jesus Dimension: Takizawa on Zen Buddhism

From the perspective of Takizawa’s theology of “small signs,” Hisamatsu’s Zen atheism with its emphasis upon the “spontaneity” of satori, utterly devoid of theistic heteronomy, is acceptable. It could even be said “strictly Christian, and in fact Christological” (TKC, VII, 272). Usually, Buddhism is considered to be a religion of self-realization in contrast to Christianity as a religion of faith. But Takizawa denies the view that the Christian believes in God as something merely outside the human being. For the Christian believes in God who is through-and-through *with* us humans.

This is *decisively* true of Jesus. Commensurate with what Hisamatsu calls the “non-ego subject” (Jpn., *mugateki shudai*) or “the original self” (Jpn., *honrai no jiko*), Takizawa understands Jesus of Nazareth as the “spontaneous self-

actualization of the *Proto-factum*" (TKC, VII, 273). He finds a parallelism between the enlightened one (i.e., Buddha) and Jesus. Indeed, Jesus is a Buddha. Consequently, faith means for Takizawa a two-dimensional actuality, an actuality co-constituted by the believer's acceptance of the *Proto-factum* here-now and by his or her being influenced by the past actualization of the *Proto-factum* as Jesus as the Christ (TKC, VII, 274).

From this perspective of a Buddhized Christology, Takizawa shares with Hisamatsu in stressing the "post-modern" religiosity, the religiosity of "breaking through [the predicament of] here without leaving [the reality of] here" (TKC, VII, 276). This religiosity is distinct from traditional theism or theonomous heteronomy and also from modern humanistic autonomy. Hisamatsu negates not only mere transcendentalism but also mere immanentism. He affirms only the "transcendence through sheer immanence" (Jpn., *naizaiteki chōetsu*). There is for Hisamatsu no other true Buddha than the selfless I who is the true subject of *ōsō-gensō* or of going to the Pure Land (*ōsō*) and return to the world (*gensō*) (TKC, VII, 261).

Fully affirming this fact with Hisamatsu, Takizawa refers to the possibility of the knowledge of God *apart from* the figure of Jesus of Nazareth, based upon his Christological conviction that the *Proto-factum*, immediately related to any human being, was not initiated by the Incarnation of Jesus Christ (TKC, VII, 280, 282). This possibility implies that faith as a two-dimensional actuality mentioned above is not exclusively dependent upon Jesus of Nazareth. The relationship of the Christian believer to Jesus is rather that of continuity-in-discontinuity.

This is important in that it negates a view, which Hisamatsu holds, that the sheer spontaneity of love or compassion emerging directly from the original self is the only basis for affirming God (Jesus Christ) or Buddha

(Amida) in the act of “ideation” (TKC, VII, 220). For Takizawa, the existence of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel alone enables us humans to be spontaneously compassionate. Takizawa’s understanding of “spontaneity” now tends to be critical of Hisamatsu’s Zen atheism. Takizawa criticizes Hisamatsu for failing to recognize the difference between the actual sign, the original self, and its real ground, the *Proto-factum*. In this Christological reinterpretation of Buddhism, Takizawa designates the *Proto-factum* the “primary contact of Buddhahood and sentient beings” and distinguishes it from its sign as the “secondary contact,” the enlightened human self.

But here arises a question: Is this extension of Takizawa’s concept of the *Proto-factum* to what might be ultimate in Buddhism adequate? There are at present two conflicting opinions about this among leading Buddhist scholars in Japan. Some, such as Ryōmin Akizuki and Gempō Hoshino, affirm Takizawa’s concept of the *Proto-factum*, identifying it with the Zen Buddhist notion of *hongaku* (original enlightenment), the enlightenment preceding *shikaku* (emergent enlightenment in some humans) (BKT,²² 108; TKC, VII, 459–63). But others, represented by Masao Abe, interpret it as a consequence of delusion because the ultimate Buddhist standpoint is that of Emptiness emptying all forms, including the *Proto-factum* (BKT, 169–170, 184). This split of opinions, to my mind, indicates at least one thing: Takizawa’s notion of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel is only *analogically* applicable to Buddhism, but not univocally, as is so intended by Takizawa.²³

Thus far, I have been observing in Excerpt 1 that Takizawa clarifies the distinction between the afore-mentioned Logos Christological principle of God as “with us” or the *Proto-factum* Immanuel (A) and the principle of God as “evocative” (B) in terms of what he designates the primary and the secondary

contact of God and humanity while at the same time critically applying it to the case of Hisamatsu's Zen vision of enlightenment. As I noted above, Takizawa's attempt is justifiable, but only partially, because he fails to attend to the Buddhist principle of Emptiness emptying itself as that to which, as I have contended, God *qua* the Logos is loyal (C). This entails, as is clear in my examination above, an analogical, but not an univocal, applicability of Takizawa's distinction between principles A and B to Zen. Let me, then, show below the positive elements (see Excerpts 2 and 3) and the negative, questionable element (see Excerpt 4) in Takizawa's critique of Hisamatsu's Zen studies, and my own interpretation of it as a whole (see Excerpt 5).

First, the positive elements as follows:

[Excerpt 2] (PIC/B, 71)

Takizawa criticizes Hisamatsu's view of *continuity*-in-discontinuity between the "samsāra-like" (Jpn., *shojiteki*) or inauthentic self and the "nirvāna-like" (Jpn., *metsudoteki*) or authentic self, for not distinguishing a primary continuity (i.e., the absolute fact of unity-in-distinction in the depths of every human existence of the eternal, universal Buddhahood and the spatio-temporal sentient beings) and a secondary continuity (i.e., the emergence of a true man as the enlightened). Then Takizawa proceeds to state:

It [the secondary continuity] can positively represent the true Absolute only insofar as it points to the vanishing-point, as it were, of all the forms, including itself, that appear in this world. If we call such a representative figure 'Buddha,' we will have to acknowledge as a matter of course [against Hisamatsu] that there really exists a truly eternal Buddha 'who is higher and more absolute than,' and 'who is

other than and is distinct from' the humanly enlightened Buddha. No matter how 'unthinkable from the orthodox standpoint of Buddhism,' we cannot but acknowledge that reality of Buddha since it discloses itself by opening the depths of our closed hearts. It would be owing to the obscurity about this point remaining unchecked in historical Buddhism that the Buddhists, who 'play a divine play even in the midst of the woods of worldly clings and show the power of enlightenment while entering the garden of life-and-death,' are apt to fall into a self-righteousness ignoring strictly scientific studies of things. (TKC, VII, 324-25; trans. mine)

This critical scrutiny by Takizawa of the humanly enlightened Buddha as the secondary continuity, undergirded by the existence here-now with us of the truly eternal Buddha, is through-and-through Christological. In this sense, it not only affirms a spontaneous emergence of enlightenment (consider here Jesus as a Buddha) but also proposes a hierarchical order between enlightenment and its ontological basis, Buddhahood (consider here the will of God the Father). This, I think, is one of the best possible interpretations of Buddhism from a Christian perspective.

[Excerpt 3] (PIC/B, 72-73)

In his critique of Hisamatsu, Takizawa also takes up the problem of how to understand the real meaning of what Hisamatsu calls the "original Buddha" and the "*upāya* (or expedient) Buddha." For Hisamatsu, the original Buddha is the selfless, enlightened human subject; any Buddha apart from that human subject, for instance, a theistic Buddha like Amida, is a secondary, *upāya* Buddha; and this *upāya* Buddha in reality is nothing other than the original Buddha himself (i.e., the enlightened) as viewed

in relation to the unenlightened as a “skillful means” of their satori. Takizawa opposes this view. For what Hisamatsu perceives as preceding the *upāya* Buddha, i.e., the human original Buddha, is himself a kind of a *upāya* Buddha of the only absolute original Buddha (i.e., Buddhahood) who really is at the base of every self (TKC, VII, 334).

For Takizawa the human expression of Buddhahood can only occur as a historical-social expression of the eternally actual point-of-contact (as the *Proto-factum*) of Buddhahood and the human self. Therefore, there necessarily arises, within the scope of the human Buddha, a ramification of the mode of representing the absolutely active original Buddha and the mode of representing the absolutely passive *upāya* Buddha. The relationship between Jesus of Nazareth and his disciples is an example of this ramification (TKC, VII, 335). In this context Jesus means for Takizawa a *universal* human figure or the humanly operative criterion of all human figures; he is something like the mathematical figure 1 in the world of “signs” in terms of the predication of God (TKC, VII, 299).

Second, let me turn to the negative, questionable case of Takizawa’s critique of Hisamatsu’s Zen studies:

[Excerpt 4] (PIC/B, 73-74)

Takizawa’s critique of Hisamatsu’s Zen atheism is through-and-through Christological as in the above. It has a merit in pointing out the one who precedes and undergirds the humanly authentic figure, whether Jesus or the enlightened person. For Takizawa the one who precedes Jesus is God the Father or Creator who is with us creatures *in the Proto-factum* Immanuel or the Logos. But here arises a question: Is what Zen Buddhists, such as Hisamatsu, call Buddhahood or Formless Self the same reality as God the Father or Creator? Takizawa adheres to

this identification in his critique of Hisamatsu. Within the scope of this identification it necessarily follows that there must be something like the *Proto-factum* as the Logos in Zen Buddhism, too.

But it seems to me that Zen Buddhists, such as Hisamatsu and Abe, deny that identification because Buddhahood is formless, whereas God the Father or Creator has a form—form of creation—however invisible and supreme (BKT, 146, 150). They also deny the *Proto-factum*, in the sense of the substantial unity of Buddhahood and sentient beings, *if it means the Logos*. For the Zen experience is utterly devoid of anything like the Christian Logos although it is related to the coincidence of Buddhahood and the self.²⁴ Rather, Zen Buddhists experience that Buddhahood *is me*, that there can be no satori if anything—however divine—is interjected between Buddhahood and the self. This is because Buddhahood in reality is “Buddhahood and me.”²⁵ Buddhahood, as the all-encompassing Reality, by definition includes in Itself worldly actualities by the principle of *pratitya-samutpada* or dependent co-origination. That is to say, there can be no satori if any single bit of over-against-ness of the divine remains in one’s self-realization. Accordingly, satori is awakening to the fact that “*I am Buddhahood*” because I am “I and Buddhahood.”

This requires a partial revision of Takizawa’s identification of Jesus with a Buddha. If he means by this identification that Jesus is like a Buddha in conforming perfectly to the will of God the Father, there might be no correlative to this on the part of Zen Buddhism. For the Zen Buddhist wants to *become himself* Formless Self or Buddhahood with total fearlessness to face reality. What matters now is courage to be here and to realize oneself rather than faith in God as Wholly Other (*totaliter aliter*). Accordingly, the Jesus-figure that we could envisage from this perspective is not one who was obedient to the will

of God the Father but one who was utterly self-effected like the figure of the Son of Man with whom Jesus identified himself.²⁶ Along these lines the Whiteheadian understanding of the “kingdom of heaven” as God’s derivative nature that is “consequent upon the creative advance of the world”²⁷ will make sense. That is to say, Jesus as the derivative nature of God is consequent upon the self-effected appearance of Creativity as Buddhahood.

Third, I would like to refer to my own interpretation of Takizawa’s critique of Hisamatsu’s Zen atheism:

[Excerpt 5] (PIC/B, 74-75)

This [the foregoing discussion of mine] does not, however, devaluate the fundamental significance of Takizawa’s double thesis of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel as the Logos and of the sign-character of the figure of Jesus of Nazareth. As long as it points to the *source* of what I would call the intended instrumental value of human nature, the onto-Christological part of his thesis, i.e., the *Proto-factum* Immanuel, is valid; Takizawa’s critique of Hisamatsu hits the mark. For Hisamatsu does not clarify the source of compassion or agape as such. The axiological part of Takizawa’s thesis, i.e., the sign-character of Jesus of Nazareth, is also valid insofar as it accounts for the truly human and God-less nature of Jesus—but only in terms of Jesus’ obedience to the will of God the Father in his case. His affirmation of Hisamatsu’s Zen *a*-theism seems to be, accordingly, the consequence of a God-less Christianity like that of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.²⁸ Both Takizawa and Bonhoeffer negate a God who is simply a working hypothesis needed for human speculation, precisely because they affirm and believe in God who really is. But in the case of Hisamatsu, the authenticity of his Zen *a*-theism solely consists in the fact that satori needs *no* God, *not* even a

real God.

At any rate, Takizawa's thesis is valid as long as it concerns itself with the divine-human relationship in terms of the "intended instrumental" structure of life. As is superbly analyzed by him, this structure consists of an irreversible, hierarchical order: (1) God the Father; (2) the *Proto-factum* Immanuel; and (3) Jesus or an authentic human person. This structure is not, however, applicable to the Buddhahood-sentient beings relationship which, I assume, constitutes the "intrinsic" structure of life or the "intrinsic value" of human nature. As a result, Takizawa's interpretation of Buddhism is in its essence theistic; he cannot account for anything in the universe apart from the concept of God, God in His triune essence and function. Therefore, it is with reason that Takizawa is less successful in his critical Christian interpretation of Zen *a*-theism than of the theistic structure/dynamics of Jōdo Shin Buddhism, our next subject matter.

In sum, what I have finally missed in my teacher Takizawa's Logos Christological critique/understanding of Hisamatsu's Zen studies is the direct knowledge of the human being's relatedness to Buddhahood. This constitutes the intrinsic nature/value of any and every human and non-human sentient being. In this sense, each sentient being is *ontologically loyal* to Buddhahood or Dharmakāya or Emptiness emptying itself. The problem, however, is whether one is *consciously loyal* to Buddhahood or Dharmakāya or Emptiness emptying itself while bringing to one's own attention one's ontological loyalty in which one is living in actuality willy-nilly. *It is precisely within this particular context, let me emphasize here, that we can say that God is supremely loyal to Emptiness emptying itself, while being "with us" in the capacity of the Logos. Herein lies God's own self-realization or satori, if I am correct.*

B. Takizawa's Critique of Karl Barth: Christology and the Problem of Pure Land Buddhism

It is for this reason that I wanted to add my Principle C, God's loyalty to Emptiness, to Principles A and B (namely, the principle of God "with us" and the principle of God as "evocative") which I found in Takizawa's Logos Christological discussion of Zen Buddhism. Let me, however, make my point clearer by reference to Takizawa's critical discussion of the problem of Pure Land Buddhism in what follows. Now his dialogue-partner is Karl Barth. I will show below four excerpts, one in reference to Takizawa's critique of Barth and the rest of the excerpts manifesting his own Logos Christological view of the parallelism between Christianity and Pure Land Buddhism:

[Excerpt 6] (PIC/B, 75-76)

The Jesus-as-the-Christ Dimension: Takizawa on Jōdo Shin Buddhism

In an essay entitled "Jōdo Shin Buddhism and Christianity: In Relation to Karl Barth's Footnote in *Church Dogmatics* 1/2" (1973), Takizawa attempts to show a parallelism between the two religions by critically surveying what Karl Barth writes on Jōdo Shin Buddhism in *Kirchliche Dogmatik* 1/2, pp.372ff. According to Barth, the decisive difference between the two religions is that *only* Christianity knows the Name of Jesus Christ. He rejects the opinion, which has been held by some of the representatives of the *Religions-wissenschaft* school, that Christianity is different from and superior to Jōdo Shin Buddhism in that it has more plausible symptoms of being a true religion, i.e., a religion of grace, than the latter. That is, Barth's theological method of comparison is strictly Christological rather than phenomenological.

This does not, however, mean that Barth is not interested at all in a phenomenological comparison. In fact, he develops one such comparison as follows: (1)

The Jōdo movement, unlike the Reformation by Luther and Calvin, started from the popular desire for an easier and simpler way of salvation; (2) Jōdo Shin Buddhism, unlike genuine evangelical Protestantism, lacks the doctrines of God's or Amida's law, holiness, and wrath; (3) The "Other Power" doctrine of Jōdo Shin Buddhism, distinct from Paul and Calvin, lacks a strong emphasis on striving against the selfishness and arrogance of humanity, and striving for God's glory; and (4) Jōdo Shin Buddhism is motivated by the human desire of attaining Buddhahood, rather than by faith in Amida, because Amida is also in the process of attaining Buddhahood (ZBK, 21-22).

Takizawa rejects each of these phenomenological critiques of Jōdo Shin Buddhism by Barth as baseless: (1) Barth fails to see that Shinran's faith (Jpn., *shinjin*) is finally rooted in a desire deeper than the popular one, namely, the desire of accepting Amida's Original Prayer or Vow (Jpn., *hongan*; Skt., *purvaṣṣādana*), which Shinran calls the "difficulty of all difficulties;" (2) Barth does not notice that the recitation of the Nembutsu was, for Shinran, the "direct command of Amida;" (3) and (4) of Barth's critique are simply repudiated by Shinran's works, such as *Yuishinshō-mon-i* (Notes on 'Essentials of Faith') and *Jinen-hōni-shō* (On Naturalness of Faith) (ZBK, 69-72). In short, in Takizawa's view, Barth never understands that Shinran's Jōdo Shinshū is grounded on the living, ever present Buddha (ZBK, 72).²⁹

It is important to note that Takizawa's critiques of Barth's misunderstanding of Jōdo Shin Buddhism are based upon his Christology critical of Barth. He finds the basic reason for Barth's misunderstanding in his ambiguous, undifferentiated view of the "Name of Jesus Christ." To be sure, Barth differentiates the Name of Jesus Christ from all the symptoms of it, including Christian doctrines, sacraments, and ministries of the Church. But he never

differentiates in that Name the Christ as the *Proto-factum* Immanuel from Jesus of Nazareth as its actual, living symptom (ZBK, 36-44).

It is precisely from this perspective that Takizawa develops a unique view of parallelism between Jōdo Shin Buddhism and Christianity. First, he refers to the parallelism between Jesus as the Christ and Dharmākara Bodhisattva as Amida Buddha. Second, he compares the doctrine of creation with the Buddhist teaching: 'All existences are Buddhahood.'³⁰ Third, he deals with the doctrine of the Trinity in parallel with the *trikāya*-doctrine, i.e., the Buddhist vision of the unity between *Dharmakāya* (Dharma-body or Buddhahood), *Sambhōgākāya* (Body of Bliss or Recompense), and *Nirmānakāya* (Manifest Body).

Let me now show my consideration of these parallel points one by one in the following three excerpts:

[Excerpt 7] (PIC/B, 76-77)

(1) Jesus of Nazareth was a historical person who actually died on the cross two thousand years ago. On the contrary, Dharmākara (i.e., the Storehouse of Dharma) Bodhisattva, is mentioned in the *Larger Sutra of Eternal Life*, which is attributed to the historical Sakyamuni. However, this difference does not prevent Takizawa from stating that the name or the existence of Dharmākara Bodhisattva (Jpn., *Hōzō Bosatsu*) was not a conceptual product of Sakyamuni or a general idea which has nothing to do with our actual existence. Insofar as he is portrayed in the above sutra quite concretely as an actual individual person, Dharmākara Bodhisattva is a spatio-temporal event. However, this does not mean for Takizawa that the Bodhisattva's practices and his famous forty-eight vows with the purpose of saving all sentient beings on earth are separable from the ever present, all-inclusive Life and Light, Amida

Buddha. Rather, these are the Bodhisattva's human correspondences to Amida's Original Vow (ZBK, 56-57).

Takizawa then develops an intriguing discussion on the "causal relationship" (Jpn., *inga*) between Dharmākara Bodhisattva and Amida Buddha. The discussion deals with two correlated propositions: "Dharmākara Bodhisattva *became* Amida by making forty-eight vows;" and "Amida Buddha *became* Dharmākara Bodhisattva." The principle of causality involved herein is not primarily a spatio-temporal succession but is rather an "eternally present, absolutely dialectical relationship," which Takizawa designates the "Dharmākara Bodhisattva *qua* Amida Buddha." He writes:

Both propositions never mean the transformation of one into the other, or a unification or combination of the two, 'somehow' actualized by a 'supernatural-personal' power, which otherwise would remain separate from each other by the immeasurable, deep cleft—as still today is 'believed' and taught by most of the representatives of this Buddhist school. No, Dharmākara and Amida are really distinctively two different entities, and yet are one—but in an absolutely irreversible order. The 'became' therefore points to the unique, dynamic relationship between the two. The first proposition, 'Dharmākara became Amida,' means that Dharmākara's vow was, to be sure, the choice of a mortal human person throughout, and yet never originates in his human subjectivity but only in the original gracious will of Amida. Insofar, it is in itself the merciful Vow of Amida! The second proposition means that Amida in the act of Vow has revealed himself in the form of the man Dharmākara, and that Buddha only as Amida manifests himself out of his genuine mercy as the man Dharmākara, and is the true, eternally-present Buddha.³¹

As is evident in this passage, Takizawa thinks of the relationship between Amida and Dharmākara in terms of an “irreversible order,” the order which includes in itself the elements of “inseparableness” and “non-identifiability.” We can find here a Shin Buddhist expression of his Logos Christology.

Takizawa’s conclusion of the comparative study of Jōso Shin Buddhism and Christianity is this: in the Christian confession of Jesus as the Christ the divinity in his existence comes to the fore, whereas in the *Larger Sutra* the Bodhisattva as a seeker, therefore his humanity, seems to be the primary concern. Yet, an essential parallelism between the two traditions is never to be denied. This conclusion is challenged by an opposite view of John Cobb’s: in both religions we deal with a circle in which both ultimate and actual aspects are needed. In the Pure Land tradition, beliefs about ultimate reality may play the primary role, whereas in Christianity beliefs about the actual course of events may be primary.³² Why do our two authors, although unanimously affirming the Christian–Shin Buddhist parallelism, differ in their respective evaluations of the actual or human and the ultimate or divine in both religions? This might be because Takizawa is more attentive to what he terms the “irreversible order” in both religions, whereas Cobb is more appreciative of what is usually called the “finality or centrality of the salvific events” in them.

In this excerpt—Excerpt 7—is manifest what I call Takizawa’s Logos Christological Principles A and B (namely, the principle of God as “with us” and the principle of God as “evocative”) in correspondence with Amida and Dharmākara Bodhisattva. As far as this point is concerned, Takizawa’s Logos Christological theology of religions is profoundly effective. However, this does not qualify him, as we will see below in the next excerpt, to

be equally effective in the matter of “creation” whose Buddhist consideration is to be seen against the background of the idea: “All existences are Buddhahood.”

[Excerpt 8] (PIC/B, 77–78)

(2) The parallelism between the two religions in terms of Christology enables Takizawa to discern a parallelism in terms of the doctrine of creation. He finds a textual basis for this view in Shinran’s essay entitled *Yuishinshō-mon-i* (Noes on ‘Essentials of Faith Alone’). Shinran states that Buddhahood is co-eternal with *Nyorai* (Skt., *Tathāgata*) who fills the universe through and through, namely, who is the heart of the ocean of all beings (ZBK, 75).³³ Then Takizawa assumes that Shinran came to realize this truth—the truth that “all existences are Buddhahood”—only through his existential encounter with Amida *qua* Dharmākara. Amida is the image or Form of the one Formless *Dharmatā Dharmakāya* (Jpn., *Hosshō Hosshūn*). As such, he is *the* skillful means (Jpn., *Hōben Hosshūn*), Original Vow, or *Sambhōgakāya* (Body of Bliss or Recompense) for the sake of the salvation of all sentient beings. Then Amida as *Sambhōgakāya* appears on earth, taking innumerable forms or bodies and illuminating the universe by the Light of Wisdom: this is the *Nirmanakāya* (Manifest Body) (ZBK, 75).

In parallel with Shinran’s thesis stated above, Takizawa prizes Karl Barth’s vision of “creation.” Karl Barth never speaks of the Creator or the creature apart from the *Proto-factum* Immanuel (ZBK, 73). Only through the knowledge of the divine-human relationship hidden in the person of Jesus Christ or of Dharmākara *qua* Amida, we come to realize that relationship in every creature in the universe. In this sense, Takizawa, with Barth, is through-and-through Christocentric in his approach to creation.

However, as we have shown in the preceding sub-section [see II, A, 1, above], this approach does not apply, except analogically, to the Zen Buddhist truth that "Buddhahood is me." I do not mean by this that Takizawa has not elucidated the Buddhist truth that "all existences are Buddhahood" in a Christological way. What I mean is simply this: Takizawa has hastily identified a theistic or Christological approach to Buddhahood with an a-theistic one. It is true that Buddhahood is one and the same Buddhahood. But it is also true that an atheistic approach to It is unique; this approach is inexplicable by a theistic one. Accordingly, we can only explain the coincidence of both approaches in analogical terms with Buddhahood being the point of coincidence.

What I mean by analogy here is the analogy of extrinsic (or symbolical) attribution *duorum ad tertium* as it is creatively reinterpreted within our dialogical context. It is well known that in his doctrine of Analogia Entis, Thomas Aquinas discarded this type of analogy because there might be no such thing as the third referent above and beyond the reality of God and creation. He could not think of anything other than some "genus," which he denied with justice, as the tertiary in this regard. But it is my contention that Buddhahood, for instance, is not a "genus" in the sense of "idea" or "form" but is the ultimate reality as the prime analogate, to which God and creation together refer analogically. Hence, a creative use of this type of analogy is viable in the Christian-Buddhist dialogue.³⁴

Important in my argument above for the analogical grasp of what lies at the core of Buddhist-Christian dialogue is the insight that God and sentient beings both refer analogically to the tertiary reality, Buddhahood or Dharmakaya or Emptiness emptying itself. In other words, we can say that Takizawa's idea of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel (God with us) implies that

there is *nothing* between God and us, this “nothing” being Buddhist Emptiness emptying itself. I might contend that this Buddhistic meaning of the *Proto-factum* is manifested within the entire divine life and also *ad extra* (toward the world of creation) in and through the *Proto-factum* as the Logos, and that the latter is supremely consciously loyal to the former, thus realizing itself.

Now, let me turn to the third and last parallelism Takizawa considers:

[Excerpt 9] (PIC/B, 78–79)

(3) Takizawa’s study of the parallelism between the two religions culminates in his trinitarian reference to Amida as Original Vow, as *Hosshō Hosshin*, and as operative in the very act of recitation of the *Nembutsu* (thinking of and uttering the Name of the Buddha): “*Namu Amida Butsu*” (I take refuge in Amida Buddha). The relationship between those three modes of Buddha, though expressed in a different conceptuality, reminds Takizawa of the trinitarian unity of the Son (i.e., the concrete-individual God who exists in individual beings), the Father (i.e., the concrete-universal God who eternally exists everywhere), and the Holy Spirit (i. e., the God who is at work in the world, expressing himself in finite beings)(ZBK, 61). There is a striking passage in Takizawa’s explication of Jōdo Shinshū. In that passage, he explicates Shinran’s expression: “Amida Buddha as *eternally realized*” (Jpn., *kuon jitsujō Amida Butsu*): In the traditional Shinshū exposition Amida Buddha is simply designated the *Upāya Buddha*, but is never called the *Dharmakāya*. But as is clear in that expression by Shinran, it cannot follow from here that there is any bit of difference in ontological value or in power between Amida and the *Dharmatā Dharmakāya* (Jpn., *Hosshō Hosshin*). Amida is the *Upāya Buddha* only

insofar as he is the *Dharmatā Dharmakāya* as conditioned by the fact that he is the hidden (i.e., sourceless or groundless) source or aim of the man Dharmākara living and making the forty-eight vows, that is, by the fact that he is directly at one with each sinner in an absolute distinction and order. (ZBK, 137).

This passage is amazingly akin to Cobb's insight that Shinran strongly tends to renounce the general Buddhist subordination of Amida to ultimate reality as such so far as practical and religious matters are concerned.³⁵ Cobb too denies the subordination of Amida to ultimate reality; but he denies it not in terms of ontological equality but in terms of incommensurability of the two.

Takizawa calls Amida's Vow "*Proto-vow*" as distinct from the man Dharmākara's; the primordial nature of the former vow is valid both ontically and functionally (ZBK, 137). To articulate this comparatively, Takizawa refers to the "relationship of Christ with God the Father (as co-eternal)" (ZBK, 137). We could compare here the following Whiteheadian statement by Cobb: "Amida or God may be identified either as creativity (*Dharmakāya* or Emptiness) as primordially characterized or as that which primordially characterizes creativity."³⁶

C. Takizawa and Tillich: the *Proto-facum Immanuel* and the Ground of Being—the Two Ultimates?

In the above excerpt is evident Takizawa's Logos Christological view of the problem of how the religious ultimate (i.e., our principle of God as "with us" or Takizawa's idea of the *Proto-facum Immanuel* or Amida Buddha as *Upāya Dharmakāya*) is co-eternally related to the metaphysical ultimate (i.e., the Buddhist principle of Emptiness emptying itself as *Dharmatā Dharmakāya* which, for Takizawa, is nothing other than God the Father in Christian doctrine). However, it seems to me that Takizawa needs to clarify more fully what he means by "co-eternally."

It is precisely within this context that I contend that my Principle C mentioned earlier—namely, the principle of God as “loyal” to the frame of reference of God’s being, Emptiness emptying itself as the intra-Trinitarian “interrelatedness” (*perichoresis*) within the purview of Christian doctrine—satisfies the requirement of the ultimacy or eternity of either of the two, God as “with us” and Emptiness emptying itself. Namely, God as “with us” is ultimate *religiously*, in the sense that God is the only one in the universe who can evoke loyalty in us creatures simply because God knows what loyalty means by God’s own experience of being loyal to Emptiness emptying itself; by contrast, Emptiness is ultimate *metaphysically*, in the sense that it is the only Reality in the universe that can empty itself, thus and only thus turning to this world of dependent co-origination (Skt., *pratitya-samutpada*) absolutely affirmatively.

And here, significantly enough, Tillich’s notion of “the God above the God of theism” (*Systematic Theology*, II, 12) would be really to the point. For “the God above the God of theism” presupposes, as far as I can see, that the God of theism is “surpassed” by this God, the power of being, and that the former must be “loyal” to the latter. And—if it is permissible for me to express the thing at issue here in my own loyalty-language further—it is only due to the “loyalty” of the God of theism to the God above God as the power of being or being-itself that the personal God, *qua* the Logos, can paradoxically obtain the “evocative” power. This same idea seems to be implied (at least to my mind), in order that we may decipher it carefully enough in our global age of inter-religious dialogue, in what Tillich writes about the unique dynamics as this inheres in the relationship between “the abyss of the divine (the element of power)” and “the fulness of its content (the element of meaning),” between “the divine depth” and “the divine logos” as follows:

The first principle is the basis of Godhead, that which makes God God. It is the root of his majesty, the unap-

proachable intensity of his being, the inexhaustible ground of being in which everything has its origin. It is the power of being infinitely resisting nonbeing, giving the power of being to everything that is. (ST, I , 250–51)

The classical term *logos* is most adequate for the second principle, that of meaning and structure. It unites meaningful structure with creativity. Long before the Christian Era—in a way already in Heraclitus—*logos* received connotations of ultimacy as well as the meaning of being as being. According to Parmenides, being and the *logos* of being cannot be separated. The *logos* opens the divine ground, its infinity and its darkness, and it makes its fulness distinguishable, definite, finite. The *logos* has been called the mirror of the divine depth, the principle of God's self-objectification. In the *logos* God speaks his "word," both in himself and beyond himself. (ST, I , 251).

What I have had in mind in making the afore-mentioned remark are specifically the last two sentences above. They may be taken to signify two things. First, the Logos loyally mirrors or re-presents or exemplifies in himself the divine ground or abyss, (which I myself might call Emptiness emptying itself) as this inheres in the intra-Trinitarian "relationality" as such (*perichoresis*), but not in the Godhead as "being," as Tillich mistakenly assumes (cf. ST, I , 250–51). The issue here would be related in part what I called earlier Tillich's total misunderstanding of Buddhism as simply negative. For he, on the contrary, seems to be thinking of the Christian Godhead as simply positively powerful by itself. However, I think of the Godhead as utterly relational, which meaning, rather, is coterminous with Buddhist Emptiness emptying itself.

In this sense, I concur with Masao Abe when he states with respect to the idea of God the Father begetting the Son as follows:

The Christian God is not "Being" in the sense that he simply transcends nihility, but a God who has embraced even nothingness itself, and empties himself. His self-negation of love precedes his self-negation in the creation of the world, which is other than himself.³⁷

It is profoundly interesting to know that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is appreciated and even deepened by a Buddhist thinker from his own perspective of Emptiness.³⁸

Second, because the Logos loyally mirrors the divine ground or abyss, the Logos is entitled to speak by the Godhead itself. His speech is not just due to his own capability, but is entirely by virtue of the Godhead as such. It is precisely in this sense that Takizawa wants to speak, with Shinran, of Amida Buddha's Original Vow as *directly* manifesting in itself Hosshō Hosshin (Skt., *Dharmatā Dharmakāya*), as we saw earlier. That is, Amida *is* Dharmakāya. By the same token, we have to say, on the Christian side, that Christ, as the incarnate Logos, *is* Godhead as such. Thus, our solution to the problem of the two Ultimates, God as "with us" and the Ground of Being, ends up with this insight: because the former is loyally manifesting the fact that it is *not* the latter, it, paradoxically, *is* the latter. This truth lies at the base of any authentic religion, whether Buddhist or Christian, which constitutes the mystery, for instance, of Jesus's words: "...whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel's will save it" (Mark 8:35). In other words, it *is* the power of resurrection as such!

Conclusions:

1. Religious Revolution for Today

Tillich was one of the forerunners of the religious revolution, or of the radical transformation of the vision of "God and the world" for today, breaking the barriers between Christianity and other Ways, especially Buddhism. This revolution was enabled

by his turn from Jesus-centeredness to Logos-centeredness, as is manifest in his view of the self-surrender of Jesus to Jesus who is the Christ as constituting the New Being (ST, III, 146).

This must be, I believe, at the core of Tillich's celebrated last public lecture "The Significance of the History of Religions for the Systematic Theologian" that ends with these words:

The universality of a religious statement does not lie in an all-embracing abstraction which would destroy religion as such, but it lies in the depths of every concrete religion. Above all it lies in the openness to spiritual freedom both from one's own foundation and for one's own foundation. (FR, 94)

After disclosing in these words his inmost hope for the future of theology, looking forward to "another or different fragmentary manifestation of theonomy or of the Concrete Spirit," the seventy-eight-year-old pioneer theologian of religions died ten days later. Our other dialogue-partner in this pricle, Katsumi Takizawa concurs with Tillich's vision of the transformation of theology when he has pointed out the necessity of a "religious revolution" in which no longer can any religion self-complacently confine itself within itself. Gautama and Jesus, for instance, have seen that the Truth of life itself alone is decisively important to them, not their own religions, Buddhism and Christianity.³⁹

2. Logos Christology in a Global Age: the Logos, Wisdom, and the Kingdom of God

Their common Logos-centeredness, enabling a religious revolution to occur for today, was then related to their critical concern for the problem of quasi-religion(s) guided by the principle of the Kingdom of God. From my own perspective, the principle of God as "evocative" is enabled to come out by the principle of God as "with us," namely, Takizawa's idea of

the *Proto-factum* Immanuel which he identifies with the Buddhist notion of *hongaku* (i.e., original enlightenment). Tillich too regards Wisdom as distinguishable from and going beyond the cleavage of subject and object peculiar to objectifying knowledge (ST, III, 256).

However, when it comes to speaking of Dynamic Typology, Tillich contrasts the symbol of the Kingdom of God and its principle, participation, with the Buddhist Nirvāna and its principle, identity. And he has betrayed a misunderstanding of Buddhism as negativistic. He does not know the dynamism of Emptiness emptying itself. By the same token, Takizawa is not totally right in criticizing Hisamatsu's vision of the enlightened (i.e., Buddhas) as those who identify themselves with the absolutely preceding Eternal Buddha. For Takizawa does not make it clear that the notion of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel is usable theologically in two ways: first, hierarchically in terms of the particular's relation to the Logos or Amida or *Hōben Hosshin* (*Upāya* Buddha) which is further related to *Dharmakāya* or *Hosshō Hosshin*; and second, synthetically in terms of the particular's direct relation to Buddhahood or *Dharmakāya* to which the particular is at the same time related hierarchically *via* Amida as *Upāya* Buddha. In Takizawa there is no clear reference to the particular's "direct" relation to Buddhahood or *Dharmakāya*, unassisted by the Logos or Amida.^{39a} I myself would like to include both ways, synthetic and hierarchical, in terms of a creative use of one of the Thomistic types of analogy: Analogy of Attribution *duorum ad tertium* (two to the third).

My own final proposal, then, is the thesis of God's loyalty to Buddhist Nothingness or Emptiness that I would like to add to the two principles that I can find in Tillich's and Takizawa's Logos Christologies, ones that have demonstrated themselves to be effective in dialogue with Buddhism. It is like this: (1) God, *qua* the Logos, is loyal to Emptiness; (2) Emptiness empties itself; and (3) God is the only one in the universe who can evoke loyalty in us creatures. Tillich seems to have something

that can encourage this thesis of mine in his doctrine of the “divine abyss” or “God above God” for whom the Logos plays the role of “mirror” in that the Logos speaks and manifests. And Takizawa too emphatically presents the truth that when the Logos speaks, he discloses for us the entire Godhead as such in him.

In this particular sense, Jesus *is* the Christ, God. That is, he *represents as* the Christ (i.e., the incarnate Logos) the entire Godhead for us in his act of being as a human person who authentically cor-responds to the Logos, *qua* the *Proto-factum* Immanuel, who originally reflects in himself in terms of the “original enlightenment” the divine abyss as such in the sense of Emptiness emptying itself *within* the Godhead.

With this renewed vision of Logos Christology in mind, we should proceed to take into account and fulfill today’s mandates on a global scale. In this respect, I concur with Robert C. Neville in holding that there are at least two themes in both Buddhism and Christianity that have great relevance to our own historical situation where post-modernism is a temporary and rather unimportant movement due to the fact that the modern period died, down to its very God. He writes:

First, the overcoming of selfishness or world-defining attachments is crucial for addressing the global travail about distributive justice. Second, the sacredness of creation, the continuity of human life with the rest of creation, or the mutual immanence of person and world, are crucial themes for recovering a global philosophy of nature for addressing deep problems of ecology.⁴⁰

What, then, is Neville’s basic theological orientation in this new historical context requiring the solution to these two issues? I attend to his following remark:

Finally, although the Kyoto School and the existential

school [of Thomas Altizer] agree that the passage into the depths of reality finds absolute nothingness or indeterminate being-itself at the end, the reverse passage of reality from that ground to the ordinary world of determinate things involves creativity, not the kenotic negation of ground [as in Masao Abe's kenotic philosophy]. So kenosis is not at the heart of the ontological question for either Buddhism or Christianity. (BGM, 113)

And I think from my own aforementioned threefold perspective of the theology of God's loyalty to Emptiness that Neville's reference to the "passage into the depths of reality" (which seems to correspond to our second element, "Emptiness emptying itself") and his emphasis upon the "reverse passage of reality from that ground to the ordinary world of determinate things" (which I consider in terms of the third notion of the "evocative Deity") may need a connecting link.

My first idea of "God's loyalty to Emptiness" is an attempt at meeting the requirement of that connecting link between the two passages. As such, in the present-day global, theological arena it apologetically-theologically opts for the middle-path position which can mediate between and connect Masao Abe's Buddhist standpoint of "total *dynamic movement* of emptying [as emptying itself], not a static state of emptying" (EG, 28) and Hans Küng's Christian view of theonomy that can provide "a basis for the absoluteness and universality of ethical demands."⁴¹ In conclusion, it is precisely *here* that my vision of Logos Christology has its unique theological voice which, however, is voiceless at its hidden core (cf. Ps. 19: 3-4).

NOTES

18. See, for instance, Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "Principles for Interpreting Christ/Buddha: Katsumi Takizawa and John B. Cobb, Jr.," *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, 3(1983), 87-89; "Sunyata, Kenosis, and Jihi or Friendly Compassionate Love: Toward a Buddhist-Christian Theology of Loyalty," *Japanese Religions*, 15/4, July 1989, 50-66.
19. *Takizawa Katsumi chosakushū (Katsumi Takizawa's Collected Works*, 10 Vols. (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1972-1974). (Hereafter cited as TKC with volume number.)
20. See *Hisamatsu Shin'ichi shosakushū*, Vol. VII (*Shin'ichi Hisamatsu's Collected Works*), pp.249-362.
21. Katsumi Takizawa, *Zoku: Bukkyō to Kirisutokyō (A Sequel to "Buddhism and Christianity")* (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1979), pp.55-69, 123-32. (Hereafter cited as ZBK.)
22. Seiichi Yagi and Masao Abe (eds.), *Bukkyō to Kirisutokyō: Takizawa Katsumi tono taiwa o motomete (Buddhism and Christianity: In Search of a Dialogue with Katsumi Takizawa)* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobō, 1981). (Hereafter cited as BKT.)
23. This observation of mine is testified by the fact that even Hoshino, who supports Takizawa in this regard, proposes as a partial revision of his thesis, the inclusion of Emptiness at the base of the *Proto-factum*. See TKC, VII, Editor's Introduction, pp.460-61.
24. See Shin'ichi Hisamatsu's conversations with Paul Tillich, "Dialogues, East and West," *The Eastern Buddhist*, 4/2, October 1971, 89-107; 5/2, October 1972, 107-28; and 6/2, October 1973, 87-114.
25. Cf. Shizutesru Ueda, "Gyakutaiō to byōjōtei" (Relationship of Inverse Polarity and Everyday-Mind), *Risō*, No.536, January 1978, 30-50.
26. Cf. Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "Re-defining Analogia Actionis in Terms of a Study of Son-of-Man Christology (unpublished, May 30, 1978), pp.11-14; Seiichi Yagi, BKT, pp.55-57, 254-55. Yagi identifies the Son of Man in Mark 2:10, 28 with the Indwelling Christ in Gal. 2:20 or God-now. But I identify him as Godhead-now.
27. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, Corrected Edition, eds. D.R. Griffin and D.W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), p.345; (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p.524. (Hereafter cited as PR according to the Corrected Edition, then according to the Macmillan 1929 edition.)
28. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Prisoner for God* (New York: The Macmillan

Company, 1954), p.164.

29. In order to highlight Takizawa's point, We can refer to a passage from the *Tannishō* (*A Tract Lamenting the Unorthodox Views*) where Shinran explains the meaning of "jinen-hōni" or naturalness of faith: "...for rebirth in the Pure Land cleverness is not necessary—just complete and unceasing absorption in gratitude to Amida. Only then does the Nembutsu come forth effortlessly. This is what is meant by naturalness. Naturalness, therefore, is that state in which there is no self-contrivance, just the grace and strength of Amida. Unfortunately, however, I have heard of people who peddantically assert otherwise. How regrettable." See *Perfect Freedom in Buddhism*, originally written in Japanese by the Tannishō Kenkyūkai, translated into English by Shinji Takuwa (Kyoto: Hokuseido, 1968), p.118.
30. Takizawa interprets this teaching as identical with his thesis of the *Proto-factum*. From this point of view, he translates a famous passage in Dōgen's *Genjōkōan* (*The Manifestation of Truth*) as follows: "Am Ursprung der Zeit, wo Dinge aller Art als solche mit dem Buddha-Dharma eins sind, ereignen sich immer neu Irren und Erleuchtetwerden, Ueben, Leben und Tod, Buddhas und gewöhnliche Lebewesen." By the translation "am Ursprung der Zeit," —instead of "wenn" —Takizawa tries to convey the unity-in-distinction character of time intended by Dōgen. See "Die Kraft des Anderen und die Kraft des Selbst im Buddhismus—Im Vergleich mit dem Christentum," in Katsumi Takizawa, *Reflexionen ueber die universale Grundlage von Buddhismus und Christentum* (Frankfurt a.M., Bern, Cirencester/U.K.: Lang, 1980), p.51; ZBK, pp.190-91, 221.
31. *EvTh*, 39/3, May/June 1979, 189-90; ZBK, pp.118-19; trans. mine.
32. See John B. Cobb, Jr., "Can a Buddhist Be a Christian, Too?" *Japanese Religions*, 11/2-3, September 1980, 52.
33. In this connection, Takizawa, after the manner of Nishida, quotes Daitō Kokushi's statement: "Buddha and I, separate through a billion kalpas, yet not separate for an instant; encountering each other the whole day through, yet not encountering each other for an instant."
34. As to the re-interpretation from this perspective of all the Thomistic types of analogy—including (1) analogy of intrinsic attribution *unius ad alterum*; (2) analogy of extrinsic attribution *duorum ad tertium*; (3) analogy of metaphorical proportionality; and (4) analogy of proper proportionality—see my article, "Portraying 'Authentic Existence' By the Method of Analogy:

- Toward Creative Uses of the Analogy of Attribution *Duorum Ad Tertium* for Comparative Philosophy of Religion," *Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No.1, February 28, 1992, 61-83; No.2, February 28, 1993, 27-50; No.3, February 28, 1994, 1-19.
35. See John Cobb's paper on "The Buddhist Witness to God" (unpublished, 1997), p.11.
 36. *Ibid.*, p.13.
 37. Masao Abe, "Buddhism and Christianity As the Problem of Today," *The Japanese Religions*, 3/3, Autumn 1963, 23. See/also John B. Cobb, Jr. and Christopher Ives, eds, *The Emptying God: Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis books, 1990), pp., 3-65; Masao Abe, "Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata." (Hereafter cited as EG")
 38. In his *Christianity Meets Buddhism* (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1974), Heinrich Dumoulin finds Abe's and also another prominent Japanese Zen philosopher Keiji Nishitani's contributions to Christian theology by their common understanding of the essence of God as *sunyata* or Emptiness (pp.180-82).
 39. Katsumi Takizawa, *Jōdo Shinshū to Kirisutokiyō* (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1974), p.428.
 - 39a. When it comes to speaking of *Dharmakāya* or *Hosshō Hosshin* as it is directly at one with each one of us individual humans, Takizawa identifies *Dharmakāya* as Amida as he opts for Original Vow (Jpn., *Hongan*). See Katsumi Takizawa, *Anata wa doko ni imaka* (Where Are You?: The Basis of Real Life and Religion) (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1983), p.78. He doesn't unreservedly attend to the case in which *Dharmakāya*, as truly Formless, is one with each one of us creatures. This, however, is the case Hisamatsu is concerned with, if I am correct. My own major concern, then, is with scrutinizing and elucidating how God, *qua* the Logos, is with us at this ultimate metaphysical level. My tentative answer to this crucial question is to say that God is loyal to *Dharmakāya* while being with us "in silence" even before calling us. This hidden, loyal reality of God is to be excavated repeatedly anew as in Richard Elliott Friedman's *The Hidden Face of God* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995) referring to the three mysteries in Western history: (1) the disappearance of God in the Bible giving rise to Rabbinical Judaism; (2) Nietzsche in Turin and Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*; and (3) Big Bang and Kabbalah. And it has to be explored further in this pluralistic, global age through dialogue with Buddhism as in the present article.
 40. Robert Cummings Neville. *Behind the Masks of God: An Essay*

Toward Comparative Theology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp.111-112; hereafter cited as RMG.

41. Hans Küng, *Global Responsibility: In Search of a New World Ethic* (New York: Continuum, 1993). p.53.