

Buddhist-Christian Pedagogy: A Process View*

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Introduction

In 1992 I began an essay on "Toward a Global Hermeneutic of Justification in Process Perspective: Luther and Shinran Comparatively Considered"¹ with these words:

Today, theology is no longer an exclusively Western enterprise, one that Eastern peoples, whether Christian or not, have merely and lopsidedly to learn in order to construe their religious perceptions of the world in intelligible and coherent manners.² Contemporary theology moves toward a world, or global, theology inasmuch as Eastern and Western peoples alike share one and the same world—the earth—although they do so in their distinctively peculiar and unique ways, religiously and culturally speaking. ("Toward a Global," 103)

What I have in mind now with respect to the status of "religious education in a world of religious diversity," which is the general theme for the 15th International Seminar on Religious Education and Values, is expressible in similar terms if the notion of theology in the above passage is regarded as interchangeable with the notion of religious education. As Wilfred Cantwell Smith superbly attests, "What is beginning to happen around the earth today is the incredibly exciting development that will eventually mean that each person, certainly each group, participates in the religious community of humankind—as self-consciously the context of faith." By saying this Smith does not mean that Christians will cease to be Christian or Muslims Muslim. What he means is that Christians will participate, as Christians, in the religious history of humankind, Muslims will participate in it as Muslims, Jews as Jews, Hindus as Hindus, and Buddhists as Buddhists. "For, ultimately," Smith claims, "the only community there is, the one to which I

know that I truly belong, is the community, world-wide and history-long, of humankind."³

In a word, religious education in today's religiously pluralistic world is a lofty enterprise which is responsible for taking into account the only community there is, that is, the community, world-wide and history-long, of humankind, to which we know we truly belong despite the fact that we participate in it as distinctively unique religionists—Christians as Christians, Muslims as Muslims, Jews as Jews, Hindus as Hindus, and Buddhists as Buddhists. Put differently, religious education is to be understood as an enterprise which is shot through with the notion of unity in diversity in a very meaningful manner. By being so, it is required to be symbolically referential to the unity in diversity of our world in the 21st century. If we are really concerned with religious education in terms of unity-in-diversity, we will be equally eager to create a world which exists in unity-in-diversity, free from the bondage to an overarching power of coercion but also not entrapped in the grip of an anarchical relativism or separatism.

In what follows let me argue for a specific exemplification of the unity in diversity formation in religious education in terms of Buddhist-Christian pedagogy in process perspective.

First, I show the intention of my Buddhist-Christian pedagogy by discussing my teacher Katsumi Takizawa's argument about the compatibility of Japanese novelist Soseki Natsume's famous work *Kokoro* (which means in English "Heart" and was published in 1914) with the Gospels. There appear in these works, Takizawa argues, the Eastern and Western ways of master-disciple relationship in depth when two teachers, Sensei and Jesus, die, the former by his own hand and the latter by the crucifixion, while leaving their respective messages of truth.

Second, I scrutinize and articulate the Eastern and Western messages of truth by way of studying Alfred North Whitehead's *Aims of Education* (1929) focusing on two of his ideas, reverence and duty. The two pedagogical ideas seem to be related to each other quite paradoxically.

Concern with their paradoxical intra-relationship is at the core of my Buddhist-Christian pedagogy. However, consideration of this important issue will be attempted carefully after I argue, third, for the parallelism between Whitehead's threefold developmental concept of pedagogy with

romance, precision, and generalization at its core and Kitaro Nishida's philosophy of pure experience which he expresses in the Preface to his maiden work *An Inquiry into the Good* (1911) with these words: "I wanted to explain all things on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality."⁴

Fourth and last, I make some concluding remarks.

I. Soseki Natsume's *Kokoro* and the Gospels: Katsumi Takizawa's View of Their Unity in Diversity

In encounter with Karl Barth's lectures on the Incarnation—*«conceptus de Spiritu Sancto, natus ex Maria virgine»*—at the Theological Faculty, University of Bonn in the summer of 1934, Katsumi Takizawa came to notice, with Barth, that "from here one can read even Goethe quite differently" (Ger.: von hier aus kann man auch Goethe ganz anders lesen).⁵ By "here" Takizawa meant what he used to call the *Proto-factum* Immanuel or the fundamental fact that God is "with us" without reservation. In his case, the *Proto-factum* Immanuel is undergirding the human existence of every person even prior to the Incarnation of the Eternal Word of God in the person and history of Jesus of Nazareth. For Takizawa, when Jesus said, "I say to you, before Abraham was, I am" (John 8: 58), what he meant by the "I" is *this universal Proto-factum* Immanuel. By contrast, for Barth, the *Proto-factum* Immanuel "came to be" in Jesus as the Christ—this point of divergence between Takizawa and Barth which has long been critically clarified by Takizawa in dialogue with Barth since 1934.

What motivated Takizawa to study carefully Soseki, a Zen-inspired writer, and other great men of literature, including Ryunosuke Akutagawa and Dostoevsky, was this perspective of the universal *Proto-factum* Immanuel inherent at the core of everyone's existence. Takizawa writes:

Kokoro, among others, greatly astonished me. Despite profound differences and contrasts between Jesus' extreme positiveness in the Gospels and the protagonist Sensei's extreme negativeness in *Kokoro*, between the crucifixion and a hidden suicide in particular, this work by Soseki, when I read it with a humble heart, has reminded me willy-nilly of the four Gospels that spoke of a person named Jesus in their unique ways. (AK, 57)

Takizawa's study of *Kokoro* was published in 1956 under the title *Soseki's "Kokoro" and the Gospels* by Yoyosha and now is contained in *Takizawa Katsumi Chosakushu* (Works) published by Hozokan in Kyoto in 1973. The above quotation comes from his report on the "1977-78 Academic Visit to Germany." Takizawa is able to summarize what he has learned from Soseki's *Kokoro* more fully so as to say:

In a nutshell, what is at the core of *Kokoro* is a confirmation of the very fact, which Ichiro, the protagonist in the previous work *Gyoonin* (The Zen Practitioner), deploras, that "there is no bridge from person to person." However, Soseki who accomplished *Kokoro*, in distinction from Ichiro in *Gyoonin*, does not think to escape from this fact lying at the bottom of life and history, by means of a bond, however it may be strong, intimate, and beautiful—a bond such as "love" or "religion" or whatever else in the world. This is neither because he does not acknowledge the loftiness of these human relationships, nor because he does not love their beauty. Quite on the contrary. It is because he prizes these relationships immensely that Sensei (Teacher) in *Kokoro* cannot but warn his young disciple against falling into a ravine carelessly owing to his complacent self-enjoyment. Don't be forgetful of that stubborn fact while arrested by the sin of absolutizing something in the world (AK, 59-60)

Takizawa regards Sensei's above warning to his disciple and his own death as truly pedagogic. However, significantly enough, unlike Jesus Sensei is not aware of an "absolute relationship" within the stubborn fact of human existence. The invisible subject of this unconditional relationship Jesus called the "Father who sees in secret" (AK, 64). His final cry on the cross, "Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani?" or "My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?" is disclosing a "truly intimate and absolutely unchanging relationship (which is simply without reason) between God and humans, including Jesus and us" (AK, 66). It is only from this, Takizawa claims, that we can clearly see why Soseki's *Kokoro* and the Gospels constitute a contrast, which is like a contrast between light and darkness, although based upon one and the same fundamental fact (AK, 66). If this is so, we can find a deeper pedagogy in the Gospels.

Thus far, we have come to the point where we can distinguish between a trustworthy pedagogy by Sensei which is sensitive to the stubborn fact of human existence and a deeper pedagogy by Jesus which leads us into an insight into its background, the *Proto-factum* Immanuel. This distinction is crucial because we thus are led to know that a true pedagogy gives us a knowledge of antinomy, such as the following one Sensei discloses in Part One, Ch. 13 when he says: "At any rate, love is evil. You see. And it is sacred."⁶ But this does not give us a solution to the antinomy.

I have a hunch that when Soseki presents the antinomy of love throughout *Kokoro* what he truly desires to refer to is the problem of patriotism that existed at the end of the Meiji Era. It seems that love is a metaphor for patriotism. This assumption might be supported by the fact that Soseki wrote an essay entitled "Man-Kan tokorodokoro" (A Trip to Manchuria and Korea) in 1909. He wrote *Kokoro* in 1914; five years later. Which means that Soseki had an ample time of pondering the destiny of Japan which might have been driven by the antinomy of patriotism. Soseki then might have wanted to say: "At any rate, patriotism is evil. You see. And it is sacred."

If my hunch is correct, the story that Sensei's friend "K" (which suggests Manchuria and Korea) in his college days killed himself because Sensei defeated him in a triangular love relationship with a girl who is his present wife, might have had a metaphorical-political connotation in Soseki's mind. And Japanese patriotism, although it might have been perceived by most Japanese during the Meiji Era as having an authentic background in the successful social/national reform of the Meiji Restoration, thus sacred, might be a suspect of the cause of wars within the context of East Asian history then and in the future time. If read against this sort of background, Soseki's pedagogy of antinomy is cynically effective in educating us in the matter of patriotism as well as in the matter of love affairs even in our century. Global citizens cannot be self-complacent in the matter of patriotism, saying "patriotism is no evil" or "9/11 justifies patriotism" or "our new constitution must have a preamble on patriotism." Yet, patriotism is sacred. But how can we say so?

II. The Aims of Education in Whitehead's Process Pedagogy of Rhythm:

Duty and Reverence

In the foregoing section we acknowledged that while Sensei in Soseki's *Kokoro* wanted to give his young disciple a cynical sense of truth about the antinomy inherent in love and patriotism, Jesus' cry on the cross urged his disciples to have an insight into the bottom of the fact of human existence, which Takizawa designates as the *Proto-factum* Immanuel. Now, Whitehead says something great about a true pedagogy dealing with a cynical knowledge of factual antinomy and a deeper pedagogy of Jesus resulting from his talking to the Father who sees in secret. He takes up two ideas, duty and reverence, as the poles of his pedagogy. Whitehead says:

[A] We can be content with no less than the old summary of educational ideal which has been current at any time from the dawn of our civilization. The essence of education is that it be religious. Pray, what is religious education? A religious education is an education which inculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises from our potential control over the course of events. Where attainable knowledge have changed the issue, ignorance has the guile of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this perception, that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity.⁷

[B] But above style, and above knowledge, there is something, a vague shape like fate above the Greek gods. That something is Power. Style is the fashioning of power, the restraining of power. But, after all, the power of attainment of the desired end is fundamental. The first thing is to get there. Do not bother about your style, but solve your problem, justify the ways of God to man, administer your province, or do whatever else is set before you. (JG, 12)

Let me deal with the latter quotation first. I think Whitehead's pedagogy as stated in B above is neatly descriptive of what duty is all about. It is interesting to see here that he relies upon the old Christian tradition of theodicy in order to talk about duty in education. We know that P. T. Forsyth in the Preface to his famous volume *The Justification of God* wrote:

We are all familiar more or less with one noble work, equally of faith and of art, whose object was stated on its front to be

To vindicate Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to man.

That is a theodicy, the attempt to adjust the ways of God to conscience. But to His own conscience above all.⁸

At the present stage in this essay it would be sufficiently to the point if I mentioned that Whitehead's pedagogy B, which is a pedagogy of duty as theodicy, in the sense of the attempt to adjust the ways of God to conscience, fits in with Soseki's pedagogy of urging toward the conscientious knowledge of antinomy in the matters of love and patriotism. However, this side of Whitehead's pedagogy, which is pedagogy B, duty, cannot realize itself unless it is motivated by a deeper cause, reverence, which let me call Whitehead's pedagogy A, which is inclusive, as is clear from the above, of Whitehead's pedagogy B.

Inasmuch as Whitehead's pedagogy A, reverence, is based upon the perception that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity, it is akin to Takizawa's idea of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel, which is identifiable with the Father who sees "in secret"—that is, at the hidden core of human existence of ours, including Jesus' existence. But the important problem is to know how pedagogy A, reverence, is related to pedagogy B, duty. It seems to me that when Whitehead, in Ch. II "The Rhythm of Education" and Ch. III "The Rhythmic Claims of Freedom and Discipline," speaks of the triadic development of romance, precision, and generalization in education, he must have come to the solution to this problem. Yet, how this is so is still unclear to me.

The following dictum by Whitehead is pivotal in understanding the necessity of containing the three stages of romance, precision, and generalization in his process pedagogy. Whitehead insightfully discloses:

Education must essentially be a setting in order of a ferment already stirring in the mind: you cannot educate mind in vacuo. In our conception of education we tend to confine it to the second stage of the cycle; namely, to

the stage of precision. But we cannot so limit our task without misconceiving the whole problem. We are concerned alike with the ferment, with the acquirement of precision, and with the subsequent fruition. (AE, 18)

Now, it is clear that Whitehead grasps education as a double problem, not as two distinct problems. Ontologically speaking, there has to be a ferment already stirring in the mind while, however, from the perspective of formation, it appears that there would be no education apart from the work of a setting in order of the ferment in question. This grasp of the matter of education is reminiscent of Whitehead's doctrine of perception in terms of "symbolic reference" whose gist he brilliantly depicts in these terms:

The contrast between the comparative emptiness of Presentational Immediacy and the deep significance disclosed by Causal Efficacy is at the root of the pathos which haunts the world.

'Pereunt et imputantur'

is the inscription on old sundials in 'religious' houses:

'The hours perish and are laid to account.'⁹

Here "Pereunt," according to Whitehead, refers to "the world disclosed in immediate presentation, gay with a thousand tints, passing, and intrinsically meaningless." "Imputantur," by contrast, refers to "the world disclosed in its causal efficacy, where each event infects the ages to come, for good or for evil, with its own individuality" (S, 47). Thus, almost all pathos includes "a reference to lapse of time" (S, 47).

III. Kitaro Nishida's Philosophy of Pure Experience As Guide: Toward a Buddhist-Christian Pedagogy of Rhythm

Given the necessity of both romance and precision, we now can pursue a similar manifestation of the double problem (i.e., reverence cum duty; or, romance cum precision) in Kitaro Nishida's philosophy "of" pure experience. Significantly enough, the "of" in Nishida's philosophy of pure experience signifies, first, the subjective genitive case in which it is pure

experience itself that comes to be philosophizing; and it signifies, secondly, the objective genitive case in which one philosophically looks upon pure experience as the sole reality.

I have already referred to Nishida's famous dictum: "I wanted to explain all things on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality." In explicating this Shizuteru Ueda proposes that the first dimension, pure experience, is an ineffable occurrence, *qua* the proto-word, which unfolds of itself into the second dimension, the *Grundsatz* (the fundamental sentence or symbol quintessential to philosophy as the "science of the first principle") to the effect that "pure experience is the sole reality." According to Ueda, the second dimension further gives rise to the third dimension, discursive philosophical thinking *per se* aiming at explaining all things from the standpoint of the "science of totality."¹⁰ From this perspective, we can divide Nishida's philosophy of pure experience into three stages:

Stage A: "Pure experience." The first stage is the bare fact of an ineffable occurrence which can be designated as awareness pure and simple.

Stage B: "Pure experience is the sole reality." The second stage consists of a *Grundsatz* or fundamental statement or symbol quintessential to philosophy as the "science of the first principle or of reality."

Stage C: "I would like to explain all things on the basis of pure experience as the sole reality." The third stage shows Nishida's philosophical enterprise as a whole as pertinent to the "science of totality or of explanation" or to metaphysics.

It is to be noted, however, that contrary to Nishida's initial intention, in the actual development of his philosophy, as he himself dwelt upon it anew in the "Upon Resetting the Type" of *An Inquiry into the Good* in 1936, Nishida had to radically reconsider this three-stage unfolding of the standpoint of pure experience into the "science of the first principle" and further into the "science of totality." And this process of radical reconsideration took place in Nishida's philosophical career, first, in *Intuition and Reflection in Self-Awareness* (1917) by introducing the standpoint of "absolute free will looking back upon itself" (i.e., self-awareness) and, then, in the second half of *From the Actor to the Seer* (1927) through the mediation of the Greek

philosophical conception of "place" (IG, xxxi-xxxiii). Significantly enough, the significance of "place" culminates in his last essay "The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview"¹¹ which was posthumously published in 1946 by Iwanami Shoten.

Those in Japanese philosophical circles know Nishida's above-mentioned threefold philosophical development as a philosophical subject-matter which attracts the attention of philosophers of different concerns, such as Whiteheadians, as the basis for a new interpretation. Hence, I have recently written a piece entitled "A Whiteheadian Reinterpretation of Nishida's Philosophy of Pure Experience: With the Concept of Symbolic Reference As Guide"¹² for a volume edited by Franz Riffert of Salzburg University. Now, it seems to me, however, that Nishida's threefold philosophical development might be acknowledged to have a pedagogical implication if seen against the background of Whitehead's process pedagogy of rhythm consisting of the three stages of romance, precision, and generalization. There would be a pedagogical turn in the studies of Nishida's philosophy if explored in relation to Whitehead's pedagogy as developed in the work at issue in the present essay. This would give rise to what I might call Buddhist-Christian pedagogy in a process perspective.

Concluding Remarks:

First, for me to envision the idea of a Buddhist-Christian pedagogy in a process perspective, the following passage from Whitehead is crucial in that it elicits the two sides of wisdom in pedagogy: on the one hand, remotively (*removendo*) denying precision for the sake of romance, thus accounting for the importance of reverence, and on the other, constitutively (*constituendo*) going beyond romance for the sake of precision, thus coming to terms with the duty of "justifying the ways of God to humanity":¹³

[Remotively] It is evident that a stage of precision is barren without a previous stage of romance: unless there are facts which have already been vaguely apprehended in their broad generality, the previous analysis is an analysis of nothing. It is simply a series of meaningless statements about bare facts, produced artificially and without any further relevance.

[Constitutively] I repeat that in this stage we do not merely remain within the

circle of the facts elicited in the romantic epoch. The facts of romance have disclosed ideas with possibilities of wide significance, and in the stage of precise progress we acquire other facts in a systematic order, which thereby form both a disclosure and an analysis of the general subject-matter of the romance. (AE, 18-19)

These two sides of wisdom constitute a paradox inherent in Whitehead's pedagogy of rhythm which is to be accounted for by the third stage, generalization.

Second, referring to my own personal instance of religious education, I used to tell my students, "If I said that the philosophy or religion you study with me is the best thing in the world, I would be a liar. Your life itself is far more important than any kind of learning, including philosophy and religion. But it is precisely when you notice that your life itself is far more important than any kind of learning, including philosophy or religion, you've got started doing philosophy or theology." This paradox, I believe, is at the core of wisdom; and as is manifested in the above quotation from Whitehead, pedagogy is the way in which we, both teachers and students, are led into an encounter with it.¹⁴

Third, let me say a few words about how my idea of pedagogy is Buddhist-Christian in nature. When it comes to talking about precision in terms of Nishida's way of looking upon pure experience (i.e., Whitehead's romance in its depths) as the sole reality, we notice that there are many kinds of Onlooks¹⁵: Christians look upon Jesus as the sole reality, Christ, whereas Buddhists look upon everything as the sole reality, emptiness. And I hold that the Buddhist satori that "everything is empty" and the Christian confession that "Jesus is Christ" are both true in their respectively authentic constitution of Onlooks.

There remains here, however, a crucial issue of how God is related to Buddhist Emptiness (identifiable with the intra-Trinitarian Godhead), which scholars devoted to Buddhist Christian dialogue call the "problem of the two ultimates." I opt for the vision of God as loyal to Emptiness by scrutinizing anew and Buddhistically reinterpreting Karl Barth's argument for the existence of God in *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*.¹⁶

Fourth, I have come to the conclusion that we have unity in diversity in

the world of religions: namely, although we come to be concerned with the precision of life or duty through a variety of different Onlooks or Grundsätze, we are equally destined to look upon something as the Really Real. As Luther insightfully remarks, "That now, I say, upon which you set your heart and put your trust is properly your god."¹⁷ Religious pedagogy of whatever kind must start from this knowledge. Further, we have to explain all things on the basis of pure experience or romance or reverence or Takizawa's *Proto-factum* Immanuel as the Really Real. "The final stage of generalization," says Whitehead, "is Hegel's synthesis. It is a return to romanticism with added advantage of classified ideas and relevant technique" (AE, 19).

Fifth and last, a quick critical comment on John Henry Newman's theological pedagogy may be in order. When we return to romanticism as the source of life *deeply* enough, then it will give rise to precision and generalization ever anew. This grasp of the paradoxical matter of pedagogy will bring the insoluble inconsistencies in education into harmony. As an example, we already affirmed Soseki's pedagogy of antinomy in the matters of love and patriotism and Takizawa's remedy. The crucial criticisms against Newman's famous volume *The Idea of a University*,¹⁸ especially those written by Sara Castro-Klaren in her essay "The Paradox of Self in *The Idea of a University*," are also worthy of notice. Castro-Klaren critically assumes:

The dialogue between Protestants and Catholics, averted by Newman's hegemonic response to the Anglican establishment, requires not sovereignty but reciprocity. His assertion of sovereignty, however, justifies his avoidance of dialogue and pluralism. This sense of equality and mutual need is of course absent from Newman's pages, for his mind was imbued with the sovereignty and self-sufficiency characteristic of the Victorian age and with "universal knowledge." In his idea of a university there is no need for reciprocity.

(IU, 338)

What Castro-Klaren presupposes is the picture that the student comes, like the catechumen of the early Christian church, to read and learn from the best

of those who have gone before him. The student walks, she continues, the well-traveled path, not deviating from it or cutting a new one. Seriously enough, in this sense "the idea of a university" denies the central principle of "a liberating education for human beings endowed with equal rights and autonomous subjectivities" (IU, 338).

But what about a Buddhist-Christian deeper pedagogy in which we look upon God as looking upon Buddhist Emptiness emptying itself *qua* the intra-Trinitarian Godhead, whom Meister Eckhart designates *Nichts*, as "greater" [*maius*]¹⁹ than Godself? In that case, the sovereignty of Newman's Deity will surely be surpassable not by some creature or creatures but by the beyond-essence of the Deity, *Nichts*, thus connotes the sense of sovereign loyalty to Emptiness emptying itself, so as to be paradoxically tending to be evocative toward and appreciative of our human reciprocal subjectivities. Then, the cause of reciprocity will go hand in hand with a deeper sense of sovereignty urged by a Buddhist-Christian pedagogy of the rhythm of threefold processes.

Notes

- * This is a paper originally written at Shibata, Niigata, Japan on October 11, 2005 for the 15th International Seminar on Religious Education and Values (ISREV XV): "Religious Education in a World of Religious Diversity" which was held at the Conference Center De Horst near Driebergen, the Netherlands, July 30-August 4, 2006. In revising the original paper to produce the present article I am indebted to Professor Allan Blondé, my colleague at Keiwa College, for his critical suggestions.
- 1 Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "Toward a Global Hermeneutic of Justification in Process Perspective: Luther and Shinran Comparatively Considered," *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, 12 (1992), 103-20; hereafter cited as "Toward a Global."
- 2 Theology is a way of construing the world, according to Julian N. Hart ("Encounter and Inference in Our Awareness of God," in *The God Experience*, ed. Joseph P. Whalen, J.J. [New York: Newman Press, 1971], pp. 51-54, cited in James M. Gustafson, *Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981], pp. 3, 140, 158, 192, 227, 308).
- 3 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Towards a World Theology: Faith and the Comparative History of Religion* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1981), p. 44.
- 4 Kitaro Nishida, *An Inquiry into the Good*. Trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990), p. xxx; hereafter cited as IG.
- 5 Katsumi Takizawa, *Asa no kotoba* (Morning Dictums) (Fukuoka: Sogensha, 1992), pp. 55-56; hereafter cited as AK. Ch. 2 is entitled "Soseki's *Kokoro* and the Gospels: A

- Report on the 1977-78 Academic Visit to Germany."
- 6 *Nihon Bungaku Zenshu* (Complete Works of Japanese Literature), Vol. 5: Natsume Soseki (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1971), p. 414.
 - 7 Alfred North Whitehead, *The Aims of Education and Other Essays* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 14; hereafter cited as AE.
 - 8 P. T. Forsyth, *The Justification of God: Lectures for War-Time on a Christian Theodicy* (London: Duckworth & Co., 1916), p. v.
 - 9 Alfred North Whitehead, *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959), p. 47; hereafter cited as S.
 - 10 Shizuteru Ueda, " 'Experience and Language' in the Thinking of Kitaro Nishida" (Eng. trans. Tokiyuki Nobuhara), *Annual Report from the Institute for Zen Studies*, No. XVII (May, 1991), 101-18.
 - 11 Cf. Kitaro Nishida, *Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview*. Trans. with an Introd. David A. Dilworth (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).
 - 12 Its Japanese abridged version was delivered at the 27th Anniversary of Japan Society for Process Studies at Chiba University of Commerce, September 24-25, 2005. Then the essay in its original English version was presented at the 6th International Whitehead Conference at the University of Salzburg, July 3-6, 2006.
 - 13 As to the two words, remotively and constitutively, see Desmond Paul Henry, *Commentary on De Gramatico: The Historical-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselm's* (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1974), p. 337; hereafter cited as Commentary.
 - 14 This paradoxical relation of romance or reverence for life and duty of doing justice to the ways of God to humanity is manifested in the case of the Mission Statement of Keiwa College (formulated in March, 2003) in terms of "piety" and "freedom": "Based upon the Christian spirit giving rise to a free and pious academic posture, Keiwa College seeks to engage in a liberal arts education to foster and create men and women who have international scopes of cultures and willingness to serve their neighbors, encouraged by a global awareness and well-equipped with the capabilities of dialogue, communication, and humane care."
 - 15 As to the idea of Onlooks, see Donald D. Evans, *The Logic of Self-Involvement: A Philosophical Study of Everyday Language with Special Reference to the Christian Use of Language about God as Creator* (New York/London: Herder-SCM, 1969), p. 128; see also John D'Arcy May, *Meaning, Consensus and Dialogue in Buddhist-Christian Communication: A Study in the Construction of Meaning* (Berne/Frankfort on the Main/Nancy/New York: Peter Lang, 1948), p. 297.
 - 16 See Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "A 'Buddhistic' Reinterpretation of Karl Barth's Argument for the Existence of God in *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*," *Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No. 13, February 28, 2004, 1-14; hereafter cited as "BR." My proposal for a theology of loyalty comprises three elements: (1) God is loyal to Emptiness; (2) Emptiness empties itself; and (3) God is the only one in the universe who can and does actually evoke loyalty or faith or allegiance in us creatures.
 - 17 Martin Luther, *The Larger Catechism*. Trans. F. Bento and W.H.T. Dau (St. Louis:

Concordia Publishing House, 1921), p. 565.

- 18 Ed. Frank M. Turner; Contributors: Martha McMackin Garland, Sara Gastro-Klaren, George P. Landow, George M. Marsden, and Frank M. Turner (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1996) ; cited hereafter as IU.
- 19 For Anselm, God is the One than whom Nothing greater can be conceived [*aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*]. This Name of God implies, I propose to interpret, that Nothingness as it negates itself, but not Something, is "greater" [*maius*] than God. See "BR," 9 -12. At one place Anselm himself speaks of "*nihil*" as that which effects the complete removal from its import of every object which is something, remotively (*removendo*), while, on the other hand, constitutively (*constituendo*) articulating the meaning which it establishes as "no thing at all" or "no thing that is something" (see Henry, Commentary, 337). For Anselm, according to Henry, "*nihil*" (nothing) has a twofold significative function, remote and constitutive, neither of which is naming. Thus, in my opinion, while "*nihil*" is negated as a concept, it simultaneously establishes itself as *reality in itself*—a procedure which is utterly reminiscent of Buddhist Emptiness emptying itself, whose logical content D. T. Suzuki elucidates and articulates as "*prajna soku hi logic*," "A is not-A; and therefore A is A, in his *Studies in Zen* (New York: Dell Publ. Co., 1955), Ch. IV. "Reason and Intuition in Buddhist Philosophy," pp. 85-128.