

Ignorance—Christian and Buddhist: Reinterpreting Anselm's Proslogion IV in Light of D. T. Suzuki's Zen Thought *

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Introduction

In my recent essay "A 'Buddhistic' Reinterpretation of Karl Barth's Argument for the Existence of God in *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*"¹ I have demonstrated that Anselm's Name for God, *aliquid quo "nihil" maius cogitari possit*, can be reinterpreted Buddhistically in terms of Nagarjuna's notion of "Emptiness" as it empties itself in reference to Anselm's *Proslogion* II and III. The argument for what Barth designates as "The General Existence of God"² developed in *Proslogion* II, which Barth, Hartshorne,³ and Malcolm⁴ call Anselm I, can be critiqued, as shown by Kant.⁵

The argument for "The Special [or necessary] Existence of God" (AFQI, 132-161) or Anselm II is, nevertheless, tenable for the following reason: On the one hand, Anselm's Deity is "loyal" to *nihil*, or Emptiness emptying itself, inasmuch as *nihil* can be conceived as greater ("*maius*") than *aliquid*, or Deity; however, on the other hand, God is paradoxically proved to "be" the only one in the universe who can call forth loyalty in us—and this in the capacity of the one who has experienced loyalty on one's own. Here we have a philosophical explication of Jesus' words urging us toward perfection: "Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven is perfect" (Mt. 5:48).

As is clear from the above, I have applied to the hermeneutics of Anselm's argument the threefold principle essential to my proposal for a Buddhist-Christian theology of loyalty: (1) God is loyal to Emptiness or Nothingness; (2) Emptiness empties itself; and (3) God is the only one in the universe who can evoke loyalty in creatures (see "Buddhistic," 11-12).⁶ Thus, the resulting perspective is one from which we see, with Anselm, that God cannot be thought as not existing. This is the way in which it can be

ascertained and verified that "[T]he whole effort of *Prosl.* 2 - 3 had been to prove conclusively that God cannot be conceived as not existing." (AFQI, 165)

If, however, one cannot take into account God's loyalty to *nihil*, implied in the expression "*maius*" (greater), as that which constitutes the inner background of God's existence *ad extra*, one may understand God's existence as simply located within the confines of the world. Herein lies the reason why one can say in his heart, "There is no God," while, on the other hand, "understanding," albeit only rhetorically, that there exists something than which nothing greater can be thought because:

...*hoc cum audit intelligit...*

... he understands this when he hears it...⁷

What we are encountering here is the problem of *insipiens* or of the Fool which Anselm describes in these terms:

Quomodo insipiens dixit in corde, quod cogitari non potest. (I 103, 13)

How [in what way] the fool has said in his heart something that cannot be conceived. (AFQI, 161)

The above is the title of the fourth chapter of *Proslogion*; and, as such, it depicts a claim or a statement of what the chapter is to show. Hence, the "*quomodo*" of the chapter heading is to be translated "*in what way*" rather than "*how*"—the latter rendering fitting to the "*quomodo*" in the first line because a question is posed there (see IAA, 70). It is important to note that the confusion of two cases (in one case the title of the fourth chapter appearing and in the other case a question being posed) of the "*quomodo*" has contributed to the neglect of IV, as Schufreider claims (IAA, 71). We have to be attentive to the difference between *asking how* the Fool thought what cannot be thought, and *claiming* to be able to show *in what way* the Fool thought what cannot be thought (IAA, 70-71).

I concur with Karl Barth when he says that the statement, reached at the

end of *Prosl.* 3, 'the fool has said in his heart, "There is no God"—is also a "statement of faith which as such requires knowledge" (AFQI, 161). "Anselm," says Barth, "takes for the subject of a final inquiry not how the fool comes to be a fool—that is his secret and God's—but rather how the Fool behaves as a Fool, what constitutes the folly of denying the Existence of God and to what extent his statement is really nonsense which must be debarred from serious theological debate" (ibid.). In this sense, what for Anselm constitutes a final inquiry in *Proslogion* IV manifests a way in which the Fool's ignorance can take place in his mind as the negation of the completion of *Proslogion* II and III in spite of the fact that it is precisely by means of the argument of II and III that Anselm has shown that God truly exists, that is, so exists that He cannot be thought not to exist. This is because it involves in itself clarification of the problem of knowing God's Existence by indicating that there is not only one way ("*non uno tantum modo*") in which something is thought, thereby articulating the *locus philosophicus* of the Fool's ignorance.

By the same token, it is crucial for the Zennist to understand the core of ignorance in order to be fully awake to Enlightenment, or to be fully open to infinite openness. I think a clue lies in D. T. Suzuki's statement that "[I]ndeed, ignorance is the negation of Enlightenment and not the reverse."⁸ In what follows I will first discuss Anselm's understanding of the Fool. Second, I will deal with the case of Suzuki's insight into the core of ignorance. Third, I will explore the convergence of these two, resulting in a reinterpretation of Anselm's *Proslogion* IV in light of Suzuki's Zen thought.

I . Anselm's Understanding of the Fool

The first line of IV runs as follows:

Verum quomodo dixit in corde quod cogitare non potuit; aut quomodo cogitare non potuit quod dixit in corde, cum idem sit dicere in corde et cogitare? (I 103, 14ff)

But how did he come to say in his heart what he cannot have conceived or how could he not conceive what he said in his heart, since 'to say in one's heart' and 'to conceive' are one and the same thing? (AFQI, 161)

Here is what Karl Barth calls a "miracle of foolishness." (AFQI, 163) Barth explicates as follows.

1 . *Two Ways of Discussing the Foolishness of the Fool and the Ambiguity* ("non uno tantum modo") of the Planes of God-Assertion/Denial

In reference to the above text Karl Barth speaks of two ways of discussing the foolishness of the Fool. The first way is to make his foolishness as such the starting-point. Barth writes:

He says in his heart what he is unable to conceive. He says, namely, 'God does not exist'. And according to the exposition in *Prosl. 3* that is something he cannot conceive. Not at all? But he nevertheless says it in his heart. Therefore, he can do the impossible. For obviously 'saying in his heart' and 'conceiving' are the same. Questions: How does he manage it? How can he reconcile this contradiction within himself? (AFQI, 161-2)

Here the foolishness of the Fool lies in improper speech, i.e., saying what he is unable to conceive. However, an inverse case is also possible: that is the way of making the fact of the foolishness of the Fool the starting-point, thus attending to the fact that he cannot conceive the thing that he says in his heart—namely, "God does not exist." Then, what is the reason for this dual miracle of foolishness? Anselm replies:

Quid si vere, immo quia vere et cogitavit quia dixit in corde, et non dixit in corde quia cogitare non potuit: non uno tantum modo dicitur aliquid in corde vel cogitatur. (I 103, 16ff)

If, or rather because he has actually conceived it (for he said it in his heart) and has not said it in his heart (for he could not conceive it)—it is clear that 'to say in one's heart' or 'to conceive' is not an unambiguous proceeding. (Barth, AFQI, 162)

But if he really (indeed, since he really) both thought because he said in his

heart and did not say in his heart because he could not think: there is not only one sense in which something is said in the heart or thought. (Schufreider, IAA, 71)

However, if—or rather because—he really did conceive of it (since he said it in his heart) and yet did not really say it in his heart (since he was unable to conceive of it), then there must be more than one way for something to be said in one's heart, or to be conceived. (Hick and McGill, MA, 7)

The Fool conceived it because he said it in his heart, on the one hand; however, on the other, he did not conceive it because he did not say it in his heart. Why so? According to Anselm, the reason lies in the fact that the assertion and the denial of the Existence of God do not take place on the same plane of understanding. And here, in Barth's view, is "the fundamental solution of the problem" (AFQI, 163). Barth explicates:

The fool is able to say what he is certainly unable to conceive in so far as when he says it he is standing on a plane where he can assert the non-existence of God. And he is unable to conceive of what he is nevertheless able to say in so far as he is standing on another plane where it would be impossible for him to assert the non-existence of God. This is the fool's basic folly that in his thinking he is standing on a plane where the assertion of God's non-existence is certainly possible but where to stand on that plane is in itself—folly. (AFQI, 163)

2. *The Possibility and the Impossibility of God-Denial: The vox significans rem and the res significata*

Then, in what way can the Fool conceive the non-existence of God while, on the other hand, he is unable to conceive it? Anselm answers this question by indicating that:

Aliter enim cogitatur res cum vox eam significances cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum quod res est intelligitur. (I 103, 18f)

A thing is conceived in one way when it is the word describing it that is

conceived, in another way when the thing itself is known. (AFQI, 163)

That is, we can think of an object by thinking of the word describing it while obeying the directions we receive from the language of the particular word. Thus, we consider what claims to be the thought of the object concerned, and admit the object concerned exists. In this manner, we conceive, on the intramental plane, the *vox significans Deum*, the word describing God. Thus far, there is no folly in that way of understanding in itself. This reminds us of what in *Prosl. 2* Anselm constructed in reference to the first general form of his Proof for the Existence of God because even the Fool has to admit at least the intramental existence of God and therefore to that extent cannot be a Fool (cf. AFQI, 164).

However, when it comes to dealing with a real, objective, as distinct from merely conceptual, existence or with knowledge of real existence or therefore with Truth itself, our intramental conception of it has nothing to do with either of them on the intramental cum objective plane. Accordingly, Barth is right when he states that "[T]he thinking of the *vox significans rem* in itself, in abstraction from the thought of something that really exists, or set over against it as something different, would have to be described as false" (AFQI, 164).

What I stated above holds true of the problem of God-denial: the Fool can deny the existence of God intramentally, but it has nothing to do with the real, objective existence of God. Hence, Anselm writes:

Illo itaque modo potest cogitari Deus non esse, isto vero minime. (I 103, 20)

In the first way, then, it is possible to think of God as not existing but impossible in the other. (AFQI, 165)

On the intramental plane it is possible for the *insipiens* to think of God as not existing. Anselm does not deny this fact, but rather admits the existence of an intellectual capacity and the inner consistency of that level peculiar to him where he can only think falsely. "Falsely" by which we can mean, as Barth claims: "...directing one's thinking abstractly to the *vox significans rem* [word describing the thing] without knowing the *id ipsum quod res est*

[that which the thing itself is]—as one must think as an *insipiens*—then it really is possible to do what according to the Proof of *Prosl. 2 - 3* is impossible" (AFQI, 165). Falsely, therefore, means the miracle of foolishness by virtue of which it is possible to think of God as "not existing." Here God is the issue of "rhetoric only." And there lies behind this merely rhetorical God-assertion/denial what Barth insightfully designates as the Fool's confession of "his own abandonment of God" (AFQI, 168)—namely, of the abandonment into which, it might be said, the Fool is abandoned himself by God (cf. Rom. 1:28).

3 . *Going beyond the Intramental Plane: Under the Compulsion of the Knowledge of God' Existence for What?*

What, then, is the realm which lies beyond the intramental plane? It is the realm Anselm depicts by reference to the thinking of *fides quaerens intellectum*, which starts out in faith from the knowledge of God himself whose existence it wants to know rationally. Anselm explicates:

Nullus quippe intelligens id quod Deus est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est, licet haec verba dicat in corde, aut sine ulla aut cum aliqua extranea significatione.

(I 103, 20-104, 2)

For no one who knows God himself can think, 'God does not exist'—even although he may say these words in his heart, whether without meaning or without relevance. (AFQI, 166)

Here Anselm shares with us the presupposition of *fides quaerens intellectum* which, according to Barth, cannot be abandoned even to please the *insipiens*, and which, on the contrary rather, just because of the *insipiens*, has to be insisted upon to the end (AFQI, 166). The presupposition on which the thought of God's non-existence is impossible is nothing else than "knowing God himself"—*intelligere id quod Deus est*.

It is precisely at this juncture that Barth shows the depth of his hermeneutics of Anselm' argument for the existence of God. He states:

From the whole tenor of Anselm's thought and from what immediately follows it—*Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest* [God in fact is the one than whom a greater cannot be conceived]—it cannot mean—'knowing God's Nature' so that God's existence would follow from what we know of his Nature. It is certainly true that knowledge of God's Nature, of his Omnipotence and Eternity, of his infinite Holiness and Mercy is also included in *intelligere id quod Deus est* [knowing or understanding that which God is]. But the fact that it is this knowledge does not compel it to be knowledge of God's Existence too. Even if every conceivable physical and moral property were raised to the nth degree, that could quite well be nothing more than the sum total of the predicates of a purely conceptual being. (AFQI, 167)

What is important to notice in the above is the fact that Barth thinks it impossible to deduce God's existence from however lofty a knowledge of God's Nature; and when Barth says this he is basing it on the basis of the Name of God, *id quo maius cogitari non potest*, "the one than whom a greater cannot be conceived." This is because the truth of the matter is just the other way round—that is, God's Nature is included in *intelligere id quod Deus est*, knowing or understanding "that which God is" or, it might be said, the entire life of the Deity. How can we legitimately deduce God's existence as a predicate from God's Nature—a procedure which Kant rightly rebuked although reasoning only within the bounds of his rationalistic ignorance—without paying due attention first to the entire life of God involving in itself God's Nature and God's Existence as they are inseparably one? Understanding God himself is to truly or dynamically know this inseparable oneness of Nature and Existence back and forth—that is, *intra se et extra se*—in the entire life of the Deity.

Now, what will happen if one conjectures, as does Barth, that what Anselm designates as "*id quod Deus est*" (which I rather take to mean "the entire life of the Deity") is synonymous with what he himself refers to as "God himself" (which reminds us of Barth's notion of *die inner-trinitarische Gottheit*)? The consequence is depicted by Barth in these words:

The fact that *id quod Deus est* is synonymous with God himself makes this

analogical, 'speculative' understanding of his reality into true knowledge of his Nature and that creates the fully efficacious, indeed over-efficacious substitute for the missing (and necessarily missing) experiential knowledge of him. This in turn compels knowledge of his Existence, the knowledge which is possible and becomes real so necessarily and so exclusively as against all other knowledge, including all denial and doubt, only in so far as it is knowledge of his Existence. God himself compels this knowledge. (AFQI, 167)

To truly understand Nature and Existence as inseparably one in the entire life of the Deity in dynamic relationships to God himself or the Godhead, Barth's explication of Anselm's argument is neither really clear-cut nor proper enough. This is basically because he takes the *id quod Deus est* as "synonymous" with God himself. From the viewpoint of a Buddhist-Christian theology of loyalty mentioned at the outset, it appears that the entire life of the Deity (which is what *id quod Deus est* means to me) comes to be as such only in dynamic relationships back and forth with God himself: first, by way of God's loyalty to God himself (Ger., *Gottheit*); and second, by way of God's evocation of our creaturely loyalty—and this as the one who supremely embodies the Godhead, i.e., God himself "as" characterized. (The "as" signifies from my point of view what Barth intends to say by the "synonymous.")

If this much is clear, then it is not difficult to perceive, as does Barth, why the above-mentioned synonymity of the *id quod Deus est* (supposedly the Nature-side of the Deity as a whole) with God himself turns on the second level into a compulsion of knowing God's existence. On the first level, God as the Nature-*intra se* loyally surrenders himself toward God himself; on the second level, however, God establishes himself as the Existence-*ad extra* in such a way as to call forth loyalty in us creatures—and this whole procedure only in reference to God himself, the Godhead. Here I identify the Godhead with the Buddhist Emptiness as it empties itself insofar as we can see that the beyond-essence of the Deity as "*perichoresis*" [circulation] is in itself "relationality," just like Buddhist *sunyata* is, not an entity or a person, even a divine *persona* or *personae*.

If that be the case, I propose to interpret the rest of the text of *Proslogion*

IV in conjunction with D. T. Suzuki's explication of "Enlightenment and Ignorance."

II. D. T. Suzuki on "Enlightenment and Ignorance"

What is needed here is to show, as much as possible, the core of Suzuki's grasp of ignorance against the background of Buddhist Enlightenment in order for me to apply it to the study of Anselm's argument for the existence of God vis-à-vis the Fool's saying, "God does not exist." In doing this I will not dwell upon Suzuki's entire reflection on "Enlightenment and Ignorance." From this limited perspective, it would be of great importance to mention that there is a parallelism between what we referred to as two ways or planes of knowing God in Anselm, that is, a merely rhetorical one constituting the Fool's folly and the *intelligere id quo Deus est* (understanding that which God is) and a correlative case in Buddhism which Suzuki explicates in the following passage:

Ignorance, which is the antithesis of Enlightenment, therefore acquires a much deeper sense here than that which has hitherto been ascribed to it. Ignorance is not merely not knowing or not being acquainted with a theory, system or law; it is not directly grasping the ultimate facts of life as expressive of the will. In Ignorance knowing is separated from acting, and the knower from that which is to be known; in Ignorance the world is asserted as distinct from the self; that is, there are always two elements standing in opposition. This is, however, the fundamental condition of cognition, which means that as soon as cognition takes place there is Ignorance clinging to its very act. When we think we know something, there is something we do not know. (EZB, 128)

As is clear from the above, the very dichotomy between knowing and not knowing, the one to which we cling to, is that which constitutes Ignorance; and it is in parallel with Anselm's Fool's saying, "God does not exist," despite his intramental knowledge of God. However, one has to go beyond this dichotomy in order to arrive at Enlightenment. It is precisely at this moment that Suzuki begins to speak of "the will." "The Buddha's insight penetrated the depths of his being as the will, and he knew what this was,

yathabhutam, or in its tathabhava (thatness or suchness), he rose above himself as a Buddha supreme and peerless" (EZB, 128). When the Buddha rose above himself, he arose by his utmost will-power (see EZB, 125, 127). But his utmost will power for what? Suzuki answers:

Enlightenment, therefore, must involve the will as well as the intellect. It is an act of intuition born of the will. The will wants to know itself as it is in itself, *yathabhutam dassana*, free from all its cognitive conditions. The Buddha attained this end when a new insight came upon him at the end of his ever-circulatory reasoning from decay and death to Ignorance and from Ignorance to decay and death, through the twelve links of the *Paticca-samuppada*. (EZB, 126)

Although scholars are tempted to ignore the significance of the will as the essentially determining factor in the solution of the ultimate problem, the Buddha basically wants an illumined will and not the negation of it—in order to see and accept itself as it actually is beyond the epistemological dualism of knower and known (EZB, 127, 158, 131-132, 129). What does this mean in actuality? It means: "After this present life there will be no beyond!" (EZB, 134,141). That is, the scale terminates in the "yathabhutam" acceptance of the world (EZB, 140). By this, however, we do not necessarily have to mean the denial of our aspiration for salvation after death, but can agree with the Japanese Zen master Ryokan who finally sang while lying in bed with a serious illness:

waga nochi o
 tasuke tamae to
 tanomu mi wa
 moto no chikai no
 sugata narikeri

while beseeching thee
 for mercy after my death
 lo I find myself
 already embodying

the Original Vow now!⁹

It follows from what I have said that we now have arrived at a totally new vision of "enlightenment and ignorance." Suzuki elucidates:

We are apt to think that when Ignorance is driven out and the ego loses its hold on us, we have nothing to lean against and are left to the fate of a dead leaf blown away hither and thither as the wind listeth. But this is not so; for Enlightenment is not a negative idea meaning simply the absence of Ignorance. Indeed, Ignorance is the negation of Enlightenment and not the reverse. (EZB, 139)

III. Concluding Remarks: Toward a Convergence of the Two Reflections on Ignorance

With the realization of Enlightenment the whole affair of life changes its aspect, and the order instituted by Ignorance is reversed from top to bottom. As Suzuki emphasizes, what was negative is now positive, and what was positive now negative. "Since Buddhism asserts Enlightenment to be the ultimate fact of Buddhist life, there is nothing negativistic, nothing pessimistic [about it]" (EZB, 139).

This state of affairs, in my view, is correlatively and interculturally reminiscent of Anselm's knowledge of God's existence, one which he says God himself compels. Let us now turn accordingly to the consideration of a convergence of our two reflections by Anselm and Suzuki on Ignorance—Christian and Buddhist.

A clue to the knowledge of God's existence lies in understanding that the Fool's Ignorance is a merely intramental or rhetorical negation of the illumination of God's Existence which inheres in that which God is, and not the reverse: By that I mean that Ignorance is the effect of his negation of the Divine illumination; and the effect vanishes like frost in the sun if the cause evaporates. As such, the Fool's Ignorance is, to borrow Barth's phraseology, "confessing his own abandonment of God...But in no circumstances will he deny God himself" (AFQI, 168).

After saying so, however, we hasten to add, as does Barth: "What the *insipiens* can prove is this and only this, that he does not know him whose

Existence he denies. And it is not his denial, but his not knowing, that constitutes his folly" (AFQI, 168). For Anselm writes in the second to the last paragraphs in IV:

Deus enim est id quo maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utque intelligit id ipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse Deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare. (I 104, 2ff)

For God is 'that beyond which nothing greater can be conceived.' Whoever truly knows that knows that it exists in such a way that even in thought it cannot but exist. And so whoever knows that this is the manner of God's existence cannot conceive him as not existing. (AFQI, 168)

Finally, to know God himself is to understand that God is he who, revealing himself as Creator, is called *quo maius cogitari nequit*, that beyond which nothing greater can be conceived. And Barth contends that God is he who immediately confronts us with his Name as the one who forbids us to conceive a greater than him. In this connection, Anselm's expression "*bene intelligere*" [truly knowing], according to Barth, is not to be immediately equated *a priori* with *intelligere id ipsum quod res est* [knowing that which the thing itself is]. "But in the sense of our passage *bene intelligere* is the fulfillment, the development, the manner of this real knowledge, which by its relation to the object establishes itself as true" (AFQI, 169).

By saying "as true" Barth points to the culmination at the level of "*existens*" of the *esse-ens-existens* development *ad extra* of God's mode of being [Ger., *Seinsweise Gottes*]. At this juncture it might be added that authentic understanding helps reality [or that which God is] to its truth [or God's Existence]. But by virtue of what? Barth rightly replies:

It [*bene intelligere*] consists concretely in the fact that the embargo contained in the Name of God is heard, recognized and obeyed and that therefore in his thinking man allows God to be God....*Bene intelligere* means: finally to realize that it is not possible to think beyond God, not possible to think as a spectator of oneself or of God, that all thinking about God has to begin with thinking to God. That is what the fool and also his advocate Gaunilo have

not yet realized. Those who have realized it, by so doing, stand under compulsion of knowledge of God's Existence. And immediately and primarily of that existence of God which belongs only to him amongst all that exists, his *sic esse*, the existence which cannot be annulled even in mere thought. (AFQI, 169)

Here I only would like to add that the compulsion of the knowledge of God's Existence is due to the fact that inasmuch as God is the one than whom "Nothing greater" [*nihil maius*] can be conceived, God is loyal to Nothingness or Emptiness emptying itself—which we Christians can find in the intra-Trinitarian Godhead whom Meister Eckhart calls *Nichts*—thereby paradoxically evoking our loyalty to him in our hearts and minds. "Therefore you shall be perfect, just as your Father in heaven is perfect" (Matt. 5:48).

Notes

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- 1 Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "A 'Buddhistic' Reinterpretation of Karl Barth's Argument for the Existence of God in *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum*," *Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No. 13, February 28, 2004, 1-14; hereafter cited as "Buddhistic."
- 2 Karl Barth, *Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of his Theological Scheme* (London: SCM Press, 1960), pp. 100-32; hereafter cited as AFQI.
- 3 See Charles Hartshorne, "What did Anselm Discover?," *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, XVII (1962), 213-222; see also John H. Hick and Arthur C. McGill, *The Many-faced Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 321-333; hereafter cited as MA.
- 4 See Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Arguments," *The Philosophical Review*, LXLX, No. 1 (January 1960), 41-62, esp. 261f., 269; see also MA, 301-320; cf. Malcolm L. Diamond, *Contemporary Philosophy and Religious Thought: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book C., 1974), p. 246.
- 5 See John Hick's comments in MA, ch. IX: "Introduction," 209-218, esp., 218. See also Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A revised and expanded translation based on Meiklejohn; ed. Vasilis Politis (London: Everyman, 1994), pp. 407-412.
- 6 See also Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "Sunyata, Kenosis, and Jihi or Friendly Compassionate Love: Toward a Buddhist-Christian Theology of Loyalty," *Japanese Religions*, 15/4, July 1989, 50-66.

- 7 Cf.: "We saw, following Anselm's own reply, that 'understand' was here being used in a weak sense. The sort of understanding that the Fool has is not a matter of thinking that which the thing itself is, but simply involves thinking (in the weakest sense of that term) about the thing by means of the words that one hears" (Gregory Schufreider, *An Introduction to Anselm's Argument*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978, pp. 83-84; hereafter cited as IAA).
- 8 D. T. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series* (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 139; hereafter cited as EZB.
- 9 Tokiyuki Nobuhara, "Ryokan's Interpretation of the Never-Despising-Anyone in *Hokke-san* and Whitehead's Idea of 'Envisagement'," *Bulletin of Keiwa College*, No. 10, February 28, 2001, 1-16, esp., 9, 15. n. 10.

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