

## Christ As the Problem of Analogy: Concerning the Theological-Analogical Significance of Q and the Gospel of Thomas

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My proposal of analogy, named *Analogia Actionis*, as regards the problem of the relationship between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith has been schematically articulated in an article entitled "*Analogia Actionis*: A New Proposal for Christology 'From Below',"<sup>1</sup> and it has been further clarified in a paper entitled "Re-defining *Analogia Actionis* in Terms of a Study of Son-of-Man Christology,"<sup>2</sup> within the context of an examination of what constitutes the Christology in the Gospel according to Mark. Basic to my proposal is the idea that our critical-historical concern with the historical Jesus is related significantly in some way or another to the coming-into-existence of the confession by the primitive Church of Jesus as the "risen Christ," an idea that has been critically examined and clearly elucidated in his own way by Wolfhart Pannenberg through his thesis of Christology "from below" in *Jesus—God and Man*.<sup>3</sup>

And I hold that this significant relationship between the two realms of concern can best be conceived in terms of analogy, the idea that negates both a flat identity or sameness and an insoluble separation between any two reasonably possible entities or ideas or categories. Thus, it may be important for us in this article to clarify our analogical position (which I designate as "Christ As the Problem of Analogy") vis-à-vis such representative authors of Christology on the contemporary theological arena as: John Hick, Burton L. Mack, and James M. Robinson. This is because our final concern with their Christologies is solely for the purpose of putting forward in a really convincing manner the theological analogical significance of the Book of Q and the Gospel of Thomas.

### I. John Hick, *The Metaphor of God Incarnate*

As far as the issues of non-identity and inseparableness mentioned above are concerned, I concur with John Hick's overall orientation toward a "metaphorical" understanding of Divine Incarnation that does not hold up the development of theologies "which are compatible with the growing contemporary acceptance of Christianity as one valid way among others of conceptualizing and responding to the divine."<sup>3a</sup> A naive theological literalism in understanding the Incarnation, which necessarily gives rise to Christian absolutism or exclusivism, would not appreciate other religious Ways as authentic. It is important, in this sense, that Hick is mindful enough of the importance of religious pluralism as in the above only in tandem with his metaphorical Christology. Accordingly, he can write:

Such theologies will not see the idea of God's incarnation in the life of Jesus as having a literal physical or psychological or metaphysical meaning. But this does not entail that it has no meaning. Let us consider the alternative possibility that 'incarnation' in its theological use is a metaphor. It is an unusual kind of metaphor, since it began as literally intended language. The more usual transition is in the opposite direction, a metaphor 'dying' as metaphor to become literal speech. But in the case of divine incarnation the initial idea has proved to be devoid of literal meaning and accordingly identified as metaphor, functioning in a way that is continuous with its non-religious uses. (MGI,104)

What are the basic contents of his metaphorical Christology, then? He further writes:

In the case of the metaphor of divine incarnation, what was lived out, made flesh, incarnated in the life of Jesus can be indicated in at least three ways, each of which is

an aspect of the fact that Jesus was a human being exceptionally open and responsive to the divine presence: (1) in so far as Jesus was doing God's will, God was acting through him on earth and was in this respect 'incarnate' in Jesus' life; (2) In so far as Jesus was doing God's will he 'incarnated' the ideal of human life lived in openness and response to God; (3) In so far as Jesus lived a life of self-giving love, or agape, he 'incarnated' a love that is a finite reflection of the infinite divine love. The truth or appropriateness of the metaphor depends upon its being literally true that Jesus lived in obedient response to the divine presence, and that he lived a life of unselfish love. (MGI, 105)

Hick's threefold metaphorical understanding of divine incarnation in Jesus' life mentioned above is, to my own surprise, interestingly akin to what I have written (originally in 1979 as a term paper for Professor James M. Robinson at Claremont Graduate School) in the paper mentioned earlier, "Re-defining *Analogia Actionis* in Terms of a Study of Son-of-Man Christology," in reference to my idea of *analogia actionis*. I wrote:

*Analogia actionis* is a theological thesis that *actio Jesu* (including his person, actions, and words) is analogous to the Christ. That means that (1) this thesis presupposes a radical distinction of Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ, that (2) Jesus is a decisively unique self-expression of the Christ, and that (3) Jesus as a human figure is obedient and correspondent to the Christ. (p.3)

Obviously, Hick's first view of the incarnation in terms of "God acting through Jesus on earth" corresponds to my point two, dealing with "a decisively unique self-expression of the Christ," while his second view of Jesus' life as the incarnation of "the ideal of human life lived in openness and response to

God” fitting in with my point three in reference to “Jesus as a human figure obedient and correspondent to the Christ” ; his third view of Jesus’ life as the incarnation of “a love that is a finite reflection of the infinite divine love” is, if I am correct, basically in parallel with my point one, speaking of “a radical distinction of Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ.”

However, one big difference between Hick and me is the fact that what he calls “God” is rendered, in my case, into the language of “the Christ.” What is basically significant in my use of the language “the Christ” is, as I would like to emphasize here again, Katsumi Takizawa’s notion of the *Proto-factum* Immanuel (i.e., the “fundamental” fact of God being “with” us, which is thus coterminous, in Takizawa’s own view, with “the Johannine notion of Logos”) especially under its (to use his own terminology) “functional” or, I might say, *incarnate* phase. This is important because what I perceive in Takizawa’s notion is the basic “inseparableness” (as combined with two other elements of “non-identifiability” and “irreversibility”) of God and humanity (including Jesus and others) as this constitutes what can even be called a literal, metaphysical bond at the base of our existence. The understanding of this state of affairs is, however, simply lacking in Hick’s argument for the metaphorical view of divine incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth—and this understandably so, because this is the very reason why he is necessitated to opt for Theocentrism, rather than Christocentrism, in his pluralistic attitude toward other great religions.

Given the above clarification of the last, and yet crucial, difference of my position (entitled *Analogia Actionis*) regarding the relationship between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith from Hick’s (as manifest in his *The Metaphor of God Incarnate*) amid our otherwise close affinities, it now turns out that the enterprise of theological analogy would be more appropriately effective than Hick’s type of metaphorical theology in articulating the relationship in question. I would contend that Hick’s metaphorical language cannot cover or shed new light upon

the ontological dimension of Jesus' being (commensurate with the being of the rest of us) as fundamentally "with" God although it is, to be sure, eloquently expressive of how Jesus is attitudinally responsive to the divine presence.

In this sense, his is an endeavor of accounting for the matter of Christology from the perspective of its *ordo cognoscendi* (epistemological order) without taking into account its *ordo essendi* (ontological order) at the same time. By contrast, ours is an epistemological *cum* ontological grasp of the matter of Christology, in the following twofold sense: Namely, (i) we realize ontologically, on the one hand, that the above-mentioned *Proto-factum* immanuel, as this exists at the bottom of any and every human being, expresses itself of its own accord in the person and fate of Jesus of Nazareth; (ii) we at the same time recognize epistemologically, on the other hand, that as a human person Jesus expresses in himself the reality of God with us to the full while responding to this same reality genuinely obediently.<sup>4</sup>

In this particular sense, *actio Jesu* (involving his entire existence—not just his outward actions but also his words, ideas, and feelings) can be conceived as "faithfully corresponding" to the Christ as the ever-living reality of God with us—that is, as *analogical* after the manner of Karl Barth's idea of *analogia fidei*, which looks upon "analogia," or "man's conformity with the Word of God posited in this conformity," as "the sole work of the actual grace of God, [such] that the only final word left us at this point is that God acts in His word on man," but not as "an inborn or accessory attribute of man."<sup>5</sup> However, as is clear in my argument here for the relationship between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith, I am using Barth's concept of *analogia fidei* in a fresh and different manner than the original intention implied in it: namely, Barth's concern was with clarifying "man's conformity in faith with the Word of God incarnate in Jesus the Christ as a whole (that is, with no conscious scholarly distinction between Jesus and the Christ)."

Hence, my thesis of *Analogia Actionis* comes up in my mind as a new proposal for Christology "from below," in the sense that we differentiate in the matter of Christology the point of departure, the historical Jesus, from the point of confessional culmination, the Christ of faith, while at the same time never failing to correlate one to the other by way of the analogy of action. For this very reason, I basically look upon "Christ" as the problem of analogy with "the historical Jesus."

II. Burton L. Mack, *The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q and Christian Origins and Who Wrote the New Testament?: The Making of the Christian Myth*

A. *The Problem of Q*

It seems to me that Mack conceives of what I called in the above the relationship between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith in terms of "mythmaking." In order to make this point clear let me quote a crucial passage from Mack's *The Lost Gospel*:

The narrative gospels can no longer be read as the records of historical events that generated Christianity. Q puts us in touch with the earlier history of the Jesus movements, and their recollections of Jesus are altogether different. The first followers of Jesus did not know about or imagine any of the dramatic events upon which the narrative gospels hinge. These include the baptism of Jesus; his conflict with the Jewish authorities and their plot to kill him; Jesus' instruction to disciples; Jesus' transfiguration, march to Jerusalem, last supper, trial, and crucifixion as king of the Jews; and finally, his resurrection from the dead and the stories of an empty tomb. All of these events must and can be accounted for as *mythmaking* in the Jesus movements, with a little help from the martyrology

of the Christ, in the period after the Roman-Jewish war.<sup>6</sup>

Here it is important to know that by New Testament scholars' critical historical studies of the Book of Q the core of the problem of the historical Jesus has been radically shifted from within the narrative gospels (i.e., the Gospels according to Mark, Mathew, Luke, and John) back onto the sayings of Jesus that were edited and created by a group of people in the interest of compelling social visions. In his 1971 English article entitled "'Logoi Sophon': On the Gattung of Q" ("Sayings of the Sages: on the Genre of Q"), as Mack notices, James Robinson has come to the conclusion that the genre of Q was a common form of wisdom literature as discernible in the early Christian collections of sayings such as Q itself, Thomas, the parables in Mark 4, the Didache, and several Coptic-Gnostic writings (LG, 35).

Although John Kloppenborg in his 1987 book *The Formation of Q* put Robinson's thesis to the test and revised it by suggesting that Q had taken shape in stages, that it had a history of collection and composition, scholars, at any rate, have finally got the real point of departure for considering the historical Jesus—namely in terms of Jesus' sayings (LG, 35, 36). Especially the fact that not only the earlier sayings involving "sapiential instruction" but also the prophetic and apocalyptic sayings could also be seen as a layer of material—a later layer Kloppenborg called "the announcement of judgment"—points in itself to a process of "mythmaking" as this already existed in the Jesus movements. Mythmaking in what sense? In the sense of *looking upon* Jesus not only as a "wisdom teacher" but also as a "prophet." What is involved herein is a *new, deeper* discovery of Jesus. This process of coming to terms with a *new, deeper* Jesus is, if I am correct, the process of "*myth-making*."

Here the connotation of the term "myth" has something to do with what Mack calls "imaginative embellishments" as when he refers to it in the following context: "The fantastic

portrayal of Jesus in the narrative gospels was the result of a layered history of *imaginative embellishments* of a founder figure, not historical reminiscence, not a meditation on the way in which spiritual life was generated from a crucifixion” (LG, 247; italics mine). In this understanding of “myth(s)” Mack is motivated, I might say, constitutively (*constituendo*) as a New Testament analyzer of the making of the Christian myth, whereas in the case of John Hick mentioned earlier, what is important for him as a systematic theologian or philosopher of religion is to get rid of the literalism peculiar to the Christian myth remotively (*removendo*), thus turning to the language of “metaphor.”

However, what is more important in this context, let me emphasize, is to grasp the New Testament reality of the Christian myth in its entire, two-fold significative function, remote and constitutive.<sup>7</sup> That is to say, we need to attend, on the one hand, to the fact, which shows the critical importance of New Testament scholarship like Mack’s, that “The discovery of Q effectively challenges the privilege granted the narrative gospels as depictions of the historical Jesus” (LG, 250). Remotively speaking, we now know that narrative gospels are also products of “mythic imagination” in the capacity of “foundation stories,” but not historical realities in themselves. This is important despite the following critical situation surrounding the Christian myth in Western Christendom:

Myths, mentalities, and cultural agreements function at a level of acceptance that might be called sanctioned and therefore restricted from critical thought. Myths are difficult to criticize because mentalities turn them into truths held to be self-evident, and the analysis of such cultural assumptions is seldom heard as good news. (LG, 251)

Now, constitutively speaking, on the other hand, we are forced to acknowledge that inasmuch as the story of Q gives us



an account of Christian origins that is not dependent upon the narrative gospels, it shows us “that the notion of a pure origin is mythic and that the process of endowing Jesus with *superlative* wisdom and divinity was and is a mode of mythmaking” (LG, 256; italics mine). Thus Mack ends up with his doctrine of “mythmaking” positively enough. But there occurs in my mind a serious question precisely at this juncture: What was in actuality and is in general the “power” of mythmaking by virtue of which Jesus people were able to conceive of Jesus afresh? Mack never asks this question, oddly enough. His only scholarly recourse in this regard is the idea of “compelling social visions” (LG, 257).

My own conviction here, however, is as follows. It is precisely in this conjunction that I can re-evaluate and creatively re-utilize Karl Barth’s notion of *Analogia Fidei*, in the sense of the prevenient divine action in the midst of the divine-human encounter/conformity in faith that is to be responded by the believer faithfully cor-respondingly (that is, analogically), while shifting its thematic context from the problem of “faith” to the problem of “Jesus’ actions” (involving his whole existence, both verbal and non-verbal)—the reason why I opt for the idea of *Analogia Actionis*. I will articulate this issue of *Analogia Actionis* more fully later on within the context of two sayings gospels, Q and Thomas, after studying carefully Mack’s and Robinson’s New Testament theologies and hermeneutics regarding them.

### B. *The Problem of the Gospel of Thomas*

It is conspicuous that Mack clarifies the significance of Jesus’ teachings for his followers responsible for the Gospel of Thomas as lying in their capacity to enable an individual to withstand society’s pressures to conform. According to him, we can attend to following different characteristics discernible in the Thomas, Q, and Mark peoples:

[The Thomas people] had meditated deeply on his sayings and taken seriously the challenge to dissociate from society and develop self-awareness, self-confidence, and self-sufficiency. When the Q people formed groups, started their mission, and then retreated behind a smokescreen of apocalyptic pronouncements when their mission failed, the Thomas people decided to go their own way. When Mark's community tried to imagine itself as a determining factor in the course of human history, the Thomas people thought that the legacy of Jesus had been betrayed. (LG, 181)

This means that before the Q people tended to become apocalyptic in their missionary stance, they and the Thomas people had shared common roots in the earliest stages of the Jesus movement. We can compare the Coptic Gospel of Thomas, which was a translation from a Greek original that scholars now date to the last quarter of the first century, with Q and notice "that approximately one-third of the sayings of Jesus in the Gospel of Thomas have parallels in Q, and that about 60 percent are from the Q1 layer" (LG, 181). What are the noteworthy features of the Thomas tradition, then, while basically marked by a strong sense of independence? Mack counts three features as follows: (1) the use of dialogue in order to present the sayings of Jesus as answers to a number of questions his disciples ask; (2) highly metaphoric and largely enigmatic content of the teachings of Jesus showing that true knowledge is self-knowledge; and (3) the riddle-like feature of the sayings (LG, 182-3).

Especially unique is the second feature, in that the contents of the teachings have no parallel in Q. This is because although all of them are what might be called second-level elaborations on those sayings that do have a parallel in Q, they themselves have to do with a shift from aphoristic injunctions to a proto-Gnostic treatise which manifests the mythology of Jesus as "the child of wisdom and son of God" detached from its epic-apocalyptic frame and centering instead around "his

self-knowledge as the incarnation of divine wisdom" (LG, 183). By contrast, there was a shift in Q from aphoristic instruction to prophetic and apocalyptic discourse (LG, 182).

To my mind, their content is considerably Zen-like. For instance, according to Mack,

Jesus refers to himself as the "light from above" (Saying 77) who represents all that the disciples are to become. Once they see it, however, they won't need Jesus anymore: "Whoever drinks from my mouth shall become as I am and I myself will become he, and the hidden things shall be revealed to him" (Saying 108). (LG, 183)

This is reminiscent, as far as I am concerned, of the Zen saying, which one of the leading Zen philosophers of our time and the founder of the F.A.S movement, Shin'ichi Hisamatsu liked pretty much, as follows: "On encountering the Buddha, you kill him; on encountering a patriarch, you kill him." What is essential to Hisamatsu's Zen philosophy is the Formless Self who "is I," thus constituting, in my view, the intrinsic value of human nature, Beauty, which is the most fundamental value of all values, including intrinsic, intended instrumental, and pragmatic values, that is, Beauty, Goodness and Praxis.<sup>8</sup>

However, in the course of the development of the making of the Christian myth, or even in the antecedent course of the development of Q itself within the context of the Jesus (and not the Christ) movements, this element of the intrinsic, formless "self"—which is referred to as "sapiential instruction" manifesting itself in Q1—was overshadowed by other elements, such as the "announcement of judgment" as Q2 and the later additions including the story of Jesus' temptation constituting Q3. The process of mythmaking was further pursued, as is well known, by the Markan formation of the passion narrative and the Pauline theology of the Christ based upon and incorporating into itself on his own the Christ cult to which he was converted,

to name just two major examples.<sup>9</sup>

Yet, what is fundamental in Q and Thomas is never to be missed. We have to explore its own peculiar, “livable” or “existential” significance (to use Mack’s phraseology, its “independence” (see LG, 181, 246)) precisely for the purpose of “rationally” scrutinizing and elucidating the process of the making of the Christian myth in correspondence with it.<sup>10</sup> Without the articulation of its own “livable” independence and “existential” gravity, the “rationally defensible” anatomy of the making of the Christian myth, like Mack’s in *Who Wrote the New Testament?*, will end as a basically groundless attempt, ontologically speaking, although culturally anthropologically plausible in presenting “the panorama of early Christian literature and social development in a lucid, convincing, and magisterial performance” (Robert W. Funk).

What I have in mind when I say as in the above is a picture—namely, my persistent idea of *Analogia Actionis* that permeates the present study in its entirety—as this is ontologically re-envisioned in terms of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*, one of the Thomistic types of analogy. I have thematically studied this type of analogy in order to find ways in which we can use it in a transformatively creative fashion for contemporary comparative philosophy of religion in an article entitled “Portraying ‘Authentic Existence’ by the Method of Analogy: Toward Creative Uses of the Analogy of Attribution *duorum ad tertium* for Comparative Philosophy of Religion.”<sup>11</sup> Here suffice it to say that this type of analogy is creatively usable within the context of the New Testament problem of the relationship between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith insofar as we can find the common ontological ground that goes beyond and above the two actualities of the “Jesus movement(s)” and what Mack refers to as “the Christ cult” while subsuming both of them under it.

The two actualities in question constitute the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* (that is, two to the third) inasmuch

as “the Kingdom of God” that Jesus proclaimed in Q and, accordingly, in the Synoptic Gospels (or the “Wisdom” in the case of Thomas) and “the risen Jesus as the Christ of faith” proclaimed by the primitive Church (the Christ cult, in Mack’s terms) can be conceived as analogically in reference to the same Ultimate Reality. An astute reader will be reminded that we have already provided discussions to this effect in the two papers mentioned at the outset—and this, however, under the heading of *Analogia Actionis* only there. Now it seems to me that my vision of the matter is clarified more fully. So I think I can resort to the picture of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* as this is creatively re-used here in this particular Christological *cum* Jesuological context in conjunction with previous thesis of *Analogia Actionis*.

### III. James M. Robinson, “Jesus’ Parables As God Happening”

#### A. *The New Hermeneutic*

It seems to me that Robinson has provided an ontological rationale for interpreting Jesus’ parables in conceiving of them as “God happening.” And this is important for our enterprise in this article because it clarifies the existence of what is more than just the human faculty of “mythmaking” at the base of Jesus’ parables as these involve “sapiential instruction.” The heart of the matter here is a new understanding of language that Robinson has learned from Heidegger because it is applicable to the case of New Testament hermeneutics dealing with Jesus’ parables. What he has in mind as a precursor here is the new hermeneutic, formally launched by Ernst Fuchs’s *Hermeneutik* in 1954. Fuchs’s work is important for Robinson, in that it has shifted the orientation of hermeneutic from an “understanding of existence,” derived from the Bultmannian interpretation of the earlier Heidegger, to an understanding of language, derived

from the later Heidegger.<sup>12</sup>

At the core of the new hermeneutic is the vision of language as “the voice of being” whose importance Robinson explicates in these words:

This understanding of language is intended as a corrective of the earlier understanding of language primarily oriented to “expression,” the putting into words of one’s own subjectivity (Schleiermacher–Dilthey) or understanding of existence (Bultmann). In the latter case, language was regarded as appropriate when it stayed within the categories of existence. However, it was seen to have a tendency to objectify existential meaning, the model example being the mythologizing of religion in a mythopoetic culture, which necessitated the demythologizing efforts of the interpreter (“existentialistic interpretation”). But now primal language is understood as called forth by being, by world. Such language itself becomes the most concrete manifestation of being or world, in which sense the later Heidegger says that what speaks is not so much man as language itself. (NQHJ-OE, 203–204)

Precisely in accordance with this new vision of language, it follows that “the parable is no longer regarded primarily as expressing Jesus’ existential understanding, but rather as the bringing into language of world or being (in Jesus’ case, the Kingdom of God)” (NQHJ-OE, 204).

If so, Adolf Jülicher’s rationalistic interpretation of the parable in *Die Gleichnisreden* (1899) is to be criticized for regarding the parable as “one of the forms of rational argument, making use of the point of a picture to argue for an equivalent point in another dimension of reality” (NQHJ-OE, 205). We can notice here a rationalistic use of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*, in the following sense: “If a comparison draws attention to the similarity between two concepts and permits a rational

judgment with regard to the more obscure on the basis of the 'analogy' to the more clear, just so the parable compares one set of concepts to another, or, more precisely, compares the judgment contained in the one set to the judgment that should be inferred with regard to the other" (NQHJ-OE, 204).

### B. *The Analogical Significance of Jesus' Parables*

Robinson himself takes Jülicher's hermeneutic of the parable as manifesting the classical *analogia proportionalitatis* or *analogia relationis*. But since he himself notices the proportionateness of the two sets of concepts as signifying that "they share one judgment, the *tertium comparationis*, the single point of the parable" (NQHJ-OE, 205), the sort of analogy at work in Jülicher's mind is not the analogy of proper proportionality, but the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium* as this is rationalistically re-used with "judgment" at its analogical center—i.e., "the third." By contrast, in my creative use of the same analogy, the tertiary element is not "judgment" but "being" (in Jesus' case, the Kingdom of God). From this perspective, I wholeheartedly concur with Robinson when he says:

...the new hermeneutic has sought to overcome the dichotomy between act and word by appeal to language as meaningful happening. This understanding of language focuses attention not upon the conceptual information communicated, but rather upon "commuication" in the sacramental meaning of the term: communion or participation. Its interest is in what happens when language takes place, the happening it calls forth. (NQHJ-OE, 205)

That is to say, "being" (in the sense of the Kingdom of God) is to be actualized with, indeed as, the language of the parables in Jesus' act of being there while at the same time the hearer being caught up into the story along with one's situation.

Here we notice three phases of reality: (1) being, (2) language-event, and (3) the hearer being caught up into the story along with one's situation (i.e., the eschatological fulfillment of the intention implied in the parables).<sup>13</sup> In my creative use of the analogy in question, phase 2 (language-event) and phase 3 (eschatological fulfillment) are correlated to each other, but only due to the reality of phase 1 (being as the third, or the Ultimate). This state of affairs is beautifully summed up by Ernst Fuchs in these words:

Language helps reality to its truth. In faith's view it is the possible that helps the real [come] linguistically to its truth and thus expresses itself as itself, i.e., as what is becoming.<sup>14</sup>

Robinson finds in this passage Fuchs's development of the Bultmannian interpretation of the future, as the dimension of possible understandings of existence, into "an understanding of language as the possible, which grants reality truth" (NQHJ-OE, 207). And he himself renders it into his own elaboration as follows:

Ultimately, reality is admitted into its truth by the language of love. Of course language is historic, sharing in the finitude of man and the ambiguity of his existence; hence, reality is always in varying degrees distorted or depersonalized, which becomes evident in the current technological depersonalizing of man. But something more wholesome can also happen in language, as it is called forth by a differing world (not to be confused with otherworldliness) and grants reality a new being, in which its true nature as love becomes audible. It is this language event which is both saving event and God's word—God's happening and God happening. (NQHJ-OE, 208)



From this point of view, Robinson perceives in the event of Jesus' language God's reign happening as reality's true possibility—an occurrence that lies between the presumption of the Establishment that identifies reality with God and the fanaticism of otherworldliness that separates reality from God.

What matters here for Robinson is, I might say, a unique analogical state of affairs insofar as he says: "Language thus serves to mark what Heidegger abstractly called the ontological difference, the distinction but not separation between things and the orientation they have, between things and their being" (NQHJ-OE, 209). Accordingly, we need to see the parable as shot through with this analogical state of affairs: namely, phase 1 ("being" as this undergirds Jesus' factuality): phase 2 ("language event" with, indeed as, Jesus' parables):: phase 1 ("being" within a new context of the hearer's situation): phase 3 (the fulfillment of the intention implied in the parable, in that the hearer is caught up into the story along with one's situation). In a true comparison (like this), as Robinson assumes, the retention of the analogous language (in our case, the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*) preserves distinction while preventing separation. Thus: "God's reign is analogous to the situation with regard to a fisherman's net, but the Kingdom of God is not to be identified with the visible church" (NQHJ-OE, 209-210). But why not?

### Concluding Remarks:

In my own opinion, this is because the Kingdom of God has to be perceived repeatedly anew as an "ever-prevenient reality" vis-à-vis our human social formation, as is so advocated by Karl Barth in his proposal of *Analogia Fidei*, as the language world in terms of which it is experienced proceeds forward all the time. Basically inherent in the parable is, in my conviction, the arrow of intentionality of showing this ever-prevenient reality of God's reign in a concrete fashion. And the arrow will

take the forms of “evocation” as follows:

[A] [The Parable of the Lost Sheep]

Which one of you, having a hundred sheep and losing one of them, does not leave the ninety-nine, in the wilderness and go after the one that is lost until he finds it? When he has found it, he lays it on his shoulders and rejoices. And when he comes home, he calls together his friends and neighbors, saying to them, “Rejoice with me, for I have found my sheep that was lost. Just so, I tell you, there will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who need no repentance. (Q 15: 4-7; Luke 15:4-7; NRSV; italics mine)

The same arrow can be discerned in the following two cases as well, as far as I can see:

[B] Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful. (Q 6:36; Luke 6:36; NRSV)

[C] ...and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. (Galatians 2:20; NRSV)

In the first case [A], the evocation “Rejoice with me” shows the arrow of intentionality of God’s reign as it happens in the language of Jesus’ parables as reality’s true possibility. The second case [B] calls forth the cor-response and response to the reality of the merciful God “with us.” What is urged is a faithful loyalty in love to the divine-human bond, the Covenant of Love. In accordance with these preceding cases in which is at work the arrow of Jesus’ intentionality, Paul discloses his faith in the Christ. His is a confessional language through and through. But who is it that is confessing in these words? It is not Paul (“I”) because it is said that “...it is no longer I who

live"; nor is it Christ, either because Christ is the one who lives "in me." Someone is observing attentively this whole situation with his own eyes. It is the Paul who is dead.

Thus, inherent in the arrow of intentionality at issue here (which, incidentally, constitutes the "power" of what Mack calls "mythmaking" in his books mentioned earlier) is the message that the more one dies to one's own ego-entirety in cor-response and response to the "voice of being" that comes from God's reign in the case of the historical Jesus who speaks in Q and Thomas, and who acts in the Synoptic Gospels in a narrative manner, the more one is vivified by the "power of God" manifest in Jesus as the Christ in the case of the kerygmatic theology of Apostle Paul (Rom. 1:16) to confess: "Christ lives in me." It is precisely in this spirit of analogy, in the creatively re-used sense of the analogy of attribution *duorum ad tertium*, that I would like to affirm the theological-analogical significance of Q and the Gospel of Thomas in relation to the Christ of faith (as confessed, for instance, by Paul as living "in me").

As far as the sorts of utterance involved herein are concerned, what we have found in the cases of [A] (Jesus' parable) and [B] (Q) are both imperative or evocative expressions, "Rejoice with me" and "Be merciful," whereas Paul's mode of speech, as found in [C] (Galatians), is indicative or confessional. This noteworthy difference between them has made scholars to think that the former two are ethical while the latter being truly evangelical in nature. But, basically, I do not hold such a view. This is because I grasp the entirety of the sequence of the making of the Christian myth analogically, in the sense noted above. The arrow of intentionality can be observed as flowing from Q (and Thomas in its initial stage) to the Synoptic Gospels probably through the medium of the kerygmatic theology, as this was represented by Paul, analogically always in relation to the ever-prevenient Reality, Jesus' "Kingdom of God" and Paul's "the Christ."<sup>15</sup> Whither does it go further, then, in a

pluralistic age such as ours? I have no better answer to this question than William Beardslee's dictum in appreciation for Amos Wilder's work as follows:

Thus his work is extremely illuminating in bringing to attention what I have called the context of expectation in which parable and proverb are heard. It is not surprising that his work is pathbreaking both to those who find that the exciting task is working for a fresh view of the transcendent as an ordering factor, and to those who work for a new imaginative grasp of the transcendent as a creative nothingness. (MB, 79)<sup>16</sup>

In my opinion, these two visions of the transcendent can both be found in Galatians 2:20-21. As New Testament scholar Seiichi Yagi and Zen Roshi Ryomin Akizuki jointly affirm, Paul is definitely enlightened when he says: "...it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me" (2:20a).<sup>17</sup> In this regard, Christian faith in the Christ "who lives in me" is profoundly akin to Buddhist satori as the act of seeing into the "intrinsic" nature of one's own. However, on the other hand, it is oriented toward the redemptive, historical principle of justification, which is shot through with the "intended instrumental" vision of life (or Goodness), inasmuch as Paul add these words: "and the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me. I do not nullify the grace of God; for if justification comes through the law, then Christ died for nothing" (2:20b-21). This double nature of Pauline Christology, if my conjecture is correct, might have contributed to the formation of the narrative gospel in Mark,<sup>18</sup> on the one hand, while, on the other, keeping in touch with the "intrinsic" orientation peculiar to Q and Thomas<sup>19</sup> —and this in a critical-dialogical manner in both cases.

## NOTES

1. *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, 39/4, 1984, 269–85.
2. A term paper for Dr. James M. Robinson's course on "the Historical Jesus" at Claremont Graduate School in the spring semester of 1979, now revised in 1996 (unpublished) to be incorporated (together with the present, the above-mentioned, and other articles) into the book entitled *Christ As the Problem of Analogy: Beyond the Theology of Karl Barth*.
3. Eng. trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (*Philadelphia: The Westminster Press*, 1968, 1977).
- 3 a. John Hick, *The Metaphor of God Incarnate: Christology in a Pluralistic Age* (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), p.104. (Hereafter cited as MGI.)
4. I suspect that Crossan's reference to the incarnation in a metaphorical or symbolical perspective in his *Who Killed Jesus?: Exposing the Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Gospel Story of the Death of Jesus* (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1995; hereafter cited as WKJ), like Hick's, might also be suggestive of his unclarity about this issue: He writes: "I answer again and again that, for the first as for the twenty-first century, Jesus was and is divine for those who experience in him the manifestation of God" (WKJ, 216; italics his). He does not clearly differentiate the manifestation of God by Godself in Jesus from the manifestation of God by Jesus in himself. If he had distinguished between the two, he would not have said: "Christian faith tells us how the historical Jesus (fact) is the manifestation of God for us here and now (interpretation). You cannot believe in a fact, only in an interpretation" (WKJ, 217). It is my contention, however, that you only can believe in that which enables you to interpret the historical Jesus (fact) in relation to the Christ of faith, but not in a human interpretation as such. That enabler, for me, is what Takizawa calls the *Proto-factum* Immanuel, as is evident in my argument throughout the present study.
5. Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* I/1, trans. G.T.Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T.Clark, 1931), p.280.
6. Burton L. Mack, *The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q and Christian Origins* (HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), p.247; italics mine. (Hereafter cited as LG.)
7. As to the two-fold significant function of a concept (e.g., *nihil*), see Desmond Paul Henry, *The Logic of Saint Anselm* (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1967), p.210; *Commentary on De*

Gramatico: *The Historical-Logical Dimensions of a Dialogue of St. Anselm's* (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, U.S.A.: D.Reidel Publ. Co., 1974), p.337.

8. See my article "Hartshorne and Hisamatsu on Human Nature: A Study of Christian and Buddhist Metaphysical Anthropology" (*Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No.5, February 29, 1996), 1-49, esp. 6-12.
9. See Burton L.Mack, *Who Wrote the New Testament?: The Making of the Christian Myth* (HarperSanFrancisco, 1995), pp. 76, 152-61.
10. There are two aspects to the pragmatic value of human nature, "livable or existential" and "rationally defensible," that are to be taken into consideration when we analyze and evaluate developments of human social formation of whatever kind. See my afore-mentioned article "Hartshorne and Hisamatsu on Human Nature," 17-19, 23-26.
11. *Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No.1, February 28, 1992, 61-83; No.2, February 28, 1993, 27-50; and No.3, February 28, 1994, 1-19.
12. James M.Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus and Other Essays* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), p.203. (Hereafter cited as NQHJ-OE.)
13. These three phases of reality are profoundly reminiscent of the three stages of development of the universe articulated in Nishida's philosophy: pure experience, self-awareness, and place. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, Nishida's three stages are correlative to the problems of the ground of concrescence, the act of concrescence or creation here-now, and its consequence (i.e., satisfaction) in Whitehead's philosophy. In poetic language, the same idea is expressed by the Japanese haiku genius Basho in these words:

Furu ike ya!	The old pond, ah!	(Stage A)
Kawazu tobikomu,	A frog jumps in:	(Stage B)
Mizu no oto.	The water's sound!	(Stage C)

(See Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "How Can Pure Experience Give Rise to Religious Self-awareness and Then to the Topological Argument for the Existence of God Cogently?: Nishida, Whitehead, and Pannenberg," *Purosesu Shiso* [Process Thought], No.6, September 1995, 125-150).

Now, in order for us to account for the entire sequence of the three phases of the advance of the universe in a really

intelligible manner, it would be crucial that we grasp the true meaning of the second phase, language event. In this regard, D.T.Suzuki's explication of the above-mentioned Basho's haiku is profoundly suggestive (although from the Buddhist perspective, in his case):

It is by intuition alone that this timelessness of the Unconscious [i.e., Basho's "old pond" ] is truly taken hold of. And this intuitive grasp of Reality never takes place when a world of Emptiness is assumed outside our everyday world of the senses; for these two worlds, sensual and supersensual, are not separate but one. Therefore, the poet sees into his Unconscious not through the stillness of the old pond but through the sound stirred up by the jumping frog. Without the sound there is no seeing on the part of Basho into the Unconscious, in which lies the source of creative activities and upon which all true artists draw for their inspiration. It is difficult to describe this moment of consciousness where polarization ceases or rather starts, for these contradictory terms are applicable there without causing logical inconvenience. It is the poet or the religious genius who actually has this kind of experience. And, according to the way this experience is handled, it becomes in one case Basho's haiku and in the other a Zen utterance. (Daisetz T.Suzuki, *Zen and Japanese Culture* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970], pp. 241-242.)

What Basho introduces into the truth of utterance from the Unconscious by reference to the "frog jumping into the water" is, if I am correct, in parallel with what William A. Bearlee as a New Testament hermeneutician considers in a Christian perspective as "the [Whiteheadian] path of rethinking a point of view in which God and the world interact," in that it shows most adequately "why, after the moment of fracture of the continuity of life, faith leads to a reentry into the continuing social relationships of men and women" (*Margins of Belonging: Essays on the New Testament and Theology* [Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press], 1991, p.78; hereafter cited as MB). In a word, after the frog's jumping there will be "the water's sound," which is the sound of both "the frog" (the individual) and "the old pond" (the Unconscious or the Transindividual) at once in their oneness in action, in my own view.

14. Ernst Fuchs, *Hermeneutik* (Bad Cannstadt: R. Müllerschön,

1954), p.211; cited in NQHJ-OE, 207.

15. This is my own hypothesis regarding the making of the Christian myth. At its core is a philosophical reasoning I have developed in the article "How Can Pure Experience Give Rise to Religious Self-awareness and Then to the Topological Argument for the Existence of God Cogently?: Nishida, Whitehead, and Pannenberg" (*Purosesu Shiso* [Process Thought], No.6, September 1995) to this effect: as is manifested by Kitaro Nishida in his philosophical development as a whole, the first stage of "pure experience" and the third stage of "discursive explanation of all things in the universe" are to be mediated by the second stage of "self-awareness" (Jpn., *jikaku*) having to do with the vision of reality (see pp. 133-40, 144-47). In the case of the making of the Christian myth, it seems to me, Q and Thomas, located at the first stage of "wisdom," proceeds into the third stage of "apocalyptic explanation of the universe" in the Synoptic Gospels (beginning with Mark) only through the medium of the kerygmatic theological "vision of reality" (such as the vision *qua* confession that "Jesus is the Christ") as enabled by somebody's self-awareness (such as Paul's in Galatians 2:20 "...it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me"). Thus, the second mediative stage is indispensable to any serious religious formation of "myths" or "belief-systems." If it is lacking as in the case of Shoko Asahara's Aum-Shinrikyō, the first stage, as practiced by his "Tibetan Buddhist meditation," and the third stage, as symbolized by his resort to the "Christian apocalyptic interpretation of the world by the idea of Armageddon," are in jeopardy of splitting into two pieces. It is precisely for the sake of filling this gap that he needed to create an artificial, "virtual" reality by the threatening power of a poisonous gas, sarin, that his followers used thereby committing atrocities against civilians in Tokyo in the spring of 1995.
16. What Beardslee has in mind in saying so is John B. Cobb, Jr.'s epoch-making article in contemporary theology of the world religions, "Buddhist Emptiness and the Christian God," *JAAR* 45 (1977), 11-25. Whether or not we can find these two visions of the transcendent in the Sayings Source is in itself an important question in Q scholarship. If we can, this will mean, as Elisabeth Schuessler Fiorenza assumes, that a historical-theological argument, such as is capable of understanding Jesus and Jonah as the messengers of Sophia who continue but do not close off a long line of prophets, "radically challenges the assumption of Q scholarship that the earliest layer of the Sayings



Source portrays Jesus as a wandering Cynic-like philosopher” (*Jesus—Miriam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet: Critical Issues in Feminist Christology* [New York: Continuum, 1995], p.157; hereafter cited as JMCSF). Actually, she observes that “In contrast to Jewish and Christian Apocalyptic traditions, the Wisdom tradition values life, creativity, and well-being in the midst of struggle” (JMCSF, 157). And she writes:

Jesus as sage and prophet of Sophia provides us with two christological images. One presents Jesus as a wise teacher, who in his concrete life relates to our ongoing quest for a gracious G\*d. The Sophia-G\*d of Jesus loves all humanity irrespective of ethnic and social links and shows concern for liberation and empowerment of the underprivileged. The other insight is that Jesus’ teaching is meant not only for hearing but also for being and acted upon. In Q we find the earliest christological instance that presents Jesus as a spokesperson for Wisdom. In him we find a way to respond to religious pluralism and the greater problem of suffering and injustice. Nothing stops feminist theologians from critically assessing the kyriocentric framework of the Wisdom tradition (and all other biblical traditions) in order to rearticulate some of its discourses in such a way that wo/men can theologially claim it. We must, however, shape this discourse in such a way that it does not reinscribe the preconstructed elite male kyriocentric framework of meaning of Western culture and Christian religion” (JMCSF, 157-58).

However, a question remains: How can these two Christological images—i.e., sapiential creativity and praxis for others (especially the *nepioi*, the babes, the uneducated, or the nobodies)—be unified as one in a feminist discourse on Divine Wisdom? I don’t think Fiorenza has successfully given a solution to this question by her view of G\*d-language as “symbolic, metaphoric, and analogous”—a view commensurate with the understanding that “human language can never speak adequately about divine reality” (JMCSF, 161). To be sure, she is right in criticizing a theory of language that subscribes to linguistic determinism because she believes: “Kyriocentric language is often understood as ‘natural’ language that describes and reflects reality rather than as a grammatical classification system that constructs reality in androcentric kyriarchal terms” (JMCSF, 161). Yet, this does not mean that Fiorenza has successfully shown the

very symbolic, metaphoric, or analogical “root” of the two Christological images mentioned above.

17. Seichi Yagi and Ryomin Akizuki, *Danma ga arawani naru toki* (The Time for Dharma to Become Manifest) (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1990), pp. 67, 201-4, 207, 214, 217, 233, 304-6. See also Akizuki, “A Zennist’s Vision of the Time for Dharma (Religious Truth) to Become Manifest,” trans. Tokiyuki Nobuhara, *Buddhist-Christian Studies*, 14 (1994), 23-32.
18. Mack claims, with Birger A. Pearson, that the addition to Paul’s letter to the Thessalonians (1 Thess. 2:14-16), written by some post-Pauline author after the destruction of the temple in 70 C. E., was aimed at directing Paul’s apocalyptic preachments against those who opposed the Christian mission—namely, against the Jews who “killed Jesus” and “drove us out,” for which reason “God’s wrath has overtaken them at last”—a judgmental reference to the destruction of the temple. This idea, in Mack’s view, seriously tarnishes the inclusive logic of the Christ myth, and it presupposes the logic of Mark’s passion narrative which runs counter to that of the Christ myth (*Who Wrote the New Testament?: The Making of the Christian Myth* [HarperSanFrancisco, 1995], 114, 151; hereafter cited as WWNT). The accusation against the Jews of killing Jesus by the author of 1 Thess. 2:14-16 and the author of the Gospel of Mark testifies to the rise of a new trend of Christian absolutism after Paul. However, it was crucial for them, I suppose, to resort to Paul’s authority for later versions of the Christian view of history and its apocalyptic finale only because it was derived from and undergirded existentially-religiously by his unique Christian self-awareness of the “Christ living in me.” Commensurate with this, probably, are two different, yet closely connected, attitudes toward the ritual meal by Paul and Mark: whereas in the Markan version of the ritual symbols, the martyrological derivation, as Mack observes, is made explicit by reference to the blood being “poured out for many” (Mark 14:24), in Paul’s text (1 Cor. 11:23b-25), on the other hand, the death as founding event for the community has been emphasized, not by the spilling of the blood, but by using the idea of a “new covenant” (Burton L. Mack, *A Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins* [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988], p.118).
19. There are certain parallel accounts in Paul’s letters to the Romans and the Galatians and in the Gospel of Thomas. First, Paul was neither the only, nor perhaps even the first person within the early Christian movement to oppose the circumcision

of Gentiles before their inclusion in Christian communities because Saying 53 reads: "His disciples said to him, 'Is circumcision useful or not?' He said to them, 'If it were useful, their father would produce children already circumcised from their mother. Rather, the true circumcision in spirit has become profitable in every respect'." Second, in dealing with the problem of Hellenistic Jewish wisdom, Paul quotes a saying from the Gospel of Thomas in 1 Cor. 2:9-10a: "But as it is written, 'What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived, what God prepared for those who love him,' God has revealed to us through the Spirit." Thomas' version (Saying 17), according to Stephen J. Patterson, is not an exact replica, but reflects the sort of differences one would expect to have resulted from oral transmission: "Jesus said, 'I shall give you what no eye has seen, what no ear has heard, what no hand has touched, what has not arisen in the human heart'." See Stephen J. Patterson, "The Gospel of Thomas: Introduction," in John S. Kloppenborg et al. eds. with Foreword by James M. Robinson, *Q Thomas Reader* (Sonoma, CA: Polebridge Press, 1990), pp. 110-13.